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Case for Nuclear Test Resumption Argued

PM2410150190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Professor V. Mikhaylov, USSR deputy minister of nuclear power and industry, as part of the "Discussion Sheet No. 69: Society. Party. Perestroyka" feature: "Why Should the Country's Nuclear Test Sites Remain Silent?"]

[Excerpts] **Commenting on Events**

Yet another underground nuclear explosion was carried out at the U.S. test site in Nevada 12 October.

The last few months of this year have seen seven nuclear explosions carried out by the United States, four by France, and two by China.

For about a year now, our country's nuclear test sites have remained silent. An alarming situation. Is such a political risk justified in our time?

The approximate parity of nuclear arsenals prevailing between the Soviet Union and the United States is the basis of contemporary stability in the world and, one could say, of the nature of political and economic relations.

Our country's unilateral nuclear disarmament paves the way to a U.S. monopoly. Of course, we could be called upon to do this beneath the banner of peace in our planet, for the sake of ensuring mankind's vital interests. But any monopoly, and especially a monopoly in a matter like this, is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire world community, with the world's nuclear countries already inhabited by a population of more than 1.7 billion, in other words by one out of every three of our planet's inhabitants. Are we likely to feel comfortable in this nuclear world? Recent history has already recorded one instance when the United States enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons—in 1945-1949. We all recall that time with ache in our hearts. Even at that time, progressive people all over the planet realized the profound abyss the situation entailed and—why make a secret of it—some of them paid with their lives for helping us in the truly titanic work to create [nad sozdaniyem] the world's nuclear shield. The first Soviet atom bomb, developed [razrabotannaya] under I.V. Kurchatov's leadership, was tested at the newly set up Semipalatinsk test site 29 August 1949. In the hard postwar years, our people proved their great intellect and talent to the entire world. That was truly a triumph for our whole people.

Since the emergence of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has been waging a firm struggle to ban them completely, starting in 1946 when our country submitted to the United Nations a proposal for a complete ban on atomic weapons. [passage omitted]

The cessation of all nuclear tests is fundamentally important today in order to prevent the creation of third-generation nuclear weapons or the so-called directed-energy weapons, not to let this evil "jinni" move on from the stage of scientific quest to the stage of full-scale development [razrabotky]. On the one hand, these weapons should produce between 100 and 1,000 times less global radioactive pollution than existing weapons, and on the other hand they should be capable of striking at the opponent's strategic targets both in space and on Earth. This is what causes alarm, because some rather hot heads could be tempted to use them in any local conflict.

In this context, it is a worrying fact that second-generation nuclear weapons could be destroyed—under the strictest international monitoring on the basis of treaty principles—apparently only as the West achieves success in the creation of third-generation weapons. It is very dangerous not to perceive such a course of the development of events. It is the responsible task of all mankind to prevent the creation of third-generation weapons.

Growing numbers of people in the world support the demand for a complete ban on nuclear tests but, on the other hand, there is really serious opposition by the West's nuclear powers. International debates on this question are today pursued more persistently than ever before. The Soviet Union has advocated, and advocates within the framework of the new doctrine of sufficient defense, an immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear tests. And it is not the Soviet Union's fault that nuclear tests continue. [passage omitted]

Does the Soviet Union need two nuclear test sites today? Taking the positive trends in the world into account, I do not think so. The country's Supreme Soviet must have its say on the schedules for nuclear test sites' operations with due consideration for the geographic location and geological structure of test site areas and the population density in adjacent regions, as well as on the rules of compensation for the degree of risk involved in living in these regions and the expropriation of land for the test sites. But the solution of this important question is dragging on, while confusion and muddle drive this problem into a blind alley. I think that, in the first place, it is necessary to halt nuclear weapons tests at the Semipalatinsk test site.

Decisions on the country's annual nuclear programs, including nuclear tests, should be made by a special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions and ratified by the USSR president.

Our test sites have remained silent since October 1989, but the Nevada test site is still functioning. True enough, the intensity of operations has somewhat declined, but it still remains at what I would describe as quite a high level. Looking over the last five years, our test sites have remained silent for virtually half this time. During this

period—between 1986 and 1990—the USSR carried out 43 nuclear weapons tests at nuclear test sites, against 64 tests by the United States in Nevada. Thus, the United States has always been ahead of the USSR in terms of the number of nuclear weapons tests. Even though the main point here is not "competition" b[illegible]rimarily national security interests.

Categorical statements by public figures on radio and television, in the press, from Supreme Soviet rostrums, and at rallies and meetings of informal public organizations about the cessation of nuclear tests in our country create public opinion in favor of the need for further unilateral steps.

There is no doubt that the majority of authors have the most sincere intentions of saving mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. In our country, however, the center of gravity of the struggle for universal nuclear disarmament has shifted over the last few years sharply in favor of its virtually unilateral nuclear disarmament. Could our country allow itself to become hostage of the other nuclear powers' political ambitions? After all, nuclear weapons today—taking all the consequences of their use into account—are primarily weapons of global policy. The voice of professionals is drowned by the chorus of public commentators in a sphere where competence and caution are especially important. In actual fact, the mass media give expert professionals no opportunity to have their say, and outright slander, fabrications, and demagoguery often remain unanswered. As a matter of fact, we still remember the chorus of press statements under the slogan "Who Feeds You, Academician Sakharov?" We feel ashamed to recall this today, and I will be told that it happened in the "stagnation" times. No, history is repeating itself. As a rule, the floor is not given to alternative points of view. The "occupation" of mass media could bring incalculable damage to our country.

In these conditions, the population's unpreparedness to objectively perceive reports about the nature and specific features of radiological and seismological conditions, the lack of information about measures to ensure safety, and the hard social and daily life conditions often result in passions being emotionally whipped around the country's nuclear test sites. It must be noted in this context that, as was shown by the joint monitoring experiment at the Semipalatinsk test site which was attended by a large group of foreign and Soviet press representatives, the safety ensured by Soviet specialists during the conduct of underground nuclear tests is in no way inferior to that in the United States, while the costs of conducting them are 10 times less than in the United States! Realities here are such that the U.S. Department of Energy's expenditure on the nuclear weapons complex is rising by 8-10 percent each year, while the corresponding expenditure in our country is dropping by 15 percent. This is the reality in which our collectives have to work. Incidentally, Soviet journalists did not attend the U.S. explosion under the joint monitoring experiment in Nevada, even though they were invited. In the situation prevailing in our country, it is deemed patriotic and progressive to utter any criticism against the Soviet test sites. As it always happens in such cases, several public figures exploit it to boost their own popularity, often acting as stage managers in the production of mass demonstrations.

Meanwhile, the United States and its NATO allies are continuing to improve their nuclear arsenal. A long-term program for the modernization of facilities associated with the development and production of nuclear weapons is under consideration. New and better forms for the management of this military-industrial complex are being created. The safety, reliability, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons over the next 20 years occupy a special place in the long-term program.

The enhanced safety of nuclear weapons in the event of accident or unauthorized access to them is perceived as one of the main demands as regards the improvement of nuclear weapons, taking into account the presence of radioactive materials like plutonium, uranium, and tritium. Underground nuclear weapons tests today represent the top priority experimental program for research and engineering work on the improvement and creation of new categories of nuclear weapons.

Intensive work is being done in the West to increase the target-hit accuracy of MIRVed warheads [boyevykh blokov s yadernym oruzhiyem razdelyayushchikhsya golovnykh chastey raket], on the creation of weapons with enhanced survivability in conditions of antimissile and antispace defense and of weapons to strike targets deep underground. But these are first-strike weapons! And this is happening at a time when the NATO countries, in contrast with our country, have not pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons!

It must be noted that last September the U.S. Senate consented to the ratification of the 1974 "Threshold" Treaty subject to, first and foremost, guaranteed implementation of effective and permanent programs for underground tests of nuclear weapons, and the retention of modern nuclear laboratories and programs for the constant advancement of nuclear technology.

Could our country's nuclear test sites remain silent in these conditions? Only a universal ban on nuclear weapons tests can prevent a new round of the arms race and put an end to the endless improvement and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are constantly striving to put our own home in order, but things are still not working out smoothly. Many examples of this can be encountered at each step. Our home is not the only one on the planet, we all live in a complex and dynamic world. In the age of nuclear-space technology, this world's space and time are extremely tight for each home.

There are still many regions in the world experiencing unstable political conditions and extremism of political feelings, including some right next to our own borders. Some "third countries" are working intensely on the

creation of nuclear weapons. Thus, the nuclear potential created at a time that was difficult for the country and its constant maintenance at a contemporary scientific and technical level guarantee the stability of peace in our planet and, I would say, also guarantee the success of the new thinking in talks on equal footing on the mutual limitation and cessation of nuclear tests. It is not a question of the number of missiles with nuclear warheads, it is a question of the country's scientific and technical potential which can flexibly respond to other countries' possible achievements in this sphere.

By cutting nuclear arms, we can save an incalculably greater amount of resources to meet the national economy's needs than under a unilateral ban on nuclear tests—the foundation of the country's scientific, technical, and military potential—until such time as a universal nuclear test ban is achieved. To prevent the decomposition of unique collectives of highly skilled professionals is much more difficult that to destroy everything. Now, taking the really complex social and economic situation into account, it would be much simpler to demand unilateral steps by our country. Was it easier for us during the postwar years, when we were creating our nuclear industry? Frankly speaking, lofty civic courage will be needed today—in the face of the situation prevailing around nuclear test sites and tests in our own country—to maintain high standards of responsibility and patriotism and not to succumb to the temptation of short-term benefits for the collectives of workers, engineers, and scientists when solving the questions of maintaining nuclear parity at all stages of disarmament.

The tender shoots of the new thinking, born out of the age of perestroyka, are just about appearing in our planet's world politics. The truly people's structures of soviet power created during the age of perestroyka are capable of competently solving these complex problems. The art of soberly assessing the situation, mutual understanding, and competence must replace the rhetoric, rallies, and gatherings for sake of retaining our Union as a great society.

Our country's nuclear arms complex belongs to the whole people, and it is impossible to divide it into separate bits and pieces, because this would be a disaster for all peoples.

I am convinced that our people will perceive and overcome the difficulties at the present stage. In conclusion, to paraphrase the famous call, I would like to say: "Dear compatriots, be vigilant!"

Ladygin Interviewed on Conventional Arms

PM2410152590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General F. Ladygin, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA military observer M. Ponomarev place and date not given: "In the Interests of Security"]

[Text] [Ponomarev] As we agreed, the subject of today's conversation, Fedor Ivanovich, will be the completion of the preparations for the treaty on conventional arms cuts in Europe. USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's recent report at the USSR Supreme Soviet sitting, statements issued by statesmen from a number of countries, and Western and Soviet mass media comment on the results of recent meetings between the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments in New York have pointed out that it has proved possible to remove virtually all the obstacles standing in the way of the signing of this treaty. Thus, should we hope that the treaty will nonetheless be ready by 19 November when the meeting of CSCE leaders opens in Paris?

[Ladygin] The date on which the CSCE leaders' meeting opens can, I think, be regarded as a kind of catalyst activating the work of drafting this treaty and stepping up the quest for solutions to unresolved questions. After all, there were until quite recently still a considerable number of serious fundamental problems preventing the completion of the work on the treaty.

It has not, for instance, proved in any way possible at the Vienna talks to resolve the problem of the level of sufficiency of arms for one country and, consequently, the question of the distribution of national levels of arms. There were major differences of approach on aviation, particularly naval aviation, the problem of the so-called "regional split" [regionalnoye deleniye], and also on questions of inspections in the interests of monitoring compliance with the treaty and the conversion of the armored equipment to be cut back for use in the national economy. These and certain other questions were the focus of attention at the New York talks between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. Bilateral accords have been secured on them. However, this does not mean that the treaty is already ready for signing. There is still a considerable amount of work to be done, not only on technical formulation, moreover. But the participants in the talks

are now proceeding from the premise that the requisite work will be completed in time.

[Ponomarev] Are you saying, Fedor Ivanovich, that there was a problem with this, but that it has now been removed? The readers are by no means uninterested in the practicalities. You realize that it is not a matter of inquisitiveness, but to do with the fact that it is a question of extremely serious matters concerning the foundations of our security. The Soviet press has carried very few specific figures, although it is said that the Americans made them public right away. Admittedly, the foreign minister's report at the USSR Supreme Soviet session did cite many of the figures. But the full text of the report has not been published.

[Ladygin] As for why the full text of E.A. Shevardnadze's report has not been published, that is not my province, that is rather a matter for you journalists. But I see no reason to hide anything. Especially since we're talking about figures on which an accord has already been secured. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers and all Soviet people are fully entitled to know everything so that they can judge everything in an aware manner. That is why I am prepared to divulge the relevant data.

[Ponomarev] That will be very nice. But you know that some people are voicing misgivings saying that during the talks in New York it was a one-way game, so to speak. They say: is the reason why we have to make do with such paltry information not that we were the ones to make the fundamental concessions in all areas, while the Americans have kept their positions inviolate? A number of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, including servicemen, have also voiced misgivings of this kind in their speeches.

[Ponomarev] Excuse me, but the concept of a "one-way game" is hardly applicable to the practical work of talks, especially those directly relating to questions of the country's security. Talks constitute a complex, difficult process of seeking compromises. The main thing is not who makes more or fewer concessions, but to ensure that concessions do not overstep the limit marking the minimum requirements for defense. During the initial stages of the New York talks I was charged with representing the General Staff as a military expert. I can say quite definitely that it was not only the Soviets but also the Americans who made concessions there.

Let us look at the facts. It is well known that the participants in the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe agreed long ago to the idea that the collective ceilings for each group of states—Warsaw Pact and NATO—in respect of the arms liable to cuts cannot exceed 20,000 and 30,000 for tanks and armored combat vehicles. Ceilings have also been agreed for artillery (20,000) and helicopters (2,000).

But that is for a group of states. What is the maximum level of arms that one country can have? And, in particular, the USSR? It has not proved possible to resolve this question in Vienna.

The Soviet Union's position was to ensure that our country's level of sufficiency was set at 40 percent of the total quantity of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and helicopters in the possession of the 22 countries involved in the Vienna talks remaining in Europe. It is important to stress that we regarded this level as the right to have a corresponding quantity of arms. We would, in effect, in accordance with this position have fewer arms for individual categories, for instance 14,000 tanks, that is, 35 percent. NATO countries, notably the United States, pressed for the USSR's level of sufficiency not to exceed 30 percent while some Warsaw Pact countries insisted on 33 percent on average (plus or minus two percent).

It did prove possible to unravel this knot in New York. It was stipulated that the USSR would receive the right to have 13,300 tanks (33.3 percent), 20,000 armored vehicles (33.3 percent), 13,700 artillery systems (34.3 percent), and 1,500 combat strike helicopters (37.5 percent). The agreed upper limit for frontal tactical aviation combat aircraft, air defense fighter interceptors, and combat trainer aircraft is 5,150 for a single country, which in percentage terms is roughly 37 percent of a collective level of combat aircraft for each single alliance of 7,000. Admittedly, I would stipulate that this figure has not as yet been definitively agreed. But it is important that both sides have abandoned their initial values for levels of sufficiency of 40 and 30 percent, and it is now roughly 35 percent on average plus or minus two percent.

Let me say a brief word about how certain other problems were resolved. With regard to ground-launched naval aviation. The essence of the disagreements in principle resides in the fact that we do not regard this kind of aircraft as a subject of the Vienna talks (they should be discussed at separate talks on naval problems), whereas the United States and other NATO countries insisted on including ground-launched naval aviation in the overall number of aircraft liable to cuts. In New York the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state agreed to solve this problem by means of a politically binding statement outside the framework of the treaty. By this statement the Soviet Union is to pledge, in particular, not to have more than 200 Tu-22M aircraft within its naval aviation. There is already a precedent for this approach. This was the way it was decided to act at the Vienna strategic offensive arms talks with regard to sea-launched cruise missiles.

As a preliminary basis the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments reached agreement on the problem of the regional split, which boils down to establishing a balance of forces not only for the whole European continent but also for its individual subregions—at the center and on the flanks. I must say that this problem, which is difficult per se, is complicated for us by the need to resolve new tasks involved in siting the troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe.

Lastly, an agreement was reached in New York on a mutually acceptable basis on questions of verification of compliance with the future treaty—what will be the subject of the inspections and the number of inspections accorded a particular state.

[Ponomarev] Everything that you have said, Fedor Ivanovich, dispels doubts to a certain extent. But I would like to draw your attention to an article in THE WASHINGTON POST regarding the progress of the talks on conventional armed forces. It said, in particular, that "it would be stupid" to postpone the meeting of CSCE leaders at which the treaty is to be signed "because some minor nut or bolt doesn't fit." But we are not, after all, talking about "nuts and bolts" but about the material means of ensuring international security. Aren't the direct "negotiators" as they are called beginning to treat tanks and aircraft like "lumps of iron" of no great significance? Aren't there disagreements on these issues between Foreign Ministry representatives and the military members of our delegation?

[Ladygin] As for "nuts and bolts," we will leave that to the conscience of THE WASHINGTON POST. As you have said, our "negotiators," regardless of their departmental affiliation, treat the business with which they have been entrusted in a responsible manner, guided by general state interests. But there are, of course, disagreements between Foreign Ministry representatives and the military members of our delegation on some specific issues. (Let me note in parentheses that the Americans tried during the New York talks both at the talks themselves and via the mass media to set Soviet military and diplomats against one another). Both the USSR Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry bear equal responsibility to the Soviet people for elaborating disarmament treaties that will result in arms cuts, reduce the burden of military spending, and at the same time not be detrimental to the country's defense and security. But it must be stressed here that the Defense Ministry bears direct responsibility for ensuring the state's reliable defense capability and is therefore guided not so much by transitory considerations based on the prevailing international situation as by potential unpredictable changes in this situation in the long term. What is more, it is primarily the Defense Ministry that has to fulfill the conditions of disarmament treaties with all their attendant political, economic, social, and, indeed, military and organizational-technical consequences.

In this connection, I think that the accords elaborated in New York on individual issues—and they did not of course concern minor "nuts and bolts—could have been somewhat different. Take, for instance, the problem of the regional split. The accord on this question does not fully take into consideration an important new factor like the Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe, particularly the Western Group of Forces, and their deployment within our national territory.

To be frank, the United States tried to exert pressure on the Soviet side: "If there is no treaty, we will not go to Paris." (Other participants in the Vienna talks also resort to this sometimes). Yet they need the treaty and the Paris "summit" as much as we do. Incidentally, an understanding of this was reflected in the reaction of a number of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the discussion of E.A. Shevardnadze's report on current international life and the USSR Foreign Ministry's work to safeguard the country's interests and security. This security is, certainly, attained by political means. But not political means alone. The preconditions have by no means been created for military means of ensuring security to be consigned to the archives. Contemporary conditions—and for the foreseeable future—do not demand that political means be pitted against military means (the following words have become popular: "Fewer weapons means greater stability") but an optimum combination of the two.

I think that it is appropriate in this connection to say that our American negotiating partners—even under the conditions of the arms cuts and their planned reduction of the numerical strength of their Armed Forces over the next five years by roughly one-fourth—plan to have the kind of military potential to safeguard U.S. interests on a global scale.

[Ponomarev] There have been reports that major progress was made in New York on the problems that are holding up the work on a strategic offensive arms treaty. This is obviously another matter. I would, however, like your consent to return to it, Fedor Ivanovich.

[Ladygin] Yes, progress was also made on strategic offensive arms. I think that we will talk about this again specially.

Zholkver on 'Beneficial Conditions' for Disarmament

LD2310215890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Commentary by political analyst Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Following the UN and the World Peace Council appeal, the action week for disarmament has been marked for several years now and, it seems, has became a routine and rather ineffective measure. However, I think that this time new, rather more beneficial conditions for solving disarmament problems have been created.

First of all, I refer to the principal changes in Soviet-U.S. relations. As was noted during our president's recent meeting with the U.S. defense secretary, the realization that war between the USSR and the United States is impossible has already moved from the area of philosophical speculation into the sphere of practical action. Indeed, the U.S. and Soviet medium- and long-range missiles are being destroyed and an agreement to reduce the strategic offensive weapons of the two largest nuclear powers by half is in the works. Our chief of general staff

is visiting the secret underground U.S. air defense center and the Pentagon chief is acquainting himself with the aircraft factory producing our MIG's. U.S. chemical weapons and 40,000 U.S. soldiers are being withdrawn from West Germany and our troops are getting ready to leave East Germany. Besides, the issue does not rest with a reduction only in the Soviet and U.S. military potential. Even France, which perhaps was the most jealous of the nuclear triad, is now talking about two of its three components probably being wound up in the near future.

The general agreement on a substantial reduction of conventional NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons in Europe is being prepared for next month and these organizations themselves are transforming more and more into political unions.

But, of course, we shall not become euphoric. Mountains of weapons have been accumulated in the world, not least with our most active participation. And, God forbid, they might start talking loudly in the Persian Gulf. And even if our testing grounds have been silent for a year already unfortunately nuclear explosions in Nevada have not ceased.

So, there are still enormous and sufficiently difficult tasks which present themselves before disarmament. But there are factors which facilitate their solution. The present acute debates in Washington on the problems of the U.S. budget deficit show that the arms race is beyond the means even of the richest countries such as the United States.

3-4 November Warsaw Pact Meeting Postponed

USSR Requests Postponement

LD2410172890 Moscow TASS in English 1720 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest October 24 TASS—A meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee, that was to be held between November 3-4 in Budapest, has been postponed at the Soviet Union's request, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky told a news conference here today.

It is most probable that the committee will meet after the Paris all-European summit ends in November, he said.

Shevardnadze on Reason

LD2410222390 Prague CTK in English 2043 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow Oct 24 (CTK correspondent)—There were no special reasons for postponing the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting but the Soviet Union believed it would be more convenient to hold it after the Paris meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told CTK today.

He said that "it would be easier to adopt any decisions after the Paris meeting". He added that the CSCE meeting would be of "fundamental significance both to the Warsaw Pact and NATO".

Shevardnadze said that after the meeting many matters concerning the Warsaw Pact would be clearer. It is increasingly evident that questions of economic cooperation are the most complicated issue in relations between the USSR and Warsaw Pact member states, and it is necessary to discuss them at the top level, Shevardnadze said.

At a meeting with participants in the seminar on the prospects of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, which started in Moscow today, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that a fundamental change in the two countries' relations is necessary, in the economy in particular. He submitted several proposals in this respect, mainly drafting and signing of a new framework agreement between the two states which would be followed by conclusion of specialized agreements for individual spheres of cooperation.

He proposed to set up a joint commission composed of experts in various spheres and independent of the governments to seek a way out of the present state which he described as a state of crisis.

Shevardnadze stressed that the seminar is the first important bilateral debate held since last year's revolutionary events in Eastern Europe.

Solton Views Postponement

LD2410223990 Moscow World Service in English 1810 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Next month the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries are to hold a meeting within the framework of their Political Consultative Committee. Initially the meeting was to be held in Budapest on 3 and 4 November but at the Soviet Union's request it was postponed. Now it is scheduled to take place in late November after the European summit is held in Paris on 19-21 November.

The postponement on the Warsaw Pact summit has generated many speculations, such as doubts as to whether the pact will continue to exist or not and in what shape. Yuriy Solton writes the following in comment:

After German unification five East European countries remained in the Warsaw Pact, apart from the Soviet Union—that is, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact, created as a counterbalance to NATO, the Warsaw Pact is rapidly transforming itself. At the Political Consultative Committee meeting in Moscow last summer it was decided to fundamentally alter the nature, functions, and activity of the Warsaw Pact. A special commission was set up to draft a corresponding document whose essence can be judged by the recent statement of the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitriy Yazov. We are coming to the conclusion, he told reporters, that the Warsaw Pact's military organization is no longer needed. Other Warsaw Pact members share this view.

It is noteworthy that change, I would even say the dismantling of military structures, are already taking place. Soviet troops are leaving Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Soon talks will begin on withdrawing them from Poland. As for the biggest military contingent, stationed in former East Germany, it will be withdrawn by the end of 1994. Nevertheless I don't thing that all this signifies the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, even though such speculations have been voiced.

The Warsaw Pact, of course, will never exist in the shape we are used to, but it will remain as a purely political and consultative organization in which the main role will be played by bilateral political, and probably military, agreements. As for the postponement of the upcoming Warsaw Pact summit, it is quite explainable. Events that will have a considerable impact on the efforts to create a new structure of European security are likely to take place in the near future. The Soviet Union is to sign treaties with France and Germany. In my view, the upcoming European summit will endorse an agreement on cuts in conventional forces in Europe. It will also consider a declaration on the new principles of relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The declaration will proclaim that its signatories will refrain from using force or the threat to use force.

It will naturally be better to discuss the changing situation in Europe and determine the place and the role of the Warsaw Pact in it more concretely and effectively at a meeting held after the expected events and not before them.

Analyst Urges Expanded Role for United Nations

LD2510090990 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS political analyst Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—The charter of the United Nations came into force 45 years ago, on October 24, 1945. Since then this date has been annually observed as United Nations Day. The role of the United nations is growing appreciably now that a new historical era has succeeded the Cold War. This change was stimulated by the policy of the new thinking and perestroika in the USSR.

The new thinking that originated in our country was in keeping with U.N. ideals set forth in its charter. The Soviet balance of interests concept is an offshoot of this new political thinking. It recognises every nation's right to freely choose its own sociopolitical system. This is why it is important today to consolidate the organisation's role as an instrument for jointly finding a balance of sometimes contradictory national interests and to transform the United Nations into a genuine centre for concerted international actions conforming to its charter.

Of course, there could be no balance of interests in a world divided into military-political blocs, busily building up their armed forces. The East stressed the "aggressive essence" of imperialism, while the West countered by accusing communism of the same sin. Vehement polemics between ideologically irreconcilable opponents dominated the United Nations.

However, the passions within this organisation cannot be explained merely by East-West confrontation, socialism and capitalism, the wealthy North and the poor South, religious or ethnic conflicts. The United Nations reflected the struggle between democracy and advocates of universal values, on the one hand, and totalitarianism and nationalism, on the other. Confrontation within the United Nations began to diminish as these contradictions became less acute. The norms and principles laid down by the United Nations charter rose to the surface again.

The spirit of confrontation was defeated mainly by dialogue between the USSR and the United States, which progressed from mutual understanding to interaction. This is borne out by the joint Soviet-American initiative at the 44th and 45th sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. They paved the way to multilateral partnership in the United Nations, which has found ample reflection in the Gulf crisis. This interaction strengthens the United Nations, enhancing its prestige [words indistinct] international arena.

The importance of the United Nations Charter lies in the fact that it envisages instruments to ensure the coexistence of states and to strengthen faith in basic human rights, in personal dignity and value. They began to operate efficiently in the current post-confrontational period. This is why the hopes for the world's peaceful, democratic transformation and the settlement of regional and other conflicts which, as shown by the Gulf crisis, can still break out in some regions, are pinned on the United Nations today.

Official Speaks at UN on Personnel Issues

LD2510052390 Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations October 24 TASS—"We support the opinion that the UN policy in managing human resources should be aimed at turning the international civil service into a standard of high competence and professionalism, a sample of the efficient functioning of executive staff," said Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Nikiforov here today.

He spoke on the agenda item "Personnel Questions" at the Fifth Committee (administrative and budgetary issues) of the 45th UN General Assembly.

Improvement in the functioning of UN executive staff has become a component of new political thinking.

"Our country has made its contribution to this process by abandoning outdated approaches to personnel participation in the work of international organisations," Nikiforov said.

"Sharing concern of the UN Secretariat leadership over the need to ensure continuity and have a permanent core of skilled staff members, we made adjustments to the practice of sending Soviet specialists to the United Nations.

"They now work at the Secretariat as long as necessary for the organisation. They sometimes sign even permanent contracts with the Secretariat. This process continues," Nikiforov stressed.

United States & Canada

Bush Approves Expanding U.S. Counterintelligence

LD2410215990 Moscow TASS in English 2129 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash]

[Text] Washington October 25 TASS—President George Bush signed National Security Directive 147 early in October, providing for the expansion of counterintelligence activities of U.S. secret services.

The WASHINGTON TIMES newspaper reports today that the document directs the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Defence, State and Justice Departments and other security components "to continue rebuilding U.S. counterintelligence programmes," a process that began during the Reagan administration.

The directive notes that the expansion of counterintelligence operations is taken at a government level, "despite the vast improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations" and sweeping changes in Eastern Europe.

According to the newspaper, a senior administration official alleged that "the Soviet Union remains a formidable intelligence threat and is expected to remain that way for years to come."

The WASHINGTON TIMES writes that the secret directive was based on a year-long inter-agency review of "U.S. security threats and vulnerabilities."

Sitaryan Meets With Canadian Trade Minister

LD2510051890 Moscow TASS in English 1543 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan, who chairs the cabinet's Foreign Economic Commission, today met John Crosbie, Canadian minister for international trade.

Sitaryan briefed Crosbie, at the latter's request, upon "Guidelines for stabilising the Soviet economy and introducing a market system" and their effects on Soviet foreign economic activities.

Sitaryan and Crosbie also discussed the state of Soviet-Canadian relations in trade and new forms of cooperation and prospects for developing contacts in these fields.

China

Chinese, Vietnamese Officials' Meeting Viewed

OW2510082190 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Commentary by station observer Mikhaylov from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] In early September, there were press reports that Nguyen Van Linh, veteran Vietnamese Communist Party leader Pham Van Dong, and government leader Do Muoi visited China and met with Jiang Zemin. At that time, however, neither Beijing nor Hanoi commented on this. Last Saturday the Vietnamese foreign minister, who was attending the UN General Assembly session, officially confirmed that the leaders of the two countries had held talks on normalizing relations between the two countries, adding that high-level delegations would be dispatched to visit each other in the future. In addition, he said that he hoped to visit Beijing.

Without doubt, the improvement of relations between the two countries will be of great signficance. In the past, the long strained relations between the two countries were a primary factor contributing to instability in the region. Not until the last couple of years did the situation become normal along the border of the two countries and was their border trade enlivened. Following Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem's visit to China early last year, the two countries resumed diplomatic contacts. Both have said on many occasions that they would try to normalize their relations. Each time, Beijing has reiterated the need for a fair and comprehensive solution to the Cambodian issue as a precondition. Recently the two sides have held consultations, but still failed to remove the differences on this issue. Vietnam has made every effort to obstruct the resumption of power by the Pol Pot elements, who slaughted millions upon millions of their compatriots in the late 1970's. On the other hand, the Chinese side has held that, if the issue is to be solved, none of the parties should be excluded, and the parties it referred to include the Khmer Rouge. Recently, however, China has announced that it is willing to stop its military aid to the Khmer Rouge, while Vietnam has agreed with the proposal made by the five permanment members of the UN Security Council. Here, one thing is quite clear: Both sides are becoming increasingly realistic in fulfilling their hope of improving relations.

EC's Renewed Ties With China Welcomed

OW2510085090 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Mikhaylov commentary from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] At their Luxembourg meeting, the foreign ministers of the 12 European Community countries decided to lift the sanctions imposed on China last June because of the Tiananmen incident. Our station observer Mikhaylov has the following comments:

The sanctions imposed more than a year ago included restrictions on high-level political contacts and economic, scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges with China. Similar measures were taken by other countries, including the United States and Japan. The decision made by the European Community to resume contacts with China may be viewed as its recognition of

the fact that its attempt to exert pressure on Beijing and any action to isolate China have brought no benefit to itself, and that the reduction of Western investment and supply could only hamper China's implementation of the reform and open policy.

The decision adopted at the Luxembourg meeting was probably based on the consideration that the situation is now stable in China, that the martial law formerly imposed on Beijing and Tibet has been lifted, and scores of detained participants in last year's incident have been released.

It should be pointed out emphatically that despite the series of sanction measures, the Western countries have not cut off the channels for dialogues with Beijing. Last year there were quite a number of examples showing that China still is an influential member of the big world family. Isolating it politically can only inflict losses on today's rapidly changing world, including Asia. For instance, were China excluded from the process of political solution to the Cambodia issue, would it still be possible to talk about the progress in settling this issue? As for measures to isolate China, actually such isolation has not been realized. Many countries that previously announced sanctions against China have now resumed their economic contacts with China step by step. In this regard, the biggest step was taken by Japan, which decided to provide China with the large sum of loan—$5.6 billion—that had been frozen last year. Meanwhile, U.S. President Bush announced the extension of the most-favored-nation status granted to China.

In my opinion, the resumption of political, economic, and cultural ties with Beijing by the European Community is in the interest of West European countries as well as China.

Northeast Asia

Correspondent Defends Soviet Role in Mongolia

OW2110120890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 20 Oct 90

[Report by correspondent (Korolev) in Ulaanbaatar; from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] According to traditions, Mongolia launches activities marking Mongolian-Soviet friendship every October. However, the situation this year is different. In these days, no placards eulogizing Mongolian-Soviet friendship can be seen in Ulaanbaatar. This is not coincidental. Today's Mongolia is facing numerous difficulties caused by domestic reform. We have evidence to say they are caused by the crisis of Mongolia's foreign debts. Some people have different ideas on this question. They attempt to blame the Soviet Union for Mongolia's economic difficulties. Some people raved that Mongolia is not the Soviet Union's debtor and that the Soviet Union caused economic and national cultural losses to Mongolia. However, facts have refuted such remarks. Can we compare today's Ulaanbaatar with its original features? Can we ignore more than 1,000 industrial, agricultural, and other projects completed in Mongolia with Soviet assistance. It will not do to simply write off everything the Soviet Union has done for Mongolia.

When I hear those blaming the Soviet Union, I cannot help but think of what is mentioned above.

Falin Confers With Mongolian Official 22 Oct

PM2410190390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A meeting was held 22 October between V.M. Falin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and T. Oold, member of the Presidium and secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. Topical questions concerning the parties' activity in conditions where new democratic structures are being formed were discussed.

Korea's Hyundai Group Founder Interviewed

SK2110002390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 18 Oct 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Hyundai, which was founded by Mr. Chong Chu-yong with a small automobile repair shop toward the end of the 1940's, has now turned into a gigantic industrial group. The Hyundai Group has come to have tens of leading firms and plants, including a huge, world-reknowned shipyard. In an interview with a reporter of EKHO PLANETY, a Soviet magazine whose name means the echo of the earth, Chong Chu-yong, honorary chairman of the Hyundai Group, said:

The main point of our agreement with the central economic organization, (Yakutsiana to Moskva), is the development of natural resources, such as gas and coal, in the Yakutskaya Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. I intend to install a gas pipeline first from Sakhalin to the ROK through Komsomoisk na Amure and then to the ROK through Yakutskaya. No doubt there will be considerable difficulty in realizing this project, for the gas pipeline will have to pass through the North Korean area. We must get the approval of North Korea. I think that we will be able to have North Korea participate in this project. For the ROK participation in this project, the Soviet side will compensate the ROK with natural gas. Besides this project of supplying gas through the pipeline, we discussed the method of mining the huge coal deposits in Yakutsk, and I think that most of the coal in that area will be exported to the countries in then Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, I am also looking into the possibility of other projects for cooperation, such as setting up a pulp paper manufacturing plant and a personal computer

manufacturing plant in the Maritime Territory [yonhaeju]. Hyundai is prepared to invest $4-5 billion in the development of natural resources and the production of industrial goods in the Soviet Union as a whole. Although there is some difference of opinion between Soviet President Gorbachev and Yeltsin, chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], they fundamentally share the same position toward the introduction of a market economy, and I am optimistic that their joint efforts will produce good results.

Chairman Chong also said that as for this issue, the positions of the officials of the Soviet Union and the RSFSR whom he had met were roughly the same.

He continued: In the ROK, the meeting between Soviet President Gorbachev and ROK President No Tae-u in San Francisco last June is regarded as a very significant event. The ROK people think that there will be few obstacles to cooperation between the ROK and the Soviet Union.

KAL Compensates Japanese 1983 Crash Victims

LD2410165190 Moscow TASS in English 1623 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo October 24 TASS—The Korean Airlines company of South Korea agreed to pay compensation to relatives of seven Japanese citizens who were among the 269 passengers who were killed when the company's plane intruded Soviet airspace and was downed by Soviet fighters in the Far East on September 1, 1983.

Local press reports that an appropriate understanding was reached with the mediation of Japanese judiciary bodies on Monday [22 October].

The 16 relatives of the Seven decreased Japanese instituted proceedings against Korean Airlines at the Tokyo district court in December 1984, demanding compensation totalling over 900 million yen.

The lawsuit filed by the relatives indicated that the South Korean Boeing-747 strayed form its course, intruding Soviet air space. The airliner was in Soviet air space for a long time, either due to deliberate actions by the airliner's crew or due to glaring negligence.

The air company administration has never been able to explain the accident. However, Yasumata Taguchi, a representative of the plaintiffs, told reporters that the size of the compensation (it is secret and, according to the YOMIURI newspaper, totals some 700 million yen) gives grounds to believe that Korean Airlines admitted, thereby, its "serious mistakes".

In August 1989, the jury of the federal district court in Washington found the South Korean air company guilty of deliberate illegal behaviour, which resulted in the Boeing intruding Soviet air space by nearly 500 kilometers.

The jury forced the company to pay $50 million to the families of the deceased.

This is the first case when families of Japanese who died in the Boeing accident have received compensation from the South Korean airline. Relatives of 20 other Japanese who died in the tragedy, are also demanding compensation through courts in Japan and the United States.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Vietnam's Debt, Future Payment Discussed

91UF0067A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by special correspondent A. Kabannikov: "Freebies"]

[Text] Hanoi—**Vietnam is prepared to pay its debts. Are we ready to accept this payment?**

There are courses in the Vietnamese language at a Hanoi institute. "Three dollars an hour," a youngish professor tells me in good Russian. "Excuse me," I say, "judging from everything, it would seem that you received your education in the USSR. Did they charge you $3 a lesson there? And this building, which was constructed with our help—was that also paid for in dollars?" "Well, so what"—he was unabashed—"is it not time to put our relations on a normal basis? Why should we teach you free of charge when everyone else pays?" There was nothing I could say: He was 100 percent correct.

Well, let us figure this out. By the new year the overall sum of Vietnam's indebtedness to our country will reach a round figure—10 billion rubles [R]. Probably someone will immediately think about how big a piece this has taken from an already meager pie. But these lines are by no means being written to pour oil on the fire of the currently popular discussion of our debtors.

How was the Vietnamese debt formed? For purposes of clarity, here is a breakdown for this five-year plan. The overall amount of our aid to Vietnam was R8.7 billion. Of this amount, R150 million was nonreimbursable aid. The "freebie" is the invariable debt behind the image of the great power magnanimously sharing part of its wealth and prosperity with its younger brother. This kind of charity is a holy thing if the households are all prosperous and healthy. But I am afraid that a discussion of how we are building palaces, hospitals, and universities in another country free of charge will not bring tears of emotion to the eyes of many of our present-day readers. Incidentally, the "freebies" do not account for even two percent of our accounts with Vietnam.

About R2 billion are set aside for aid in carrying out large industrial projects. This includes equipment, construction materials, and wages for thousands of our specialists. At one time we were establishing entire branches in Vietnam. For example, the rapid upsurge of agriculture, which turned that country into a world-class exporter of rice in two years, was possible largely because

of the Hoa Binh hydroelectric power plant and the Pha Lai thermoelectric power plant which were constructed with our aid. The country is provided with electric energy and there are no longer any problems with providing water or draining the paddies. Here we, as it were, "hit the nail on the head," and both the Vietnamese and our specialists agree on this.

But then there is the construction combine in Hanoi. So far I have not seen a single gantry crane in the capital. It is a fact that large-block construction costs three times as much here as the construction of buildings by the traditional method does—from local brick, by hand, and with the help of the bamboo forests. It turned out that the products of the plant for reinforced concrete sleepers were not needed. The diesel engine plant which was started up just last year is not loaded to capacity. The ship repair plant is idle....

All this is familiar. Here we can understand what it really means when we say that our economic bureaucrat is an internationalist. In the sense that it makes no difference to him where the money goes—to the Caspian lowlands or the Cuu Long plain. Even though we hardly have enough of these things for ourselves. They were granted to Vietnam on credit and entered into their book of debts.

Formally, everything is in order: The necessary amount of time will pass and we will receive our money back, and with interest. But let us glance at the last section of the document concerning five-year credit, which will clarify the situation somewhat. We have earmarked R2.2 billion for refinancing. What does this mean? This has to do with when the time comes for the debtor to repay the credit of the preceding five-year period and he cannot or will not do this. He is told magnanimously that they will not write off his debts but they will give him more credit to pay off the debts themselves. But no longer for the ridiculous two percent interest but for a "crushing" four percent. That is, so far we are paying off debts to ourselves out of our own pocket.

At one time the state paid billions for products which did not end up on the domestic market but went to distant Indochina. Inflation has accelerated and the budget deficit has grown, but the time to pay has finally come. And here it is suggested that the gap in the budget be closed... with another promissory note. Friendship on the installment plan.

Of course, it is impossible to explain the logic of what has happened by economic categories alone. The one claiming hegemony has paid for his ambitions. The payment has been multiplied by the vainglorious generosity of certain leaders and the disorderliness of the departments. Vietnam, incidentally, managed to conduct its trade with the West with a gain for itself last year, thus augmenting its hard currency reserves. But that is pure business. As for us, here is the story I was told here: The Vietnamese have repeatedly suggested that we deliver cement or rolled metal directly to them in payment for the labor of their workers in the USSR. But the Vietnamese workers are employed by the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. And the suppliers are the MBES [International Bank for Economic Cooperation]. And even with all of our shortages, it was more convenient for the latter to squeeze more credit out of the government and, without a care, to deliver more goods for another promise to pay for them at some unspecified time. How long can this go on?

The generous donor, who even yesterday was trying to keep his spirits up, alas, now has one foot in the grave himself.... But even Vietnam is aware of the inevitability of changes. It states that it recognizes its multibillion ruble debt and is prepared to negotiate about paying it.

It would be unfair to say that Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation is nothing but a one-way street. All we have to do is look at the assortment of Vietnamese deliveries: rubber, petroleum, rice, tea. If we were to purchase these goods in any other country, they would all require hard currency. Vietnam is one of the few countries with which we trade as an industrial state. The proportion of machinebuilding products there reaches 30 percent. In exchange for our generally noncompetitive technology, which Vietnam is still glad to get (thanks to the U.S. blockade), we receive, for example, coffee, which costs us R1.5 per kilogram here. It turns out that normal trade with this country is unusually effective for us. And the markdowns involved with the forthcoming changeover to accounts in hard currency promise us an additional advantage.

At the same time, in recent years Vietnam has not been at all satisfied with the role of passive consumer in our economic relations. The upswing that country's economy is now experiencing has also been reflected in the dynamics of reciprocal deliveries. While at the beginning of the five-year plan for R4 worth of our goods we received only R1 worth of Vietnamese goods, this year in exchange for R1.2 billion worth from our side the Vietnamese are to deliver R750 million worth of their products. And we will not meet our commitments (this is already clear). Vietnam will more than meet its commitments.

In a word, we are faced with preconditions whereby, without destroying anything completely, we can announce that the stage in our relations governed by the principle of "donor-recipient" has passed and we can arrange further relations on the basis of realities, common sense, and the laws of business.

Principles are being formulated for such relations. Our economic experts are expressing them in various forms. In the first place, it is clear that under current conditions there is no possibility of nonreimbursable aid. And it seems to me that the Vietnamese, who are well aware of our crisis, can understand this quite well. In the second place, all reciprocal deliveries should be strictly balanced. The situation on the domestic market is such that today we cannot take goods away from it in exchange for promises of future benefits. Things can only be fifty-fifty.

Furthermore, our technical assistance can be given only for those objects that are to be completed in the near future. Neither here nor abroad is it permissible for us to get involved in more large-scale construction with the payoff to come years later. And, finally, it is time to put an end to refinancing. It is time to pay the bills. Ten-year payment limits are being imposed. Although this seems unrealistic to many people. They are talking about paying the first 850 million as early as next year. This sum has not yet been agreed upon. But such figures are being mentioned, and this means that we have reached the time for paying off debts.

This is the perfect time to clarify one more issue which seems simple at first glance: To whom should the Vietnam debt actually be paid? It would seem to be clear: the state. But more specifically? Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the Ministry of Finance, the International Bank for Economic Cooperation? It turns out that in reality it is none of these. In countries with normal economies there is a policy which was established long ago. The decision to grant credit is made by the legislature. Then the specific department borrows the money from the bank and gives it to the other country, thus dividing the responsibility for its repayment. Our departments have created such an elaborate system of granting credit and have learned to arm themselves with such resolutions from the "higher-ups" that they themselves have not born the slightest bit of material responsibility.

They would perhaps take on this burden if Vietnam were paying in gold and hard currency. But in this case the repayment of debts is another layer of the complicated work where both business abilities and nonstandard thinking are necessary. One of the obvious paths is completely in keeping with the changes taking place in our country. It is necessary to take Vietnam's state debt out of the state system. It should be sold to banks, enterprises, and cooperatives—anyone who will take it. On credit or with an auction. For as much as they will give for it.

Buyers will probably be found. Today's Vietnam is becoming attractive to businessmen. Each year the country will be increasingly integrated into the family of progressive Asian states. And anyone who wants to get established there now will have an excellent point of departure for entering the Asian market in the future. Even today Vietnam has established the most favorable conditions for foreign investments in Southeast Asia. And is it not tempting for us, for example, to think about creating joint enterprises here, using the local work force and the technology of a third partner who is nearby, say, in Hong Kong? Having direct ties between the enterprises and the firms is the new strategy and the future of our economic relations. The sale of the debt would fit right in with this and would give a significant boost to the development of these ties.

As for the state, it does not stand to lose anything. Its budget will almost immediately receive at least some additional revenue from the promissory notes that have turned yellow with age. The rest, of course, will be turned over to those who should have been handling this from the very beginning—people who are able to keep track of money. It would seem that this is the only way today we have a chance to move on from rhetoric and fussing over the problem of debts to actually doing something about it.

Near East & South Asia

Primakov Visits Cairo To Discuss Gulf Crisis

Arrives 24 Oct

LD2410161490 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Cairo October 24 TASS—The Soviet president's special envoy and member of the USSR Presidential Council Yevgeniy Primakov arrived in Cairo today.

This is one of the stages of his mission to consult leaders of several countries on the Gulf crisis. He is expected to meet President Husni Mubarak and other Egyptian statesmen.

Sees Options for Settlement

AU2410143590 Paris AFP in English 1127 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Cairo, Oct 24 (AFP)—Soviet envoy Yevgeni Primakov Wednesday said there are still options for a negotiated settlement in the Gulf that have yet to be explored.

Mr. Primakov, an advisor to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, arrived here Wednesday as part of a tour that has already taken him to Baghdad, Muscat, Rome, Paris amd Washington.

"All the approaches to a peaceful settlement (of the Gulf crisis) have not been tried," he said on arrival.

His efforts to date, he added, have yielded "positive results," but he did not elaborate.

Mr. Primakov was Thursday expected to meet President Husni Mubarak, who is currently on a tour of the Gulf.

Both Egypt and the Soviet Union have condemned Iraq's August 2 invasion of Kuwait.

Military Answer Called 'Catastrophic'

LD2510112490 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Text] In Cairo, Soviet presidential envoy Yevgeniy Primakov, who is again touring the Middle East in a search for ways to settle the Gulf crisis, has held talks with the Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's adviser Usamah al-baz.

The Soviet envoy said nonviolent means must be found to settle the situation under present circumstances. He emphasized that a military solution would be catastrophic.

Commentaries Review, Assess Gulf Crisis

Situation in Baghdad Examined

PM2410104590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by political observer Eduard Volodin: "Arab Knot; Subjective Impressions and Thoughts of Our Political Observer Eduard Volodin, Who Has Just Returned from Baghdad"]

[Excerpts] Baghdad-al-Basrah-Moscow—We five representatives of Russian public organizations flew to Baghdad in an empty IL-86 to familiarize ourselves with our specialists' living conditions and to analyze the events taking place not only from the viewpoint of Western news agencies but also through our own experience, observation, and consideration. This flight was to carry seven tonnes of food for our compatriots working in Iraq under contract but Turkey, religiously fulfilling the terms of the blockade, ordered that the freight be left in the USSR, and Aeroflot complied with this order. Moreover, in Ankara the aircraft was forced to land and Turkish servicemen with UN tags on their jackets worked splendidly to ensure that there was nothing on the aircraft which could break the circle of the blockade.

Baghdad was shining with lights and enveloped in warm air. Outside the Al-Rashid Hotel was the cheerful chaos of several weddings and the charming brides dressed in white completely confused us as we remembered from our childhood the blockade, the night-time blackout, or the hardship of life behind the lines. It all bore little resemblance to a blockade in subsequent days, too, when even al-Basrah, which is close to Kuwait, was full of noisy crowds in the evening while the bazaar had anything you wanted on offer and the night-time sky was peaceful and had a fairy-tale allure. And at the walls of Babylon peasants who had been harvesting dates talked calmly among themselves just as they probably did a year, 10 years, or even a century ago.

In the stores we saw an abundance of goods and food but we also saw a line for bread formed during the night in order to reach the store in the morning. We saw adobe hovels in the villages but we also came across Mercedes and Toyotas standing outside the hovels. We did not see beggars anywhere. Everywhere we were treated benevolently and people were always ready to help us but there was not even a hint of servility. The people are kind and responsive, like any people in the world, while the children, as is the case everywhere, are curious, wide-eyed, and revered by all.

And we also saw in Baghdad a rehearsal for a parade involving 1 million men by the people's army (home guard) which opened with a march by a women's battalion followed by subunits of volunteers from Arab countries and, in black uniforms, detachments of suicide volunteers who have sworn to stand to the last round and the last grenade in battle. And when the rehearsal ended the neat ranks broke up and the young boys began to go home, joking and singing, some carrying submachine guns, some grenade throwers.

I wrote that we drove to al-Basrah, but I should explain that we drove in trucks and along an old road. We did not drive along the new freeway, the authorities would not allow it. But along the old road the truck went at a speed of 120 km an hour and on individual sectors easily exceeded 160 km an hour and we felt neither jolting nor strain.

Outwardly everything looks well in the country and the reports of demonstrations in al-Basrah and of troops opening fire on them were a total falsification. Just as the reports of the introduction of armored subunits into Baghdad were a falsification. And words about the "developing eruption of the people's anger in Iraq" should be put down to what someone desires and not to the real state of public awareness and social psychology.

We had many meetings. With the top Iraqi leadership, scientists, public figures, students, and ordinary workers. Some people agitated, some people explained their viewpoint, some complained of the curtailment of scientific and cultural ties with our country. But no one had a bad word to say about Soviet people and everyone recalled our peoples' traditional friendship. [passage omitted]

After the Security Council has denounced Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, after our colleagues have begun to say all kinds of things about Iraq and its leadership and the actions of the Army, it would be superfluous to describe the aggression once more. Therefore, noting my categorical disagreement with the Iraqi means of resolving problems, I shall try to define my viewpoint of the events in the Gulf region. But first I want to draw readers' attention to the following point. With the presence of the 200,000-strong contingent of troops in Saudi Arabia and the naval formations in the Gulf, with the concentration in South Iraq of the 400,000-strong Iraqi Army, well armed and with eight years' experience of combat operations, we must clearly realize that the conflict has acquired a new quality and calls to "punish the aggressor with weapons" are as "humane" as they are unprofessional. The oil extracting complex, whose destruction is fraught with the danger of several Chernobyls, and that would be a worldwide ecological catastrophe, is also becoming a very serious factor. That is why I repeat once again that I agree with and share the noble anger against Iraq's conduct in Kuwait but I see only a political path for settling the conflict.

In my view two factors influenced the dramatic development of events in the Gulf region. The first I see in the fact that we have lost the role of a world party and are only nominally rated a great power. And in any case only

the existing missile and space complex makes it possible to consider the "Soviet factor" in world politics. The political instability in the country, economic chaos, and interethnic tension have turned us into an underdeveloped country, and that requires a new disposition of forces in the orchestra of world politics, whose permanent conductor the United States reckons to become. This disposition itself is always painful and unpredictable enough to make it impossible to expect simple and civilized methods and means in creating a new disposition of political and economic forces and interests in the world. This redistribution is already actively under way throughout the world and events in the Gulf region have merely been the most conflict-laden form of the redistribution of economic and political interests. Moreover, there are no guarantees that new contradictions may not be discovered in some parts of the world or that other forces may not be brought into action in them. And the new Germany will scarcely fail to remember its traditional Near East policy. And Japan will probably not continue to agree that the Pacific Ocean should be no more than an internal sea of the United States. And so forth.

The second factor I also link with the state of affairs in the USSR. The economic crisis has developed in our country faster and faster and the active quest for partners in a joint venture, whose raw material base the entire country has become, has led to Western capital and "Western democracy," which have simultaneously become a model for emulation and the sponsors of economic reforms. The choice has been made, but an alternative could have been sought if the country were to be put in order without haste and with a view to the long term. Saddam Husayn's proposal in February 1990 at the fourth summit of the Arab cooperation council's member states could have been considered one such alternative. Noting that the word "advantage" has appeared in the political vocabulary of the East European leaders and that the countries with great influence in that part of the world will continue to hold the position of leaders among the other non-Arab countries in the same region, the Iraqi president suggested reorienting Arab investments to the USSR and the East European countries. One can debate the degree of feasibility of this proposal but it was a serious proposal which should have been seriously discussed. There was no discussion but the idea itself obviously affected the West's interests. And it was no accident that an anti-Iraqi campaign in the Western mass media soon began and intensified. The play on reducing oil prices, in which Kuwait played its part, was no accident, and merely intensified long-standing historical and economic contradictions between the two states. The conflict had been ripening for a long time and the fact that it was resolved by the introduction of Iraqi troops into Kuwait must be understood a a military and aggressive means of resolving a problem which took a long time to emerge.

We rightly refused confrontation with the United States and we are freeing ourselves of the "cold war" mentality. But there remain economic interests, which generate economic contradictions and antagonism which do not depend on ideological cliches. We have had and still have economic interests in Iraq (one-third of currency revenue into the USSR) and it is primarily our country which stands to lose from the present conflict while the United States already has a military forces present in the richest oil region of the world and this presence is being paid for by Saudi Arabia. The conflict will ultimately be settled, but we will be the losing side. And when our economy has grown strong and political chaos has been ended, we shall again try to regain our role in the Near East and the Gulf region. But in a few years' time that place will be taken and no one will be waiting for us here. That is why it seems to me we should have denounced the invasion of Kuwait but it was hardly worth taking part in the food and medical blockade against Iraq (incidentally, the most popular city there now is Leningrad, with the blockade period of its history). And how considered are arguments about our troops' participation in the company of U.S. troops given the existence of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq?

I also mentioned "military complicity" because the Islamic fundamentalists in the Arab world have denounced the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and in Iraq every Friday the muftis call for readiness for a jihad (holy war) to liberate the Holy Land. Perhaps it would be worth considering in foreign policy the Islamic factor within the country?

I do not know how the conflict will be resolved but I very much want political ways of resolving it to be found. But I am convinced that a solution can be found only by the Arabs themselves and through a universal settlement in the Near East. At the present stage the USSR's authority among the Arabs is still high enough for our country to perform a peacemaking mission which France is already prepared to accomplish. That is far more humanitarian than talks with Cheney about military aspects of the situation in the Gulf region. And it would be right for a start to suggest to all participants in the conflict that they state that they will undertake not to be the first to initiate military operations. After all we have been officially recognized as peacemakers and let us reaffirm this status of ours by such a proposal.

Pros, Cons of Soviet Role

PM2410110090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major R. Mustafin under the rubric: "Viewpoint": "Save Face or Lose Our Heads"]

[Text] The more tense the situation in the Persian Gulf area becomes and the stronger the smell of gunpowder in the air, the more concerned is mankind about the future. This concern is sweeping our country more intensely. How will events develop, will war be successfully avoided there, and if not, how will this affect us—these are some of the questions that are worrying many people today.

"We will put up with everything—empty shelves in stores, ruin, the scale of crime, and lawlessness. Only do not send our children to their deaths in the Persian Gulf. Was Afghanistan not enough?" the Nikolayevs from Nikopol write. And there are plenty of letters, telegrams, and telephone calls to the editorial office like this. Admittedly there are other letters, whose writers propose that we "raise our voices against Iraq" or else put forward options about how to strike that country. And more. Some of our newspapers have started to unloose volleys of articles that pose straight out the question of the USSR's participation in a possible war in the Persian Gulf area.

The sharp discussion that unfolded last week at one of the USSR Supreme Soviet sittings concerning the foreign minister's address, only added fuel to the fire. Although, to be honest, this address did not really clarify things. E.A. Shevardnadze stated that it is possible that we may participate in combat action in the Near East. But a UN Security Council decision would be required for this. However, "the Soviet leadership has no plans to use its forces in the Persian Gulf. Before there can be any question of the participation of Soviet troops in UN actions to control the aggression, a statutory mechanism must be created." One thing is clear: The USSR Supreme Soviet and the country's leadership will have the last word, as the minister said.

In my view, while the guns have not yet made themselves heard in the Near East, this is the very time to discuss all the reasons "for" and "against" our participation in a war. Only I do not know whether the title "hawks" will suit the advocates of decisions to use force. Remember, this title was commonly used in our country in former times. And today the label is pinned onto people who seem to be opposed to war. In any case, USSR People's Deputy N. Petrushenko, who doubts the expediency of a military approach, immediately found himself among the "hawks."

One of the trump cards of the advocates of an approach involving force is the affirmation that trying to come to an agreement in an amicable way with a pigheaded person such as Saddam Husayn is impossible. Hopes that sanctions will work quickly and effectively are decreasing with each passing day. If this does not defeat the Iraqi army or Iraq's military and economic potential, and unseat Husayn, the whole world, and the USSR included, is faced with an even greater threat.

Indeed, such a threat does exist. And not only on the part of Iraq. But does this mean that it is necessary to start a war, and with our participation?

First of all, it is not known how hostilities will develop. Will there be a lightning strike, and how effective will it be? The Americans themselves believe that it will not be easy. According to their predictions there will be losses of between 20,000 and 30,000 people. There is a great probability that this war which has not yet begun will turn into a protracted one.

Second, there is no certainty that the United States and its allies, and we too, if we turn out to be in the same camp, will not come up against a completely new and still quite unpredictable military and political situation. The incipient increase in Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism may lead to a basic change in political structures and a change in regimes among the United States' present Arab allies in the anti-Iraqi coalition. The coalition itself may collapse. There is a great probability of new lines of confrontation emerging: North-South, West-South. Given the Israeli factor and Husayn's desire to transfer the conflict onto the plane of Arab-Israeli confrontation, this probability increases even more. We also cannot ignore the question of the influence such a turn of events may have on the mood of Muslims in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics.

Finally the economic consequences. Can we afford, amid the most serious economic crisis and political instability, to throw huge resources into a war fund? Keeping U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf zone is costing the United States almost $50 million a day. Where would we get such resources when we are talking about a reduction in the military budget and the Armed Forces? Admittedly, voices can be heard advising us to restrict ourselves to dispatching volunteers to participate solely in defensive actions on a restricted scale. But again we cannot be sure that once we are drawn into the war, we will be able to avoid the escalation of our own part in it.

And another premise of the advocates of war is their desire to "save face," as I would put it. They say that the Soviet Union cannot stand aside when it is a question of creating all-embracing security and building a nonviolent world. In order to punish the aggressor, force will have to be used, and we will have to incur costs and take risks in order to prove that we adhere to the principles that are being advanced.

I agree. We need to both create a security system and resolutely repulse aggressors. We should not stand aside from these matters. But this does not mean that we are obliged to rush into a fight straight away. I think and I believe that we will not lose face. The Soviet Union acted with the world community, condemned the aggression, and joined the sanctions and aimed to make them tougher. Our country demonstrated its principled attitude by the very fact that it condemned its former client and ally. The whole world estimated our position at its true worth. This world understands our difficulties and our problems. So why should we lose our heads?

I do not think that this is what the world expects of us today. It expects that we will really become a powerful pivot consolidating all forces advocating a just political solution to the current crisis. Particularly since the possibilities in the complex of political and economic means to resolve the conflict are far from exhausted. The very fact that the Iraqis are taking out of Kuwait what they have stolen, and the fact that the United States does not agree to a partial and compromise solution, may serve as an indirect sign of possible changes for the better

and the aggressor's probable departure from the occupied country. And in the West, particularly in the United States and France, an activization of adherents of a peaceful solution has been noted recently. It is easy to start a war. But how difficult it is sometimes to finish one.

Attraction of 'Despot' Eyed

PM2410122990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by Yu. Zinin: "Iraq: Where the 'Father of the Nation' Is Headed"]

[Excerpts] Baghdad-Moscow—Wherever you go these days in Baghdad you see a man depicted on the walls of houses, on screens erected in squares, in pictures displayed in institutions, stores, and hairdressing salons, always wearing a smile but in a variety of attire: civilian clothes, military uniform with a marshal's shoulder boards, a checked bedouin headdress, a turban—it is President Saddam Husayn, the man who controls the destiny of the 17 million-strong population of Iraq. [passage omitted]

In their propaganda the media portray the president as the father of the nation, alive to the concerns of his ordinary citizens, and associate Iraq's social gains directly with him: free education, health care, various benefits, subsidized prices for basic foods. Personal complaints and requests are often addressed to the president, directly or through the press.

The president uses the power of the information and propaganda apparatus to appeal to Iraqis and their faith in their special role in the Arab world. A map of the Arab homeland, from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, colored green, is to be found all over Iraq.

It is generally acknowledged that the country's policy is in the president's hands and everyone must follow the road he has chosen. Saddam Husayn is a resolute and hard man when it comes to taking and implementing very important political and stategic decisions. His determination to attain his set goal makes him and all Iraqis hostage to the decisions that are made.

The style is reminiscent of the oriental despot, with certain adjustments for the era, of course: People are generously rewarded for being devoted and assiduous servants of the stern leader. The Damoclean sword of punishment hangs over offenders. To all appearances, drastic measures in Iraq are the best means of ensuring once and for all that goals are attained, whether in the political plane or in day-to-day life. [passage omitted]

Recent years have seen the rise of a cult of Saddam Husayn. The glorification of the president, comparing him to the ancient rulers of Babylon and Assyria, the naming of population centers and buildings after the president, the composing of songs and suites in his honor.

Against the background of the Arabs' wounded self-esteem because of the unresolved Palestinian problem, the inability of many Arab leaders to solve vital issues, and the crisis of traditional forms of government, the Iraqi president's resolve and will are a cynosure for those who are tired of waiting.

Situation Seen as Uncertain

NC2510063590 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Commentary by Mikhail Mayorev from "The World Today" feature]

[Text] Dear listeners. Contrary to previous practice, no report has been released on the outcome of talks held by Yevgeniy Primakov, special emissary of the president of the Soviet Union, in Rome, Washington, Paris, and London. This secrecy generates more speculation on a possible military solution to the Persian Gulf crisis instead of an amicable one.

It is difficult to recall any similar situation in which the Soviet Union could have assumed a mediatory role in a regional conflict, as it is doing today, especially in a complicated, perplexing conflict, which has so many obvious as well as potential participants, such as the Near East conflict. Moscow's inclination to play a new role in the international community as well as in this regional conflict is apparent.

However, perhaps in order to prevent a military confrontation between Iraq and the multinational forces, inclination is not enough. The issue is not that Soviet diplomacy does not have any experience mediating international matters. The strength and perception of academician Primakov, who had been appointed as an emissary by Mikhail Gorbachev, 1990 Nobel Peace Prize winner, to visit Iraq and then four Western capitals, is enough to fill such a vacuum. Perhaps the critical, worsening situation is deterring the success and favorable outcome of the mission of the Soviet President's emissary.

Some feel that a violent confrontation in the Persian Gulf region has reached such a sensitive juncture that no one is giving any thought to the negotiating table. Imagining that the U.S. soldiers suddenly pack up their artillery and return to their homes from Saudi Arabia is becoming more difficult. The turn of events in the machinery for inflicting a military blow to Iraq has moved so swiftly that it has become difficult for its wheels to suddenly grind to a halt, and go in reverse. Now, the olive branch cannot prevent the revolving chains of tanks. Politics is the art of achieving tasks that are possible. To what extent are Primakov and all those who have talked with him, from Saddam Husayn to George Bush, endowed with expertise in this art?

It is possible that the psychological war in the Persian Gulf crisis will take its toll on the fortitude and endurance of some of the politicians who are more inclined to

press the attack button, rather than to continue to remain poised in this position. U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, who visited Moscow last week, believes that the U.S. military doctrine should include the Pentagon's participation in international forces stationed in various explosive areas around the world. The issue can be interpreted in this manner, if the issue of war with Iraq were to be resolved in this way.

I do not believe that despite his expertise, Yevgeniy Primakov can be a magician and keep pulling rabbits from his hat! However, I believe that for those who are trying to resolve the matter, a bridge should be formed for contact between Baghdad and other capitals. This initiative is at least better than constantly dancing on the precipice of war.

In conclusion, the chances of peace in the Persian Gulf are waning daily, but have not been exhausted completely. If the claims of Arabic newspaper were to believed, that Saddam Husayn saw the Holy Prophet of Islam in a vision, who exhorted him that certain measures should be taken in accordance with the UN Security Council's decisions, then such a peace seems possible!

Reports View UN Talks on Situation in Afghanistan

Afghan Foreign Minister Comments

PM2410183690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report on interview with Afghan Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil by correspondent V. Plastun in Kabul; date not given: "Republic of Afghanistan: Search for Peace"]

[Text] Kabul, Oct—The pressing problems now being experienced by the world have been discussed at the UN General Assembly 45th Session in New York. One such is the situation in Afghanistan. How did its discussion go? Were any new approaches developed? Afghan Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil discusses this with your correspondent.

The present session proceeded in a new, encouraging atmosphere, 'A. Wakil stated. A spirit of mutual understanding and commitment to obligations and agreements prevailed. A desire to continue efforts to reduce tension in the world, to speed up progress in disarmament, and to resolve regional conflicts and other clashes by political and diplomatic methods was clearly observable.

Regarding the situation prevailing in and around the country the overwhelming majority of speakers at the session have expressed sincere support for a political solution of the Afghan question. This opinion was vigorously supported in individual meetings between the head of the Afghan delegation and the UN secretary general and five to 10 foreign ministers.

According to 'Abdul 'Wakil, an accord on signing joint statements establishing diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between those countries and Afghanistan was reached during the work of the session and in meetings with representatives of Uruguay, Ecuador, and Namibia. The documents on further expanding diplomatic relations will be published in the very near future. At present 100 UN countries have political and diplomatic ties with Afghanistan.

The United Nations, the Afghan foreign minister noted, has played and continues to play a crucial role in the peaceful, political solution of Afghanistan's problems. The resolutions of the 43d and 44th UN General Assembly Sessions on Afghanistan, adopted by all participants in them, create a good foundation for approaching the solution of the problem. We hope that the draft resolution of the 45th session (paragraph seven) submitted by us, which takes account of Afghanistan's proposal for a political solution of the problems by holding free and fair elections, will be unanimously approved at this November's session.

Afghanistan has always supported and continues to support the efforts of UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar to achieve an international agreement on a political solution of the Afghan problem. We do not forget that he said: "Despite the acute and urgent problems in the Persian Gulf region, we will not neglect the problem of Afghanistan. I hold myself personally responsible for solving this problem."

While certain of the rightness of its cause and pursuing a course of national reconciliation, 'Abdul Wakil said, the Afghan Government is perfectly capable of repulsing the bandit attacks of the enemies of the Afghan people. It should be mentioned that during the 20 months of independent combat operations waged against the intransigent opposition the republic's armed forces have taught them a fitting lesson and confirmed the regime's stability and viability.

In 'Abdul Wakil's estimation, the war has brought enormous human and material losses: one million dead and more than one million injured. According to the resolution of the second UN conference on the least developed countries, Afghanistan figures among the 41 countries in an extremely grave economic and social situation. In the eighties Afghanistan, as one of the least developed countries, had a per capita income of $187, which was the lowest figure compared with the other countries of that type. That sum has now fallen by 24 percent. During the war 2,000 schools, 200,000 hectares of forest, technical facilities, and water supply systems, and two million dwellings have been destroyed. These losses are estimated at $10 million.

At the same time, the Afghan minister noted, Afghanistan has for 10 years received no aid or credit from international organizations. We would like the countries which previously offered support, such as the United States, France, the FRG (now united Germany), Japan,

and Britain and also multinational financial and economic organizations to review the question of assisting Afghanistan's revival. It is essential that the needs of this war-stricken country be taken into consideration. Cooperation is essential. And here it is, of course, essential to mention the UN and its special mission.

U.S. Afghan Policy Assessed

LD2510090190 Moscow TASS in English 1859 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS news analyst Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—On Thursday the 45th U.N. General Assembly session will begin to discuss all aspects of the situation in Afghanistan. The world public is certain to focus its attention on this discussion, because the situation in and around that country remains tense, two and a half years after the signing of the Geneva agreements of Afghanistan.

This tension is particularly striking against the background of progress achieved in efforts to settle long-standing conflicts in other areas of the world, above all in Cambodia.

The United Nations is observing its 45th anniversary today. Never before has this international organisation enjoyed such a high prestige. The positive shift in its activity can be attributed to the Soviet and U.S. move from confrontation to cooperation over the last five years, including in terms of regional conflicts.

As for Afghanistan, things are sorting themselves out there very slowly due to the specific situation in that country, although some progress has been made. Regrettably, quantative positive changes in many aspects have not yet brought about a qualitative turn that could help restore peace on the Afghan land.

This happens, in part, because Washington is not yet ready to take a consistent stand on the Afghan conflict, which many on the banks of the Potomac view as all-important in foreign policy. At point is elementary pragmatism, the ability to consider facts, without trying to force them by power methods into the procrustean bed of established stereotypes.

Facts are as follows. Unprecedented interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, an equal member of the United Nations Organisation, on the part of Pakistan with the active assistance of the United States, has been going on for two and a half years. This interference aims to overthrow the Kabul government using the opposition forces. Virtually every provision of the agreements signed by representatives of Islamabad in Geneva was trampled upon.

Nevertheless, during the independent defence of the country, after Soviet troops left Afghanistan, the Afghan Government has gained in strength and prestige on the international scene. At the same time, the armed opposition has demonstrated its total failure in military and political terms. But bloodshed still continues.

Other facts, too, are available. In launching ever newer initiatives, the Afghan Government cooperates with the United Nations in defusing the long-standing conflict. Ringleaders of the Afghan opposition, who settled in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, impede these U.N. efforts.

The U.N. Secretary-General called on all Afghan leaders and the whole of the Afghan people recently to put the interests of the nation above everything to achieve a comprehensive political settlement.

Afghan President Najibullah calls upon Afghans to take the cause of national reconciliation into their hands. Both Javier Perez de Cuellar and Najibullah think that consensus on the national and international levels should be the main condition for restoring peace. The base for movement forward does exist.

To achieve this progress, [word indistinct] forces without exception need to renounce any form of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, to give Afghans a chance to sort out themselves what set-up they want in their own home. This is, possibly, the only way towards peace in the war-ravaged country.

Yeltsin Plans To Meet With Mujahidin Leaders

PM2410160090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 41, 9-15 Oct 90 pp 20-21

[Interview with Professor Yuriy Gankovskiy by Aleksandr Chudodeyev and Yakov Borovoy: "People From Peshawar. It is Time for Moscow To Stop Being Intransigent With the 'Intransigents'"]

[Text] [NEW TIMES] Not long ago, there was a report in the press, saying that agreement had been reached on holding a meeting in Moscow between the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Boris Yeltsin, and military and political leaders of the mujahidin. This was, probably, no news to you, since you were one of the first persons in the Soviet Union to establish contacts with the opposition in Afghanistan. What do you expect to see come out of the coming meeting between the leaders of Russia and the leadership in peshawar?

[Yuriy Gankovskiy] First of all, I hope that the coming discussions between Yeltsin and the mujahidin will touch not only on humanitarian, but also political issues. So far, the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the "government in exile" has been far from adequate considering the political and military significance of the opposition on the Afghan political scene.

Though it is true that the Soviet Union has had some contacts with the Afghan opposition, they have been limited to humanitarian issues connected with the

release of POW's. There has been absolutely no serious contacts on political issues. Such a policy, I feel, must be fundamentally altered.

As regards my meetings with several leaders of the Afghan opposition. I had no authority to conduct any discussions with them, let alone negotiations on political subjects. I met with them merely as a member of the USSR Public Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Soviet Servicemen Captured in Afghanistan. However, during the course of our meetings, we touched on issues concerning the political situation in Afghanistan. I cannot yet speak about all the details of these talks. Those leaders of the mujahidin with whom I met and I came to a gentleman's agreement not to discuss the content of our discussions.

[NEW TIMES] As is well known, Washington and Moscow are negotiating the cessation of arms supplies to the belligerents in Afghanistan.

How does Kabul and Peshawar view the convergence of the Soviet and American positions on the issue of Afghanistan?

[Gankovskiy] The leader of the biggest opposition party Hizbi Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who commands some 40 percent of the "intransigent" forces in Afghanistan feels that Gorbachev and Bush have no right to solve Afghanistan's problems behind their backs. The fact is that today the opportunities for Moscow and Washington to influence directly the situation inside Afghanistan have become severely limited. Let us say the Americans cease supplying the mujahidin with arms. Naturally, that would create problems for the mujahidin, but that would not mean that they would be left without arms all together. The main source of aid for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The possibilities for Moscow to influence the situation have also become less. In spite of massive political and military support to Afghanistan and Najibullah, who controls only about 30 percent of the territory of the country, carries out his own policy course, often not even taking into account the opinion of the Kremlin. Thus, the convergence of the positions of the two superpowers has come at least several years too late. We can now only put our trust in an international confernece on Afghaniostan, one that would involve all the countries having a stage in the results.

Such a conference could be held only after the fulfilment of the following condition: the cessation of any and all interference in Afghani internal affairs. I would like to add that this interference, in fact, produces little. In the US Congress, the question where the American military aid went has already been forcefully raised. This is also a legitimate question to be asked in the Soviet Union. One American journalist I know once said to me: "One gets the impression that one sees more Soviet AK-47 submachine guns on the streets of Karachi than in Afghanistan."

In my view, it is essential to cease to view Afghanistan as a bipolar scheme—Kabul and the opposition forces. There is no unity in Kabul and even less among the opposition.

[NEW TIMES] How do you assess the political significance of the Afghan opposition which at one time emigrated to the West? Can the former monarch Mohammad Zahir Shah, in your view, play a conciliatory role in untangling the Afghanistan mess?

[Gankovskiy] Yes, he can. However, under no circumstances should we overestimate this role. Many Leaders in Peshawar have categorically refused to have anything to do with the former Afghani monarch. Hekmatyar rejects flat out any contacts whatsoever with Zahir Shah. At the same time, the king, who was deposed in 1973, remains popular in the country, especially in Kandahar where the Durrani tribes, which are related to the 76-year-old monarch, live.

What is important here is that Zahir Shah played no role in the slaughter which took more than one and a half million of the lives of his former subjects.

[NEW TIMES] As the Kabul weekly Akhbar-el-Hafta wrote not long ago, an overwhelming number of the country's populace make up the so-called "third front," that is those who support neither the Kabul authorities nor the mujahidin. What stance will they take in case nationwide free democratic elections are held?

[Gankovskiy] If such elections do take place, then they will be typically Afghan in nature; that is to say, they should not be compared to such elections in the Soviet Union or in the West. Here, I should explain what exactly I mean. First of all, an enormous role is played in social and political life in Afghanistan by the leaders of the numerous tribes. People will vote the way they are told to vote by the leaders of their clans. And Afghans will tend to follow the opinions of the Muslim theologians.

As regards the "third front," it is indeed the case that a significant portion of the population supports neither the authorities in Kabul nor the mujahidin. As for the supporters of Najibullah in the ruling party, in spite of the policy of national reconciliation pronounced four years ago in relation to the "intransigent opposition," they themselves take intransigent positions and refuse to take cardinal steps toward reconciliation. For example, the death sentences past on a number of well-known opposition leaders at an open trial in absentia in Kabul in 1986 have not been repealed yet.

I have already said that the mujahidin too do not have the full support of the population. Each region in Afghanistan listens to and supports its own local leaders. In the early 1980s, the Pakistani leadership forced many local mujahidin leaders who led the fight against the government in Kabul to submit to the directives of the Peshawar leadership, threatening to deprive them of financial and military aid if they do not comply. In

addition, the presence of Soviet troops temporarily united several diverse opposition groups.

Now that the Soviet Union has withdrawn its forces' from Afghanistan, many local leaders have begun to act more independently. And if the civil war in Afghanistan does not come to an end, the Soviet Union will find itself with a Lebanon along its southern border, and one that is even more dangerous than the original. The country has already started to become divided up into "appanage principalities." In fact, this process is gaining momentum.

[NEW TIMES] Are the leaders of the opposition confirmed Islamic fundamentalists, or are there some who believe in democracy in the Western sense?

[Gankovskiy] "Democracy" is a very vague term. There are some people in Peshawar who have received a brilliant Western education, who not only know many European languages, but also are very well versed in Western Culture, history, traditions, etc. The majority of them did not play an active role in politics before April 1978. Take for example, Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani. He is enormously wealthy. Before April 1978, he owned a Peugot car dealership in Kabu which was the largest dealership in all of Afghanistan. In the 1920s, whe Gailani's father was a student of Berlin University, he made acquaintance with a beautiful German girl, Maria Richter, and married her. Gailani's relatives live in London. But how is it that he left Kabul and became one of the leaders of the opposition? That is very simple. One night shortly after April 1978, Kabul revolutionaries arrested more than 20 relatives of another well-known Afghan figure, Mojaddedi, who lived in the mansion to Gailani's. They were brought to a tank training ground, shot, and the place of the murder was buldozed over. After that, Gailani and other members of the Afghani aristocracy fled the country.

The leaders of the opposition party Nejat-e-Melli Afghanistan take a position of their own. They have their headquarters in Delhi and have affiliated groups located throughout the West. They consider themselves social democrats.

In short, the opposition is diverse and adheres to different political views.

[NEW TIMES] According to data received from Western sources, there are 60 to 70 Soviet POW's being held in Pakistan. What concrete measures are being taken by Kabul to obtain their release? Who is showing more good will in trying to free them, the official authorities or the mujahidin?

[Gankovskiy] According to the information I have there are no Soviet POWs in Pakistan. But here one must bear one thing in mind: several Soviet POWs adopted Islam, gave up their Soviet citizenship and thus in actuality lost their status as POWs. I have photographs which I obtained from American colleagues, who spent some time visiting the camps of the opposition in Peshawar, showing some of these "prisoners" held by the mujahidin. Such people can be found anywhere. However there are some former officers and men who still remain POW's in the full sense of the world. Though they are not to be found in Pakistan, they may be imprisoned some two kilometres from the border in Afghanistan. That I have been told by several leaders of the mujahidin.

As to what concrete measures are being taken to obtain their release, I am no fan of bureaucratic decisions, but should there not be someone who personally and officially takes responsibility for them?

The mujahidin have sent lists of Soviet POWs being held in Afghanistan to the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Soviet Servicemen. But have we sent them any such list in return? No, and we are not likely to be able to do so any time in the near future, because we possess no information on the location of their prisoners.

'Apprehension' Follows Mujahidin-Pakistan Talks

NC2410171190 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Afghanistan's leadership has expressed its apprehension about the visit to Islamabad last week by one of the leaders of the Afghan mujahidin, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud. In the opinion of Afghan President Dr. Najibullah, these talks with the Pakistani authorities were aimed at stepping up military pressure on Kabul right before general elections to Pakistan's National Assembly.

Such apprehension by the Afghan leadership is not unwarranted. The Pakistani militarist and fundamentalist circles need to keep up a conflict with neighboring Afghanistan in order to preserve their influence and to prevent any liberalizing of the present regime. This factor provides the necessary political atmosphere in Pakistan and its vicinity for the implementation of extraordinary measures for imposing restrictions on the country's democratic forces and the intimidation of the Muslims with an alleged threat to Islam.

In addition, for quite some time the Pakistani military echelons have been hatching a plan to eat up Afghanistan by a merger into an alleged confederation with Pakistan, under Islamabad's supervision. Documents that prove the existence of such a plan have been frequently published in Afghanistan's newspapers. Pakistani fundamentalists and militarists utilize the services of the Afghan mujahidin to attain such an objective. The Afghan opposition is incited to occupy cities, even the capital city of Kabul, despite the mere impossibility of such measures.

Some time ago, an Afghan opposition group suffered losses of 170 persons killed and more than 100 wounded in their attack on Kabul. The Afghanistan Government spokesman announced that the attack was repulsed. The military units carried out mopping-up operations in the

vicinity of Kabul and seized large quantities of military equipment including 380 surface-to-surface missiles, 490 mines, cartridges, as well as two radio stations.

Most of the Afghan mujahidin are beginning to feel the burden of the Pakistani militarists' instruction. Sebghatollah Mojaddedi, the head of the Afghan mujahidin interim government, declared in an interview with the VOA correspondent [as heard] in a tone tinged with complaint and criticism, that he is under constant pressure from the Government of Pakistan. The reason for his gripe was that the Pakistani authorities had been demanding the support of the interim government for the program of a massive attack on Kabul formulated by the extremist faction of the Afghan mujahidin and the Pakistani Intelligence service.

According to Mojaddedi, if he does not support this program, he is threatened with expulsion and exile from of Pakistan. Despite this, Mojaddedi refused to support the plan for another Afghan opposition leader Hekmatyar's units' attack on Kabul. Hekmatyar announced that he would raze the Afghan capital to the ground. According to the head of the interim government, this would neither be in the interests of Afghanistan nor of Islam.

Most of the field commanders, included Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, have adopted and declared similar stances. It is not known, however, what Mas'ud's stance was after his visit to Islamabad, but it appears that with the continuation of bloodshed, the Afghans are suffering most of all. Similarly, it is the Afghan people who are faced with such a difficult choice. Either they must support the proponents of the establishment of a regime suited to the Pakistani fundamentalists, or a government which favors the convocation of free elections under UN supervision.

The first option does not appear to foresee an end to bloodshed within a specific period of time. The second option however is a harbinger of peace.

East Europe

Ryzhkov Comments on Trade With Czechoslovakia

AU2410123990 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by Vladimir Jancura; in the Soviet legislature on 19 October: "In a Radical and Conciliatory Way"—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] [Jancura] Yesterday during a break in the Soviet legislature's debates, I asked Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, for a short interview.

How will trade between the USSR and the CSFR be carried out next year? Will we transfer to accounting in freely convertible currencies (for all items) as of 1 January or will there be a possible transitional period with the gradual implementation of the new principles?

[Ryzhkov] I would recommend that you ask your Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus this question. Yes, Mr. Klaus. At the CEMA meeting in Sofia he had very radical ideas—the most radical ones of all who were present. He persuaded us that it is necessary to transfer to payments in convertible currencies as soon as possible. Now I am constantly hearing that the CSFR is in favor of a gradual implementation. I think it will be both. We will adopt a radical stance on some issues and in others—as I hope—we will find a common language and make compromises. This applies mostly to mutual deliveries of machinery parts and appliances in order to avoid production stoppages in your enterprises as well as ours.

[Jancura] Are you aware of the problems that have arisen in our country due to the cutbacks in Soviet crude oil deliveries?

[Ryzhkov] Yes, I am. However, we are in a difficult situation too.

Soviet Deserters' Cases in Czechoslovakia Viewed

PM2410101790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Oct 90 p 3

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Ye. Chernykh: "Soldiers Joining the Partisans; Soviet Army Servicemen Fleeing Their Units in Czechoslovakia to Request Political Asylum"]

[Text] Prague—... On 17 April Private A. Maslyayev left his unit and asked the CSFR authorities for political asylum. But he was returned to the unit command the following day. The story only came to light several months later. Three Czechoslovak journalists sent an open letter to President M. Gorbachev expressing concern for the soldier's fate and the hope that he had been pardoned.

It is now October. "First Maslyayev—Now Temnikov"; "Man Hunt"; "Another Man Hunt." These are all dramatic headlines in the press about more Soviet soldiers seeking political asylum, whom paternal commanders have virtually dragged by force from the refugee camp.

E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia, gave a news conference recently. Private V. Temnikov and Private P. Abolentsev—who are now very popular because of the events described above—took part in the news conference with their parents.

E. Vorobyev said that criminal charges had not been brought against Maslyayev. He had been transferred to the Turkestan Military District. He is now section commander. He was recently given leave for good service. Homesickness was the reason for V. Temnikov's flight. He had decided to go back to the Soviet Union. He got on a train on 24 September, not knowing where it was

going. He was apprehended by GDR border guards and returned to his unit the same day. Temnikov had not made any application for political asylum.

Those present at the news conference were interested in P. Abolentsev most of all. He had hidden in the forest for about a month. He was arrested by the police on 8 September. But our official bodies were only informed of this two weeks later.

According to Colonel General E. Vorobyev, he had made a written request to the CSFR Government to hand Abolentsev over to the command or at least to arrange a meeting. His request had met with a refusal.

The parents flew in on 1 October. Seeing his mother and father, Petr immediately wrote that he did not want political asylum and left the refugee camp with them.

"Why did you not request asylum?"—journalists asked Petr. "First, I did not make any such request: I had asylum offered to me. The police told me that either they would hand me over to the Soviet authorities or I would make an application for political asylum. But I made no such application."

What kind of views must you hold for the authorities to have to pursue an ordinary soldier in conditions of pluralism? Why did this "fighter for an idea" hide in the forest for so long when he could have freely surrendered to the Czechoslovak authorities?

P. Abolentsev and his parents went back to the Soviet Union after the news conference. At his mother's request, Petr will continue his military service in the Turkestan Military District, not far from his home in Chimkent. Temnikov recently completed his military service. He has now returned home. The colonel general assured us that none of them will be punished.

The search for a criminal in the story of the deserters continues. Watching the news conference on television, the author of the article "Man Hunt" said that Abolentsev had been beaten up the day before and was drugged.

"The arrival by air of Abolentsev's parents is also suspicious," M. Fendrikh [name as published], official press secretary for refugee affairs, said. "They were brought by military aircraft and did not even go through passport control." Is this a flagrant violation of the law? I called the embassy. It was explained to me that the agreement signed between the USSR and CSFR governments on 26 February 1990 states that the regulations in existence at the point when the agreement was signed apply to the Soviet forces until they have been completely withdrawn. And, under a 1968 treaty, people belonging to the Soviet forces and members of their families are exempt from passport and visa controls.

But this truly criminal story has continued in an unexpected way. On 1 October, the Czechoslovak side officially notified the unit command that Private Zaripov and Private Naumov had been arrested trying to rob a food store. The damage was somewhere in the region of 5,000 korunas. The soldiers had requested political aslyum and, according to M. Fendrikh, had been concealed in a safe place.

Withdrawal From Czechoslovakia Poses Problems

91UM0047A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia, by P. Chernenko; place and date not given: "Armed Forces Reduction: Facets of the Problem—Military Post for Sale"]

[Text] **The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia is continuing. A tank division departed recently for the Motherland, and now there is not one large tank unit [soyedineniye] in the CSFR. By the end of the year, one more will leave—motorized infantry, and by the beginning of next April, not one Soviet Army subunit will be left in Czechoslovakia.**

But does this conform to the planned schedule of troop withdrawal? It is this question that began our correspondent's interview with Colonel General E. Vorobyev, commander of the Central Group of Forces and the representative of the Soviet Government on the withdrawal of our troops from Czechoslovakia.

[Vorobyev] Yes, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is proceeding exactly according to the established schedule. Here are the figures. According to the status on 1 October, more than half of the Group personnel have been withdrawn, 78 percent of the tanks, and 58 percent of the infantry combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers.... In the second stage, it is possible that even more troops than was planned will be withdrawn. Why? Additional forces and resources have been appropriated for the preparation of new deployment locations. And the experience that has been gained has already shown: The Group of Forces can and must participate more actively in the preparation of barracks housing and other inventories at new deployment points. In addition, an agreement was reached about the opening of additional routes for echelon movement through the territory of Poland. At the news conference with foreign journalists, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel said that the withdrawal of Soviet troops is being accomplished according to schedule, without any kind of deviation.

[Chernenko] The division that was the first to depart the CSFR in fact "landed" on a bare spot. There was no housing for the families of officers and warrant officers, and there were no schools, kindergartens, and municipal utilities. Are the units that are being withdrawn now ending up in the same situation, or has the situation changed?

[Vorobyev] I would not agree with such a statement of the question. They were getting ready in the districts for

the arrival of new troops, and they were doing everything possible so that people would have a roof over their heads. It is another matter that catastrophically little time was devoted to the fulfillment of these tasks, especially for our first division. There was somewhat more time for preparations for the following large units, and the situation with housing in deployment areas improved considerably.

Although I will say frankly: I did not think that I would have to make a trip to our unit deployment locations. But the situation compelled me to do this. I have already visited Belorussia, where I talked to chiefs of garrisons and representatives of party and soviet organs. Measures are now being taken jointly with them to improve the local situation. I have planned to visit other regions as well.

Commanders of the large units [soyedineniye] and units [chast] that are being withdrawn, political officers, and members of women's councils have also visited the new deployment locations. In addition, operational groups were also established on their recommendations, which, together with the personnel staffs of the local garrisons, are preparing military posts for the arrival of the troops, and they are also engaged in laying in vegetables for winter. Rooms are being prepared for officers and warrant officers almost everywhere, and, starting in the second half of 1991, housing units that are being built will be put into operation. Nevertheless, housing for the units being withdrawn remains the main problem as before. Only the Ministry of Defense, which, unfortunately does not have the necessary resources is working on this. It is likely that everyone understands that the problem will not be resolved with this approach, and that it could even get worse in the near term. That is why it is so important that the social security program adopted by the government for servicemen and members of their families starts to work soon.

[Chernenko] Eduard Arkadyevich, every now and then Czechoslovak television shows the garrisons we left behind: Windows are broken in the houses, kitchens have been ransacked, the terrain is cluttered up....

[Vorobyev] The Czechoslovak mass media is dealing very actively with the withdrawal of Soviet troops. I would say, sometimes with a large dose of fantasy, overemphasizing our shortcomings: Not everyone believed that the withdrawal would occur strictly according to schedule. When they became convinced of the irreversibility of the process, of our sincere effort to comply with the agreement, the objectivity of information increased. This was promoted by the working contacts with representatives of CSFR organs that were established in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops and also by the parliamentary commission for verifying the withdrawal. But, still, some zealous journalists are looking for "juicy" facts, and they show those installations that we are dismantling on television screens and in the newspapers. They say, see what the Soviet soldiers are leaving behind. But the facts are: At present, we have transferred 72 military posts under guard. Moreover, according to the acts, in good condition.

[Chernenko] Nonetheless, what is the future of the military posts that we left behind? Up until now the Czechoslovakian side did not acquire even one of them, although quite a lot of time has passed?

[Vorobyev] All of the preparatory work for the sale of the installations and property belonging to the Soviet side has been done. This process was held back somewhat, because of the lack of an appropriate decision of the Soviet Government. It was adopted the other day. Now a governmental delegation is being set up that will soon arrive in the CSFR to conduct negotiations and to sign interdepartmental agreements for the sale of military posts, dwelling houses, and other buildings and installations. Many firms and private individuals have expressed a desire to acquire our installations and even entire posts. For example, one of the firms proposes, in exchange for the military post in Milowice, to build a 100-apartment building of its own design in the Soviet Union for the same sum. And if difficulties arise with the supply of construction materials, the firm agrees to build a reinforced concrete construction plant in the USSR.

[Chernenko] Still fresh in my mind are the rallies and demonstrations that occurred at the deployment locations of units of the Central Group of Forces before the troop withdrawals. At some of them, there is no use hiding it, it reached the point of insults being directed against us. What is the attitude now of the local residents and authorities to the Soviet servicemen?

[Vorobyev] I have already touched on this. In many ways, the attitude depends on ourselves and the behavior of the Soviet soldiers. At the present time, the attitude is well-wishing, and it creates normal conditions for the withdrawal of troops. This is also promoted by the glasnost of all of our measures. We hold news conferences regularly, and we organize visits of journalists to military posts and joint meetings with various commissions. In short, there is nothing to complain about. Questions are resolved through good contact with the Czechoslovak side and with mutual respect. And this gives hope that the traditional friendship that has evolved between our people will continue to serve the cause of peace, goodwill, and cooperation.

CSFR Deputy Minister Views KGB Activities

PM2410150290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 41, 21-28 Oct 90 p 11

[Letter from Czechoslovak Deputy Interior Minister Jan Ruml: "Moscow's Response to the 'Prague Variant'"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Excerpts] Following the publication in Issue No 30 of an interview with Jan Ruml, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Czech KGB—a letter from Colonel of State Security (ret.) V. Kosolapov. The author of the letter worked in Czechoslovakia in the capacity of

deputy chief of the KGB's mission at the local Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs through the entire gloomy 20-year period from 1968 till the "tender revolution" of 1989.

Inasmuch as the statements and claims in Kosolapov's letter touch directly upon Jan Ruml's words and even personality, we at the editorial office considered it our duty to send a copy of the letter to Mr. Ruml in Prague. MN [MOSCOW NEWS] warned the KGB that it would publish Kosolapov's letter in full as soon as it received a reply from Prague. To all appearances, this turn of events did not suit the State Security Committee, which is why Kosolapov's letter was printed, even before its appearance in MN, in the newspaper "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" (No. 213) under the headline "Is this a Prague variant?" We see no need to publish it in full again, so we offer our readers the more important excerpts from Kosolapov's letter and the reply from Jan Ruml. [passage omitted]

In the article by V. Kosolapov, former KGB representative in Prague and now a retired colonel published in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the only truthful thing is perhaps the fact that in the issue dated August 5-12 1990 Moscow News featured an interview I granted its Prague correspondents. The rest of it is either downright lies or deliberate halftruths. Although perhaps he is right about one more thing: we Czechs have profound mistrust for everything emanating from the Cheka (NKVD or KGB). We have our own reasons for this based on sixty years' acquantance with the "sharp sword of the world proletariat".

The Soviet intelligence service was already active on the territory of prewar Czechoslovakia. If differed from similar services of other countries in that it not only collected information, but also created a network of political adherents in order to have a well-organized "army" at hand in the eventuality of a political crisis. Therefore the NKVD maintained contacts with practically all the so-called proletarian public organizations, from the leadership of the CPCZ to, say, the Union of Proletarian Esperantists.

Then came 1938—the end of free Czechoslovakia. It is clear that Soviet intelligence tried to establish contacts with the Czechoslovak Resistance. Less clear, however, are its attempts to control the structure of the Czechoslovak Resistance and establish its own network on our territory, not from among professionals, but again from among communists. By the end of the war the NKVD was already active, not being particularly fastidious in its choice of means: it recruited officers of the Czechoslovak Corps, especially signal men and cipher clerks (this is evidently how Hanuliak, subsequently chief of state security, became an NKVD agent) and rerecruited Gestapo officials, its principal objective being to obtain compromising material on any Czechoslovak citizen.

As early as May 15, 1945 the NKVD staged a mass round-up throughout Czech lands and Moravia, hunting for Czech citizens of Russian extraction among the "white guard emigres". It is clear that, in organizing such an act, the NKVD could not do without a ramified network of agents. Today we know that Soviet advisers appeared in Czechoslovakia in 1946, not in 1948. They organized their own internal subunits within Czechoslovak security bodies and thus committed unlawful actions, including murder. With their aid and with support from the leadership of the Communist Party the Czechoslovak state security system was being created after the NKVD's image and likeness, i.e., as an instrument of struggle against the Citizens of their own country.

When Stalin decided that Czechoslovakia as the economically most developed country of the Soviet bloc must also have the strongest bourgeoisie, he sent dependable advisers and investigators here. Such names as General Likhachev (he came to Czechoslovakia as the head of the NKVD's investigation department), Boyarskiy, Beschasnov and Galkin are still etched on people's memory, as are the methods of conducting investigation at that time.

Later, it is true, the balance changed somewhat—not so many people were hanged, while beatings and torture ceased to be commonplace during interrogations. But Soviet advisers and staff members remained in the Czechoslovak state security system. Then came the year 1968, and in May-June Czechoslovakia was visited by Studensky (real name—General Skripo), who met old friends from wartime years and the period of the Slovak Uprising and cautiously sounded the situation. In short, he prepared information to support the operation to be known as Exercises Danube-68 and activized old contacts.

Mr. Kosolapov knows subsequent developments from personal experience. He came to our country in December 1968 as an expert in combatting the "internal enemy" and carried out his activities until late November 1989, when he quietly disappeared from the state security building in Prague's Thakurova Street and moved into the Soviet Embassy. He naturally knows that Soviet consultants were present not only at the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs but also—he himself was among them—in several security departments. Namely: in one—intelligence, two—counter-intelligence, six—technical, 10—internal enemy, 11—economics. Readers may wonder which of them Colonel Kosolapov applied his rich experience to. If they decide it was Dept. 10 they will not be mistaken. It was the staff members of this department—"honest, decent people" and "good professionals" (as Kosolapov qualifies them in his article)—that watched every step made by people with the "wrong" views.

Soviet consultants had access to all the documents they requested, and so that nothing should escape them they formulated the last point of their request as: "everything of any interest". "The representatives of Soviet intelligence at Department one of state security are being kept posted in practical terms of the daily findings of this

department," we read in the preparatory material for the Minister's collegium meeting on November 20, 1980. The situation was similar in other departments.

This no longer goes on. Needless to say, counter-intelligence exists now and will continue to exist in Czechoslovakia—we are not so naive as to believe that foreign intelligence services will not work against us. But today no one exercises so-called counter-intelligence patronage over the Church, political parties and other organizations, no one hangs round bars to find out what "the people are thinking". We need only turn to the Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and, in the final analysis, the elections. If we want to know the views of political opponents we can read their newspapers. Mr Kosolapov's experience will be no use to us any more.

I do not know what makes Mr. Kosolapov confident that the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs still has some officials in Moscow. I would like to meet these people at least to find out why they palm themselves off as staff members of the Czechoslovak Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The reference to my "close contacts with representatives of the American special services even before November 17" would be ridiculous had it not been a clear sign of the incipient misinformation campaign. To reply to Mr. Kosolapov's article, I can only say that I did not accept the proposal on espionage in favour of the USA for two reasons: first, it was simply never put to me, second, even if it had been it would have been dangerous for me to accept it in the atmosphere of spy mania which had grown up here as the result of more than 40 years of Stalin's state security.

Now, as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, I maintain contacts with different intelligence services (not with the KGB). This is one of my responsibilities. And it is not a secret that there are fields in which secret services cooperate—for example, in the struggle against international terrorism or drug trafficking.

Mr. Kosolapov's assertions to the effect that the KGB has not recruited Czech citizens as agents are likewise unmitigated calumny. Mr. Kosolapov must be perfectly well aware that all staffers of the Czechoslovak state security system, beginning with department chiefs (including the so-called cadre reserve) had to pass through a course (of several months) at the KGB Higher School. Our state security officials completed the usual five-or three year course at the same school. Mr. Kosolapov must also know that his Czech colleagues, these "patriots of their country", considered it their duty to be always ready to render services to the KGB without any formal commitment. And he can hardly be unaware that the counterintelligence of the Central Group of Troops also looked for agents among Czechoslovak citizens.

I am afraid we must deal with this category of citizens. We have every reason to suspect they have not resigned themselves to their loss of position, functions and influence and will try to regain them unconstitutionally. Mr Kosolapov says that we have been creating "new enemies" for ourselves. This is not true. They are old enemies. We have got to know them well enough over the last 40 years. We know that excessive condescension and even inattention towards them can be fatal for us. And we shall not commit this mistake. (Signed) Jan Ruml
September 20, 1990
Prague

Oil Cutbacks' Effect on East Europe Viewed

PM2310094190

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 October 1990 Second Edition carries on page four under the headline "What Lies Behind the 'Oil Blow'" a feature on the problems caused to East European countries by the decline in oil deliveries from the USSR. The feature includes reports by PRAVDA own correspondents from Budapest, Prague, and Bucharest and a commentary from the USSR State Planning Committee. It begins with the following PRAVDA introduction:

"The mounting problems connected with oil extraction in the Soviet Union have struck a painful blow to the economies of our East European partners. As is well known, shipments of oil and petroleum products along the "Druzhba" oil pipeline are being reduced. What is the situation now? What will happen in the future?"

This is followed by a report from Budapest by correspondent V. Gerasimov:

"A cartoon has appeared in the Hungarian newspapers showing black drops spurting onto the pipes of the 'Druzhba' oil pipeline, forming the Russian words 'the end.' Shortfalls in the delivery of Soviet oil, although they have not caused panic—there are not yet crowds at the gas stations—have nonetheless added to the Hungarian economy's concerns.

"Some 6.48 million tonnes of Soviet oil should have arrived this year in accordance with the agreement signed in the spring. That ensured nearly three quarters of the country's requirements. Hungary saves 50-60 billion forints a year on the difference between world and 'CEMA' prices and received $400 million on the resale of raw material from the USSR. My notebook also contains the following figure: When oil was expensive (1978-1984) Hungary saved approximately 400 billion forints.

"When at the end of July this year it was announced that the 'Druzhba' oil pipeline would provide 1.38 million tonnes of oil less than envisaged by the agreement, the Hungarian government had to buy fuel for convertible currency in the Near East and African countries.

"But the situation is changing again. Prices for an 'American cask'—a barrel—are soaring. Where to get the funds? Will the international banks help, as people here believe: Bela Kadar, Hungarian minister of international economic relations, believes that in the fourth quarter

two million tonnes of Soviet oil should have come to make good the shortfalls but scarcely 1.2-1.3 million will come.

"People in Hungary are growing used to the idea that next year too, despite the transition to world prices and accounting in dollars, no more Soviet oil will be delivered than this year.

"One liter of gasoline costs two rubles here, to compare prices roughly. The events in the Persian Gulf and the 'dollar accounting' with the Soviet Union will force an increase in the price of fuel (there has already been a rumor that it will increase to 56-62 forints, that is to three rubles a liter). With this accounting, incidentally, Hungary will to a certain extent become indifferent to where it acquires 'black gold.'"

The next item in the feature is a Prague report by own correspondent A. Krushinskiy:

"The pitch of passions connected with the oil crisis has abated somewhat here. Deliveries of Soviet oil are below the 16.6 million tonnes level envisaged by the interstate protocol on trade turnover for 1990.

"But to judge by the press assessments local industry's minimum requirements are now being satisfied. This was confirmed during my talk with I. Panteleyev, USSR trade representative in Czechoslovakia.

"'Although the basic oil refining regions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] are experiencing grave difficulties,' he said, 'the Soviet side is seeking to fulfill its commitments under the protocol for 1990 as far as possible. Moreover, to better supply Czechoslovakia's oil refining industry, under an agreement between the two countries' foreign trade organizations 300,000 tonnes will be delivered this year for freely convertible currency....'

"'What would you say in reply to those Czechoslovak journalists who assess this as 'speculation,' saying that the Soviet Union is undersupplying oil for transferable rubles, saying there is a shortage, yet has found oil to sell for dollars?'

"'I do not see a contradiction here. The reduction of deliveries affected all CEMA countries. Difficulties with the supply of all are also being experienced by Soviet enterprises. As for those 300,000 tonnes, essentially they were taken from the quota intended for sale on the Western countries' markets. The USSR embarked on this step precisely because it understood the difficulties Czechoslovakia is experiencing. Incidentally, other opportunities are also being sought in the interests of the Czechoslovak partners. An example is the barter deal which has just been concluded with Czechoslovak organizations by the "Rosvneshtorg" foreign trade organization and the "Megionneftegaz" production association.'"

The next item in the feature is the following report from Bucharest by correspondent V. Vedrashko:

"The state of affairs in energy supply is causing great anxiety here.

"But the Romanians are quite well informed of the difficulties which the Soviet Union is experiencing and, without henceforth relying on generous shipments of energy carriers, are preparing for the cold weather. The point is that after the change of political regime the country immediately announced the cessation of the export of food. But of the five million tonnes of oil which Romania receives every year from the USSR in accordance with a long-term agreement, 1.6 million were in exchange for Romanian food products. That is one reason for the reduction in Soviet oil deliveries—the contracts for this year provide for the export of only 3.4 million tonnes.

"Soviet-Romanian talks were held in Moscow recently, focusing on problems of shipments of energy carriers and raw material from the USSR. The Romanian press notes that the talks were difficult."

The final item in the feature, published under the subhead "USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] Commentary: 'Situation is Unreassuring,'" is a report by correspondent A. Sharyy of the comments by USSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman A. Troitskiy. The first paragraph is a PRAVDA introduction:

"PRAVDA correspondent A. Sharyy asked USSR Gosplan Deputy chairman A. Troitskiy to comment on the situation which has taken shape.

"'Our neighbors' anxiety is entirely justified. I should like to note immediately that the question of oil deliveries has no political undertones. It is a question of complexities of an economic nature.

"'Every year in our country there is a natural decline in oil extraction caused by the depletion of deposits. Oil stocks are being exhausted, we must move to new regions and drill new boreholes. In previous years we succeeded in compensating for this reduction in extraction volumes by the prompt identification of new deposits and the commissioning of capacities. Unfortunately, we are not succeeding in doing this now.

"'One can point to a whole complex of reasons. Difficulties in developing new regions have increased considerably. For a number of reasons the Tengiz deposit in Kazakhstan was not commissioned—the sporadic delivery of equipment and material resources and the delay by the construction organizations had an effect. At some other deposits less oil was extracted than planned because of planners' miscalculations. Finally, a simply catastrophic situation has taken shape in supplying the sector's enterprises with material and technical resources.

"'I do not think that the situation will change radically in the very near future. Next year oil extraction will be reduced still further. To prevent a further decline in the

level of oil extraction substantial capital investments in the oil refining industry are needed.

"'We realize what difficulties the reduction in deliveries is causing our partners and we are trying to find a way out. Thus, we are examining the question of making a proportion of deliveries to East European countries through quotas paid for in freely convertible currency. Here we take into account the fact that next year there will no longer be accounting in transferable rubles. The Soviet Government has taken a number of steps encouraging enterprises to increase oil extraction—for raw material obtained over and above the plan collectives have increased currency allowances. We are conducting talks with our partners and seeking mutually acceptable solutions. But I repeat that so far the situation remains unreassuring.'"

West Europe

Gorbachev's Upcoming Visit to Spain Examined

Visit To Influence Internal Problems

LD2410213290 Moscow TASS in English 2052 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Madrid October 24 TASS—One can judge even today, two days before Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival in Spain, that this visit has long been awaited. The local press writes in profusion about the forthcoming talks. They are the topic of discussion for Spanish television reporters, ordinary citizens and in political circles.

The arrival of a great many Soviet and foreign journalists in Madrid is also evidence of the importance of the forthcoming official visit. A news conference involving a group of Soviet public figures: lawyers, writers, economists and cultural personalities was given for them at Madrid's Palas Hotel today.

Opening the news conference, Deputy Head of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee International Department A.S. Grachev noted that the visit to Spain became possible thanks to sweeping transformations in the two countries and in Europe as a whole. The news conference grew into a keen debate on perestroyka in the USSR, on political, economic and social problems faced by the Soviet leadership in transforming society.

"We cannot separate the Soviet leadership's foreign policy activity from our internal problems," Presidential Spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told TASS when asked to comment on the role and importance of the visit.

"In this regard, Gorbachev's visit to Spain is not only a confirmation of the USSR's foreign policy but is also an event influencing our domestic affairs. Even the list of the agreements and documents to be signed in Madrid demonstrates the relationship between the visit and our domestic problems.

"I would single out an agreement on scientific-technical cooperation, a consular convention, which will affect the destinies of thousands upon thousands of families both in Spain and the Soviet Union, and the settlement of unresolved legal problems which also affect the interests of many people.

"In addition, the two countries are expected to sign agreements on tourism, on joint efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and on boosting cultural cooperation. I would like to emphasise that this visit will help solve our internal problems," Ignatenko said.

Spanish Premier Interviewed

LD2510095790 Moscow TASS in English 0758 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Text] Madrid October 25 TASS—Changes in the Soviet Union inspired by perestroyka are perhaps the most important political, economic and social peacetime reforms of the 20th century, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez told TASS on the eve of President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to this country.

"We are facing an extremely important historical period of radical changes having numerous internal and international consequences," Gonzalez said. "Spain will promote the success of perestroyka as best it can."

The prime minister described Gorbachev as a man whose activities "bring about the most important historical events this century".

He noted that he is closely following developments in the Soviet Union.

Commenting on internatioal issues, Gonzalez paid particular attention the forthcoming Paris summit of countries participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

He said the summit could adopt the first package of measures that would "boost the Helsinki process, efforts to work out an agreement on reductions in conventional armaments and the mutual recognition of the need to raise the level of the CSCE institutionalisation".

Gonzalez called for the extension of the all-European security and cooperation process to other regions of the world, including the Mediterranean.

Gonzalez Views Perestroyka

LD2510015490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Interview with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez by Soviet journalists in Spain; date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez gave an interview to Soviet journalists accredited in Spain on USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev's

upcoming visit. Answering a question on the importance of the changes taking place in our country he said:

[Gonzalez, in Spanish with superimposed Russian translation] From the very beginning I have followed the process with exceptional attention and interest. I did not share the evaluations put forward by the Western world per say. At first it treated perestroyka with a good deal of distrust and then switched to a position of admiration and even glorification, that is, from distrust to admiration. I did not indulge in glorification. I tried to regard perestroyka with as much realism as posible. And now I do not belong to those who profess a pessimistic point of view. I think that there are very many difficuties and it is very hard to solve these problems. And these difficulties I think cannot be solved from outside. Outside help can be given only in solving certain problems if attempts to solve them in practice have already been made somewhere, that is, experience has already been acquired. a year ago I said that neither the European community nor the United States—I have in mind state resources—can finance such enormous changes as a social and economic transformation of society. I do not mean political changes. No, I am speaking about economic changes. Enormous capital is required and it cannot appear simply by itself. It will apear only when trust is secured in the new economic system which is being created.

Germany's Lafontaine Views Post-Unification Issues

PM2410172290 Moscow NEWS TIMES in English No 42, 16-22 Oct 90 p 17

[Interview with Social Democratic Party of Germany Deputy Chairman Oscar Lafontaine by Konstantin Isakov; place and date not given: "Victory Postponed"]

[Text] [Isakov] Oskar Lafontaine, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, prime minister of Saarland, nominated for the chancellorship of the FRG, has been repeatedly reproached for seeking to slow down the progress towards German unity. Nevertheless, his warnings against the adverse effect that excessive haste in this matter might have on the standard of living both in the GDR and in the FRG are regarded by some analysts as sober-minded and realistic. What is it that underlies this stand taken by the West German politician?

[Lafonfaine] The ideas which are now becoming a reality formed the core of the programme adopted by the Social Democratic Party of Germany in Heidelberg back in 1925. It was as early as then that Social Democrats started calling for the United States of Europe. Speaking of the Federal Republic, the current political differences boil down to what should come first: the creation of a new german national state or the formation of the United States of Europe.

Second, opinions are divided over priorities: should we emphasize the "merger" of the FRG and the GDR at the state level—or the integration of German society? In my opinion, what German unity is all about is bringing the quality of life in Leipzig, Dresden and East Berlin to a level as highas it is in Cologne, Duesseldorf or Frankfurt.

What I would like the readers of your magazine to know first and foremost, is that Social Democrats want to "press-fit" German unification into the process of European unification, that they seek to form the United States of Europe which would maintain partnership and good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and with the United States of America.

[Isakov] But I read in the papers that Oskar Lafontaine's critical attitude to the process of german unification stems from the SDPG's being in the opposition, and from the rising tensions on the political scene as federal elections are drawing near....

[Lafonfaine] That would be too shortsighted of me. The reason why I have reminded you of Heidelberg was to make it clear that we are going by the principles worked out over the previous decades. Naturally, we enter into polemics and criticize the government's decisions if we take a different view of the European unification process. We want German society to be united, of course. This, however, should not presuppose further industrial progress of the FRG and the disintegration of the GDR's economic structures with all the ensuing consequences for free enterprise.

[Isakov] But surely the unification of Germany did not go by the SDPG's scenario, did it?

[Lafonfaine] The external aspects of the German unification process which led to October 3 would have been unthinkable without Mikhail Gorbachev's consent. On close inspection it turns out that the Social Democrats' propositions disputed by the CDU/CSU for years, are now included in the texts of official documents. Thus, the recognition of Poland's western borders, always advocated by the SDPG and long objected to by the Federal Chancellor, is now provided for by the treaty on the final settlement of the German question. The SDPG's suggestion that a nuclear-free zone be set up on the GDR territory was also disputed by the federal government. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned treaty did formalize the renunciation of the possession, production and proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The same applies to the concept of the armed forces cut in Central Europe and of changes in NATO's strategy.

In the home policy sphere, Social Democrats go by the concept of a social state. We regard it as our chief mission now to put the market economy at the service of the new state structure now being created in the GDR.

[Isakov] So who stands to gain from October 3?

[Lafonfaine] The crucial date for me was November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. What happened on October 3 formalized this process at the state level. The external aspects of German unity have been ascertained. Now we face a more difficult problem: the defining of

the internal aspects of unity. It will be years before social unityis achieved and standards of living are levelled up. It is only then we shall see who has benefitted by October 3, and who has not.

Police Raid on Berlin Party Headquarters Reported

PM2410195290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov under the rubric: "We Report the Details": "Intimidatory Shows"]

[Text] Berlin—The police raid on the building occupied in Berlin by the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] Board has rung an alarm bell for democratic German society. This action contains many startling features. The fact that the search of PDS headquarters, which lasted all night long, was carried out, it transpires, without an appropriate warrant.

It is alleged in justification that there was no time to get a warrant drawn up—"danger was looming." The fact that more than 150 policemen were drafted in to carry out the operation. This is said to be because a major protest demonstration could have spontaneously arisen in the middle of the night. The fact that during the action the offices of Bundestag Deputies H. Modrow and G. Gysi, who enjoy parliamentary immunity, were searched.

A large police show was mounted in the heart of the German capital.

The reason for it was an event which could have been quickly investigated, if need be, during working hours, as PDS representatives said. Discharging the obligations assumed by the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany], the PDS, as its successor, has tranferred large sums of money abroad, executing a perfectly legal financial transaction. The party leadership presented the relevant documents to the authorities—and that was the end of the matter.

Who, then, needed to depict a legal, democratic party, which, as the recent Land elections in East Germany reconfirmed, enjoys the support of more than 11 percent of the electorate, as a hub of dangerous conspiracies and illegal actions, and to what end?

The PDS is not the former SED, but is a renewed party with a new program and new statutes. Within the united country it is working toward becoming a powerful, left-wing opposition in the all-German parliament and an essential element in the new Germany's democratic state structure. It sees its task as representing and defending the interests of the population of the former GDR.

The PDS' honest, open objectives do not suit those who are now in power in the country. Preparation for the parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2 December, has now started in Germany. It is taking place against a background of persecution of the PDS. The present police action marks a high point in that campaign. The refusal to grant the PDS the right to create its own faction in the Bundestag, which sharply restricts its ability to participate in the parliamentary process, is another link in that chain. As are the constant attempts to raise the question of the confiscation of its property and to discredit its leaders.

A year ago democratic forces launched the process of political changes in the GDR in the hope that the new Germany would be a state firmly based on the power of the people. The word "democracy" was invariably present in the speeches and statements of politicians on both sides of the German border right up to 3 October—the day the GDR joined the FRG. It is difficult, however, to understand how commitment to democracy can square with the use of police methods to combat those regarded as political opponents, rather than political dialogue. There is a clear desire discernible here to intimidate PDS members and supporters and make them feel social outcasts and outlaws rather than fully fledged participants in democratic life.

Such tactics vis-a-vis the PDS are also indicated by a statement made by Lutz Stavenhagen, minister of state in the Federal Chancellor's Office responsible for coordinating the actions of the secret services. He reported that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution "will carefully check" whether the PDS is engaged in work "hostile to the constitution." And whether permanent police observation of it will be established will depend on the results of that check.

The PDS Presidium statement adopted after the police raid says: "If certain circles circles want to hinder our activity, that only strengthens our conviction that the existence of a consistently democratic, left-wing, socialist party is so important in this country."

Varennikov Welcomes FRG Ground Forces Inspector

PM2410111590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Official Visit"]

[Text] Lieutenant General H. von Ondarza, FRG Ground Forces inspector, arrived in Moscow 21 October on an official visit at the invitation of Army General V.I. Varennikov, commander in chief of Ground Forces and USSR deputy defense minister.

He was met at the airport by Army General V.I. Varennikov and other officials. The welcome party included Brigade General W.O. Scheffer, defense attache at the FRG Embassy in the USSR.

V.I. Varennikov had a meeting with H. von Ondarza. They discussed questions of mutual interest.

The guest laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin Wall and visited the German cemetery in Lyublino.

Nuclear Reactors in Germany To Close

PM2410132590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Germany: Dangerous Reactors"]

[Text] The FRG Government has informed Soviet officials that in the middle of December it will close down five nuclear reactors constructed with the Soviet aid on the territory of the former GDR inasmuch as they do not meet safety requirements and the cost of their reconstruction is too high.

According to a newspaper report it is a case of the four units of the Lyubmin [name as transliterated] nuclear electric power station near Greifswald and a single unit at the "Rheinsberg" nuclear electric power station.

In the opinion of IAEA official representatives Germany's decision will lead to the growth of demands to close down at least 26 similar reactors scattered over the territory of East Europe and the Soviet Union.

To a question from a TASS correspondent Bertold Gyuke [name as transliterated], a spokesman for the FRG Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Reactor Safety, replied that as of today only one unit is in operation at the nuclear electric power station in Greifswald. The remaining units have been switched off.

France Plans To Revise Nuclear Stockpiles

91WC0010A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "Truncated Triad?"]

[Text] Paris—**The French authorities are studying the question of eliminating a component of the country's nuclear triad, on which the doctrine of nuclear deterrence—the cornerstone of national defense—has been based for approximately a quarter of a century.**

What nuclear arms does France possess today? Five submarines (a sixth will be commissioned in 1994), 20 Mirage aircraft equipped with intermediate-range missiles, and 18 surface-to-surface missiles deployed on the Albion Plateau. It is the latter, specialists observe, which will most likely be sacrificed (or their modernization program, at least), whereas the so-called ocean-going strategic force will remain the "core" of deterrence.

J.-M. Boucheron, chairman of the Defense and Armed Forces Commission of the National Assembly, considers "ideal" a system of defense which consists of nuclear submarines and the latest Rafale aircraft equipped with missiles with a range of up to 1,500 km, which will replace the Mirages in a few years. This viewpoint is shared by many military officers also.

For its part, the French Defense Ministry believes that it is essential to preserve all credit intended for the nuclear arsenals—and this means 33 billion francs [Fr]—even if a component of the triad is eliminated.

The scheduled revision of nuclear stockpiles would be a part of a revision of the entire defense concept. The new concept would take account of the fundamental changes in the international situation and the unprecedented progress in the disarmament sphere and also the country's far from unlimited financial resources. It should also take account of the danger centers which have emerged recently, primarily the conflict in the Persian Gulf region.

At the same time the people on the banks of the Seine are also counting to a certain extent on cooperation with Britain in the creation of the latest missile with a greater range. This would permit a marked reduction in costs. As a whole, J.-M. Boucheron advocates a reduction in defense spending from 3.5 to 3 percent of GNP by the year 2000, which would provide a savings of Fr120 billion.

Many correspondents in the Paris press are currently accusing the Defense Ministry, the General Staff and General Arms Directorate, which deals with the manufacture of combat equipment, of a lack of strategic thinking and an inability to adapt to the changed conditions and formulate new approaches to defense.

President F. Mitterrand, who is commander in chief of the Armed Forces, will in the next few days announce the main directions of France's military strategy in the conventional and nuclear arms sphere for the coming years.

Despite the possible elimination of a component of the nuclear triad, the commissioning in the 1990's of a new class of submarine, new aircraft and the Hades tactical missiles will expand France's offensive potential considerably. For this reason many people here believe that it is time for Paris to draw a line under its nuclear stockpiles and abandon a further buildup there, the more so in that the Soviet Union and the United States intend to continue reducing their nuclear offensive arms.

As far as the "invulnerability" of the submarines is concerned, on which, to judge by everything, France is now counting, as the local press observes, quoting the American journal AVIATION WEEK, the Soviet Kosmos 1870/Almaz surveys and photographs the oceans to a depth of 300 meters.

Marshal Kulikov Researches War Data in France

LD2410004590 Moscow TASS in English 2352 GMT 23 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Khrekov]

[Text] Paris October 23 TASS—After a lengthy interval, the Soviet Union and France resumed contacts related to a search for data on Soviet and French servicemen who died in France and the Soviet Union in various years.

Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Veterans and Invalids, visited France for this purpose.

The Soviet guest was today received by Secretary of State for War Veterans Andre Meric. The French side supplied lists of Soviet servicemen buried in France.

Expressing gratitude to the French side, Kulikov pointed to the importance of new data for the compilation of the All-Union Book of Memory which will list the names of all Soviet servicemen who fell during the Second World War.

Luxembourg Prime Minister's Visit Continues

Meets With Sitaryan

LD2410125490 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Santer met Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan today to discuss specific areas and forms of effective economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Luxembourg.

Santer is currently on an official visit here. The talks were also attended by representatives of business and banking circles from both countries.

The Luxembourg prime minister drew attention to the fact that Luxembourg enterprises and firms have great experience in dealing on the foreign market and can help the Soviet Union train managerial staff for industry, agriculture and banking.

There are good prospects for cooperation in the field of transport, safety at nuclear power stations and in metallurgy.

"We are here to familiarise ourselves with the situation and to eliminate obstacles on the way of cooperation," Santer said, adding he became convinced of "the need to back up political perestroyka in the Soviet Union with the economic one."

Addressing the prime minister, who is to be the president of governing bodies of European Communities in the first six months of 1991, Sitaryan expressed the hope that Luxembourg will have "constructive" attitude towards establishing close links between the USSR and the EC.

Sitaryan confirmed that the Soviet Union currently faces economic hardships, but the common market countries should bear in mind that the Soviet Supreme Soviet had adopted a programme for the transition to a market-driven economy, clearly indicating in which direction the Soviet economy will develop.

Speaking in a TASS interview at the end of the talks, Santer specially emphasised that "Luxembourg, as the future president in EC bodies, has specific proposals on developing political relations with the USSR as well".

In this connection one should point out that at today's talks at the USSR Council of Ministers, Santer gave a high appraisal of his talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. He stressed, in particular, that it was held "at an extremely important moment for the USSR and Europe".

Speaks on Historial 'Links'

LD2410154690 Moscow TASS in English 1517 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—Radical changes in the Soviet Union's political and economic life, the Soviet leadership's determination to bring society's renewal to successful completion and his productive exchange of views with Soviet leaders were praised here today by Prime Minsiter Jacques Santer of Luxembourg at a news conference devoted to the results of his official visit to the Soviet Union.

Speaking about Soviet-Luxembourg relations, Santer recalled the historical friendly links between the two countries. He said that Russia had acted as a guarantor of his people's independence as far back as 150 years ago. He expressed satisfaction with the fact that present Soviet leaders favoured continuing these relations.

On behalf of his people, Santer voiced gratitude to the Soviet Union, which ensured the return of numerous citizens of Luxembourg to their homes from Nazi extermination camps after the Second World War.

"Thanks to the Soviet Union," he said. "Those young men were able to return to their homeland and reunite with their relatives".

Santer told the news conference that an extraordinary session of the European Council would be held in Rome from October 27 to 28 to discuss assistance to Soviet economic reform. "I believe that the European Communities must share responsibility for economic reforms in the Soviet Union because they stand to gain politically from these reforms," he said. "Without these reforms, there would have been no German unification, no changes in other European countries and no progress within the CSCE framework," Santer said.

Santer recalled that his country would chair the EC bodies from January 1, 1991. In this connection, he expressed hope that necessary measures to support Soviet economic and financial reforms would be approved and implemented.

Santer ruled out the possibility of EC partners disagreeing with the plan. He said that the proposals, submitted by Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Sitaryan to the leadership of the EC Commission in

Brussels earlier this week, will provide one of the basic components for working out necessary measures.

As regards bilateral Soviet-Luxembourg relations, Santer pointed to the present potential for expanding trade exchanges. For this purpose, he stressed, a credit, worth 100 million Luxembourg Franks, will be issued.

During his talks in Moscow, he proposed organising the thorough training of Soviet specialists for work in market economy, including in banking.

He expresseed interest in signing an agreement with the Soviet Union on avoiding double taxation in light of the latest Soviet legislation, which is to go into effect on January 1, 1991.

"We do not overlook the difficulties of the transition period in the Soviet Union. These difficulties are unavoidable," Santer sid. "However, it should be said with full sincerity that the Soviet leadership's determination to finalise renewal within a compressed period of time inspires optimism".

Departs 24 Oct

LD2410183990 Moscow TASS in English 1715 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Santer left the Soviet Union today. He was staying in the USSR on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

The state flags of Luxembourg and the Soviet Union were hoisted at Sheremetyevo Airport. Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and other officials were among the send-off party.

A guard of honour from troops of the Moscow garrison was mustered at the airfield. The state anthems of the two countries were played.

Ryzhkov and Santer reviewed the guard of honour.

The formal ceremony ended with the march past of the guard of honour.

Laverov Holds Talks With Austrian Chancellor

LD2410080490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2217 GMT 23 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 24 Oct (TASS)—Topical issues of economic cooperation between the USSR and Austria were the center of attention at a meeting held here on Tuesday between Franz Vranitzky, federal chancellor, and Nikolay Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology. He is in Vienna in connection with the Days of Soviet Science and Technology which are being held in the Alpine republic.

There was an interested exchange of views on specific areas of deepening bilateral interaction in economic, scientific, and technological spheres.

The chancellor showed lively interest in the processes of perestroyka in the USSR. He expressed the conviction that the large-scale transformations being implemented in the USSR will help the further expansion of contacts between the USSR and Austria in economic, scientific, and technological spheres.

The conversation, in which Valeriy Popov, Soviet ambassador to Austria, took part, was held in a business-like and constructive atmosphere.

New Austrian Ambassador Arrives in Moscow

PM2410151490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[TASS "Official Announcement"]

[Text] Austrian Ambassador to the USSR Friedrich Bayer arrived in Moscow on 15 October.

Finland Hopes To Continue Visa Exchanges

PM2310105990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[Item from "News Flow 19 October" column of PRAVDA and TASS reports: "Finland"]

[Text] Finland considers it necessary to retain the practise of visa exchange with the USSR. This is reported by the newspaper DEMARI in its coverage of the results of a meeting between Finnish President M. Koivisto and the chief editors of Finnish newspapers. He stated that he does not regard the abolition of the existing practise of visa exchange between the USSR and Finland as sensible. "The president's view is completely justified," the newspaper writes. It is to be expected that in the next few years millions of Soviet citizens will go abroad in search of a better life. It is assumed that a considerable proportion of them will head for Finland. At the meeting with journalists the Finnish president expressed concern in connection with the possible increase in the flow of people from the USSR and stated that he sees no need to abolish visas for the entry of Soviet citizens into Finland.

Latin America & Caribbean

Argentine Leader, Foreign Minister Continue Visit

Shevardnadze Meets Counterpart

LD2410205590 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—During today's meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his Argentine counterpart, Domingo Cavallo, who is

accompanying President Carlos Saul Menem during his working visit to the Soviet Union, expressed similar views of world events.

The sides noted that the process of renewal and the transition from confrontation to mutual understanding and partnership is picking up steam in the world.

However, the improvement of the international situation has yet to achieve worldwide political stability, they stressed.

The present situation is a test for humanity, a test for its ability to take agreed and reasonable actions for the sake of peace.

The ministers examined the creation of reliable security on worldwide and regional scales and discussed urgent issues in disarmament, the settlement of regional conflicts and the establishment of a new economic order based on democratic principles.

They stated with satisfaction that cooperation between the two states is spreading to important spheres, including ecology, international law and control over illicit narcotics trafficking and international terrorism.

During the meeting, the sides noted that the Soviet Union and Argentina favour a more important role for the United Nations as a key instrument for ensuring the peaceful solution of outstanding issues and a factor of stability and irreversibility of positive changes in the world.

The ministers stressed that the Gulf crisis jeopardises gains achieved by the community of nations during the past few years. They also emphasised that world nations should do their best to find a political solution of the conflict.

Cavallo praised the Soviet Union's honest, open and predictable policy in Latin America and supported the Soviet intention to develop the dialogue with the Organization of American States and the "Rio de Janeiro Group".

In the opinion of the sides, interaction between the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America, which is now being established at the inter-regional level, helps strengthen the mechanisms of global cooperation.

Shevardnadze and Cavallo expressed satisfaction with the state of Soviet-Argentine relations.

They noted that the dialogue between the USSR and Argentina is becoming more comprehensive, involving growing numbers of representatives of political, business and public circles.

At the same time additional efforts are needed to improve cooperation, especially in the economy and technology.

This cooperation should be conducted on a large scale, conforming to the potential of the two countries and their role in world affairs. This will be promoted by important Soviet-Argentine documents drafted for Menem's visit to the USSR.

The meeting was held in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual understanding.

Lukyanov Meets Argentine President

LD2410183490 Moscow TASS in English 1756 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—"At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which ended a couple of hours ago, deputies asked me to convey to you cordial greetings and wish you success in your activity," Soviet Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov said at a meeting with President Carlos Menem of Argentina in the Kremlin today.

Menem arrived here today on a working visit.

Lukyanov also told the guest that in the run-up to this meeting, he talked with President Mikhail Gorbachev who "expressed hope for a friendly meeting" with the Argentine president.

Lukyanov acquainted Menem with political transformations in the USSR aimed at building a law-governed state and renewing the federation and with economic reforms meant to ensure the transition to a market. Lukyanov also familiarised the guest with the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Menem positively evaluated current democratic processes in the USSR. He said the world community's growing interest in them was explained by perestroika's salutary impact on efforts to form a new international political climate.

The two politicians focused on sweeping changes in the world, which prompted an about-turn in inter-state relations from confrontation to cooperation. The sides emphasised the need to intensify both countries' efforts to forge positive tendencies in the world arena, create conditions for building a nuclear-free and non-violent world and ensure international security.

The sides stated that their positions on major international issues were identical or close, which objectively facilitates more effective and close Soviet-Argentine interaction.

Menem and Lukyanov expressed satisfaction with the comprehensive development of bilateral relations. They emphasised that the atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding that has asserted itself in the political dialogue between the two countries "opened new opportunities for making the entire range of Soviet-Argentine links more dynamic".

Gorbachev Meets Counterpart

LD2510100390 Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT 25 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Rublevsky]

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—A meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and President Carlos Menem of the Argentine Republic began at the Catherine Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace (?today).

Menem arrived in Moscow on a working visit on Wednesday.

He congratulated Gorbachev on his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and wished him further success in the noble activity for the benefit of peace and global security.

The two politicians are expected to discuss key international issues related, first and foremost, to the building of a new world order and the participation of all states in this process. Bilateral trade and economic relations will also be a major topic of discussion.

Several Soviet-Argentine documents will be signed upon the end of the talk.

'Peaceful Settlement' Urged in El Salvador

LD2010033890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1320 GMT 19 Oct 90

[By TASS political observer Nikolay Chigir]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Oct (TASS)—As a result of the exchange of views held in Washington between representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S State Department on the problems of Latin America, the sides expressed consistent support for a peace settlement in El Salvador. The USSR and the United States believe it desirable that the government of Alfredo Cristiani and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMNLF] step up the process of peace talks between them, with the aim of more rapidly achieving political agreements on a ceasefire. At the same time the conviction was expressed that both sides in the El Salvador conflict should refrain from armed actions capable of damaging the cause of achieving peace in that Central American country.

The Soviet-American exchange of views on the El Salvador problem confirms that both the great powers are consistently implementing the drive, on which they have agreed, for a comprehensive political settlement to regional conflicts according to the principles of national reconciliation. Such reconciliation has long been a pressing need in El Salvador. Nor is it merely a matter of the troubles and suffering of the people of El Salvador, who have lost 75,000 human lives during the many years of bloodshed. Continuation of the armed confrontation in El Salvador represents a serious threat to peace and security throughout the Central American region, and could have a negative impact on the international situation as a whole.

Like the entire course of the development of the conflict in El Salvador, the deployment of forces in the country today speaks convincingly of the fact that neither one of the conflicting sides is capable of victory. Continuation of the conflict will only entail numerous further futile human casualties. Common sense suggests that there is no reasonable alternative to an immediate end to the bloodshed and a political solution of all the country's problems, on the basis of talks based on the equality of rights between the government and the FMNLF—all the more so when the meetings that have already been held between their representatives, including that in Caracas in May of this year, have produced encouraging results.

It has, of course, to be understood that the forthcoming talks will have no change of success if any kind of unilateral demands are made of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in the future. A positive result can only be achieved in the event that both sides embark upon the road of necessary compromises and mutually acceptable solutions.

Guyanese Ambassador Received at Foreign Ministry

PM2310140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] B.N. Chaplin, USSR deputy foreign minister, received R. Chandisingh, Guyanese ambassador to the USSR, at his request 19 October. The talks, which were held in a friendly atmosphere, included a businesslike exchange of opinions on certain issues of Soviet-Guyanese relations and, in particular, the financial conditions pertaining to the functioning of the two countries' embassies.

Supreme Soviet

Deputies Endorse Federal Laws' Supremacy

LD2410142490 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Ivan Ivanov, Vladimir Isachenkov, and Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—The Soviet parliament today passed a law enforcing federal laws, which reaffirms the supremacy of federal legislation over republican legal acts within the centre's sphere of responsibility.

The new law, effective immediately after publication and through the conclusion of a new Soviet Union Treaty, invalidates republican acts contradicting this principle.

According to the bill's sponsors, it should end the "war of laws" between the centre and republics, most of which have declared that their legislation takes precedence over federal laws.

Yuriy Kalmykov, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Legislation, who presented the bill, said it should help stabilise the legal system and the overall situation in the country.

"We are neither declaring war on republics nor bringing pressure to bear on them," he said. "The republics should understand that this legal act is in the interests of all."

It stipulates that if a republic is opposed to any of the law's clauses, it can directly appeal to the Federal Supreme Soviet or Congress of People's Deputies.

The debate on the bill was heated and focused on a clause giving the president the right to fire various local officials. The terms under which he should be able to do so proved a bone of contention.

After the parliamentary houses took separate votes on the bill, it turned out that the Council of Nationalities approved it with the exception of this clause, while the Council of the Union fell four votes short of the minimum required for endorsement.

A commission of conciliation, however, later worked out a compromise wording of the controversial clause, and the bill was finally approved by both parliamentary houses.

Parliament, which today sat only until lunch, then heard an address from the 19th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions currently under way in Moscow.

The latter expressed "indignation at the position of parliament which has been dragging its feet on the adoption of a law on trade union rights."

It suggested that parliament should "consider the law as a matter of priority and have its first reading before the trade union congress draws to a close".

Lukyanov said that this kind of recommendation is "not quite correct" and that the charges of marking time on the trade union law are unjustified.

He proposed that the parliamentary commission on labour, pricing and social policies and representatives of the trade union congress meet on Thursday to review the preparation of the bill.

If the commission decides that the bill is ready to be discussed, parliament can have its first reading next week, Lukyanov said.

The parliament schedule for Thursday includes only committee and commission meetings.

Discussion on Supremacy Reported

LD2410112790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Report by V. Tsygankov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Tsygankov] The speedy adoption of the bill being discussed today by the Union legislature—which is to ensure the efficacy of all the legislative acts that have already been adopted—is dictated by the complex situation that has arisen in the country. Yuriy Khamzatovich Kalmykov, chairman of the Committee on Legislation, gave a detailed exposition of the document. The main idea of the draft (?lies in) its importance in stabilization, so that before concluding the Union treaty we may stand on firm legal ground in accordance with the existing Constitution of the country and the delimitation of powers between the centre and the Union and autonomous republics.

The supremacy of Union law in no way damages the sovereign rights of the republics belonging to the Soviet Union. The debates, and particularly the arguments about the fourth article, which gives some extra powers to the president when officials are released from their duties, showed that the draft still needs work. A compromise commission was set up.

Then Vologzhin, chairman of the Committee on Economic Reform, informed the legislature of the results of work connected with the publication in the press of the Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market Economy with the amendments and remarks introduced into the document while it was under discussion by the Supreme Soviet of the country.

Supreme Soviet 24 October Meeting Reported

LD2410221490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1844 GMT on 24 October carries a 43-minute program with recorded excerpts on the 24 October

session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin. Lukyanov introduces the law on supremacy of union legislation ensuring the implementation and validity of all union laws on all USSR territory and then hands over to Deputy Yuriy Kalmykov.

Kalmykov speaks for 17 minutes. He says that the development of the national processes in the country is one of the most important results of perestroyka, including the various declarations of national sovereignty. This is a progressive process which has some negative tendencies, with some republics having declared that they have halted the validity of union laws on their territory or have seen the need to ratify them, he notes. This destabilizes the situation in the country, he says. The bodies of law and order do not know whether to follow the union, republican, or both sets of laws, and these negative tendencies have caused the need for the law on the supremacy of union laws to be drawn up. He says that this draft law is an interpretive piece of legislation and should have a stabilizing effect.

Asked what the law contains, he says the law confirms the principle of federalism and the principle of the supremacy of Union laws. This law is to act in the period until the conclusion of a union treaty, so that the Union laws stand on a firm legal basis. What the future brings we do not know, he says, so for the moment we should maintain normal principles. Moving on to the meaning of supremcy, he says that what is intended is the validity of a union law on republican territory within the framework of established norms. He adds that it does not mean the violation of the sovereignty of a republic. The law of 26 April 1990 defines the authority of Union and repubican supreme soviets. He appeals for the observance of the present law during the period until the adoption of a union treaty.

He goes on to point out that the law also envisages the supremacy of republican laws over automous formations' laws. The law touches on the role of the committee of constitutional control to which a republic can appeal if it considers its sovereignty is violated or its interests harmed by union laws. The matter would then be passed the USSR Supreme Soviet within a month for discussion, thus ensuring that republics have a right to be heard.

Concluding his address, Kalmykov says that the law gives the president the right to dismiss officials and managers of state enterprises. Because of the situation in the country and in view of the increasing executive powers of the president it has been decided to give the president the power to act over the head of his ministers. Any person dismissed under this law has the right of appeal. These are the basic points of the law, Kalmykov says.

After brief exceprts of the debate on this law, an announcer says that the law was passed by the Soviet of Nationalities but has still to be debated by the Soviet of the Union. It will then be handed to arbitration commission

At 1906 GMT Lukyanov speaks about the publication of the basic guidelines concerning transition to the market. He points out that deputies will be given the text before publication.

Deputy Baranov then reads an appeal from the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions concerning adoption of the law on rights of trade unions.

At 1909 GMT Lukyanov says that accusations of delaying the adoption of the trade union law are not well founded. He proposes that trades union representatives take part in discussions with the committee which is developing this law.

An unidentified deputy continues the topic of the trade union appeal and says that work is not going slowly on the trades union law. She says that this is a basic law which defends the rights of the workers and must not be rushed.

Another unidentified deputy says the deputies at the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions congress are workers. He says people have no confidence in the future and fear unemployment. He proposes that some USSR Supreme Soviet deputies speak at the congress to help calm the natural fears of the workers.

At 1915 GMT Lukyanov says that a sitting of the committee on this matter is planned for tomorrow and proposes that trade union delegates attend.

At 1916 GMT Kalmykov returns to the rostrum to talk about the law concerning supremacy of union laws and then reads a compromise version of a previously disputed article. This is adopted by 276 votes in favor with 26 against.

Deputy Borovik comes to the rostrum. He denies a rumor that a Silayev, a Grishin, and a Gorbachev received a free trip to the United States during the recent Gorbachev-Bush summit. All those named were on the trip, but they have no relation to their famous namesakes. He refutes accusations of abuse of public funds and of nepotism.

At 1927 GMT the program ends.

Lukyanov Remarks

LD2510091790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 24 Oct 90

["Legislative Diary" program with Andrey Nikiforov—passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Nikiforov] You have no doubt noticed, comrades, that in the drafting, adoption, and implementation of virtually every law, including the one which we are discussing now [on the supremacy of federal legislation over republican legislation], the USSR

Supreme Soviet keeps finding itself confronted by one and the same question, the Union treaty. Deputies urged today that its drafting should be speeded up. Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov had the following to say about this:

"[Lukyanov] A week ago the USSR president sent a memorandum setting out an outline and draft of the Union treaty to the chairmen of supreme soviets and the presidents of all Union republics and to the chairmen of the supreme soviets of all autonomous republics and autonomous entities. When this question was discussed at the Council of the Federation, all the republics made the point that they did not want to receive several versions of it. After all, the republics had themselves brought with them their own versions of the treaty. Give us the version which you consider expedient and acceptable, they said. The president sent these versions of the Union treaty to all the Union republics.

"Without echoing, so to speak, what Yuriy Khamzatovich [Kalmykov, chairman of the Committee on Legislation] said, I want, comrades, to make one point here. some people seem to have the impression that the Union has an interest in violating the rights of the Union republics and acting outside the scope of its powers. Where is the evidence?

"This causes extra friction. The union passes laws. You know this well. After all that's the only thing we do here. The Union passes laws within the powers which have been established, not only those which have been established by the Constitution, but also by the law which we adopted quite recently, on the demarcation of powers. Let the Union republics or autonomous republics try and find a law which violates these laws, the Constitution, and the law on the demarcation of powers. Then they would have something to complain about. From my point of view, a Union law issued within the scope of these powers must have priority over a republican law, and a republican law issued within the scope of the powers of a Union republic of an autonomous republic should have priority on that territory. That's the long and short of it. These powers have to be differentiated."

[Nikiforov] Deputy Vologzhin, chairman of the Committee on Economic Reform, delivered a report today on the reworked text of the Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market economy. The text has been improved. The amendments made by the Supreme Soviet have been incorporated. However, this gave rise to further debate today. Amendments to the document were suggested verbally. They could also effect its substance. Therefore, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov proposed that the question be deferred, so that the commission [as heard] can rework it again, with a transcript of all the amendments at its disposal. The commission will report again on Monday, and on Tueseday the basic guidelines will probably be published in the central press.

Now for something else which was discussed today. A number of USSR deputies are taking part in the congress of the country's trade unions which is in progress at the moment. This has been reflected in the legislature's work. [passage omitted]

"[Lukyanov] I think, comrades, that the appeal is a serious one, although I do not think that the charge that the USSR Supreme Soviet is deliberately holding up the review of this bill is justified. Furthermore, I do not think that this is a good idea to inflame passions by saying that the country's supreme legislative body has different ideas or views on the role of the trade unions. We appreciate this role. We see the need for a strengthening of this role when we have a market economy in our country. So, there is no question to be discussed here." [passage omitted]

"[Lukyanov] Comrades, if we are going to talk seriously, let it be about this. First, I have just spoken over the telephone with Mikhail Sergeyevich. You must have noticed that I was absent. I asked him for his views. He is at the [trade union] congress. He asked us to study this proposal attentively once again. I explained our situation to him. Our commission is in fact scheduled to meet tomorrow. This is a scheduled meeting. Preparations for it have already been completed. The only thing we can do—and we don't have to adopt a decision on this—is to invite congress delegates to take part in the meeting of our commission. If the commission deems it expedient and possible to put forward this bill for its first reading, we will examine it next week, without our existing schedule, our existing timetable.

"I also want to say a few words about the bill. I have followed the debate very closley. I attended the meeting of the commission. I was, in fact, an initiator myself. I supported the proposal—comrades will recall this—for the adoption of the law on trade unions, considering it to be a very important element, so to speak, in the entire package of laws on the market, connected with the transition to the market. But this must be a law on trade unions, not on trade union organizations or the trade union apparatus. It should be about the millions of people—the 140 million people—who at this difficult time really are concerned to see that the protection of rights should be approached from precisely this direction. I hope that television will transmit our discussions today and express our concern for the members of the trade unions themselves, the millions of working people. We will not go back on our word as far as this is concerned."

[Nikiforov] Tomorrow the Union legislature will be work in committees and commissions.

PRAVDA Publishes Decree on Public Associations

91US0031A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

["USSR Supreme Soviet decree: Introduction of the USSR Law 'On Public Associations'"]

[Text] In accordance with the enactment of the USSR Law "On Public Associations," the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To introduce the USSR Law "On Public Associations" as of 1 January 1991.

Until legislation is brought into line with the said law, acts of legislation concerning public associations will apply inasmuch as they are not contrary to this law.

2. To establish that provisions of the USSR Law "On Public Associations" governing the registration of the statutes (regulations, other fundamental instruments) of public associations extend to the statutes of public associations created prior to this law taking effect. The statutes of such all-Union and interrepublic public associations will be registered up to 31 December 1991; the rule of Part 2 of Article 11 concerning presentation of statutes for registration within one month of their adoption does not apply here.

Particular features in regulation of the provisions governing registration of the statutes of trade unions and supervision of their activity contained in Articles 11, 20, and 22 of the USSR Law "On Public Associations" are stipulated by legislation governing the trade unions.

3. To recommend that the Supreme Soviets of the Union and autonomous republics:

bring legislation of the Union and autonomous republics into line with the USSR Law "On Public Associations";

prior to 1 January 1991 determine the list of state authorities authorized to register the statutes of interrepublic (if they are not registered in the USSR Ministry of Justice), republic, and local public associations.

4. That the USSR Council of Ministers:

issue and publish in the press rules on the examination in accordance with the USSR Law "On Public Associations" of applications for the registration of the statutes of all-Union and interrepublic public associations; determine the procedure for collecting, and the amount of, the fees for the registration of the statutes of all-Union and interrepublic public associations;

prior to 1 December 1990 decide questions connected with the creation in the USSR Ministry of Justice of a special service for registering the statutes of all-Union and interrepublic public associations and for monitoring compliance with their statutes, and personnel, material, financial, and other support for the activity of this service;

bring the decisions of the USSR Government into line with the said law.

5. To recognize as invalid as of 1 January 1991 the following legislative instruments of the USSR:

the decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of 6 January 1930 "On Procedure of the Establishment and Liquidation of Non-Profit-Making All-Union Societies and Unions" ("USSR Code of Laws" No. 7, 1930, Article 76);

the decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of 7 September 1932 "On Procedure of the Activity Within the USSR of Foreign and International Voluntary Societies and Unions" ("USSR Code of Laws" No. 67, 1932, Article 404).

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 9 October 1990.

Political & Social

24 Oct Trade Union Congress Proceedings Detailed

Gorbachev Addresses Congress

LD2410221890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the 19th USSR Trade Unions Congress in the Kremlin on 24 October—recorded]

[Text] We discussed and conferred on this in the leadership, and came to the decision that we must not fail to take an attentive attitude to everything that will take place here over the next few days at the congress of the country's trade unions. This is because it is all very important, and it is difficult to imagine what organization other than our trade union is closer to the working people. If you take into account that this congress is taking place at a stage in our country's development when we have come to a phase and juncture of the deepest changes in all spheres of our country's life, what this congress will convey from the point of view of information about the processes taking place in the country is very important; it is very important what stance the trade union congress will adopt on the principal issues that concern our society, all of us, the Soviet people; and it is important from the point of view of what the near future, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow will hold, and how we are going to live in the coming months, and also from the point of view of where our choice and the road we are following lead. It is because of all the pressure and acute difficulty of the problems that we are all currently experiencing—a source of worry for all of us—that we should nevertheless not forget or lose sight of our goals and points of

reference. Otherwise we could end up going in a completely different direction, which will not meet our interests.

So, I can unambiguously say to the congress that we have the most respectful attitude. We have a very great interest in the success and fruitful results of the congress proceedings. I believe, moreover, that they can be fruitful on two conditions: That the congress confirms the need for further transformations in the interests of people, in the interests of improving all our lives; consolidates the positive things that perestroyka has already yielded; and tries to state its position on and propose measures for getting rid of what concerns all of us and presents a certain threat to us today, particularly from the point of view of the goals we are aiming for.

The first thing I would like to confirm is that we have a very great interest in having strong and—I am not afraid to utter and use the word—independent trade unions. This is because you can hardly be strong if you do not adhere firmly to independent positions and do not stand firmly on your own two feet. So we have an interest in seeing strong trade unions which will act constructively and responsibly, and it seems to me... [changes thought] I was asked what impression I had of the congress and its proceedings and speeches, after my two days attendance. I think that for all the sharpness of the forms of words and opinions that are being expressed from this platform and from the microphones, the main message I can detect, nevertheless—the message of all the sentiments and viewpoints—is that people are alarmed and worried by the situation, and most importantly by the destiny of their country. This is the most important thing. All the rest, I think, feed the existing alarms and troubles our society is experiencing.

I therefore welcome the seriousness and the [words indistinct] of judgements and proposals, and I perceive the exacting formulation which delegates are putting forward in the course of this conversation at the congress. This is the first thing.

Second: As I see the role of the trade unions, I cannot conceive that our cause can be successful or that we might resolve the tasks which currently face us without the active role of the trade unions. You will recall that at that congress, too, I said that I personally am impressed not by those trade unions that dance to the tune of the economic managers, but by the constructive, intensive work of those trade unions that take a firm position, based on the interests of workers, based on responsibility for the destiny of the country and the life of the people. I think that this is already evident today, and I welcome precisely such a role on the part of the trade unions. It is not destructive, but creative; and comrades, we all need to remember this.

We now have very many specialists in gaining authority, sometimes just cheap authority, with, as it were, a sharp phrase or loud premise, as it were, particularly with... [pauses] especially if... [pauses] I was told during the conversation that particularly now... [pauses] For a long time in Russia there has been a tradition of criticizing the leadership. It has existed at all stages in the development of our state. But now, in the age of glasnost, openness, and freedom, it is necessary to reveal all that has accumulated here; and so far it has not been revealed, even though much has already been said. Someone once said: If you do not criticize the leadership, no one will listen. But, you know, I think it is not the leadership that matters, but the analysis of policy, the analysis of decisions.

In this connection, I come to the third point in my speech. Of course, comrades, we take in sharp critical remarks, but on one condition: that we remember where we are as a result of these years of perestroyka or transfer from certain forms of life—economic, social, political—and in our multinational state to new forms. From this point of view, during these years we perhaps have passed through what some peoples and nations sometimes take a century to pass through. And we have become completely different. Nothing will ever cause people who have tested all that they have received in connection with perestroyka to turn back. There is no need, I think, to fear the fact that there is now a great deal that is not to our liking, and not only mistakes, but also processes taking place within the framework of perestroyka. Along with the positive things, there is much that is negative that has occurred, and I think if we had not allowed—this is the most serious thing—if we and you had not allowed complications to occur on the consumer market, the aggravation of living conditions, their deterioration as a result of the deregulated state of the market, then everything else, comrades, could be understood.

The main thing is that we could have restrained this, but under pressure from the fact that there were a great many problems that had to be addressed, we went to meet this, like people responding to need, to difficulties, to problems, to the fact that we could see that issues were being raised in reality; we went to meet them, and we opened up, so to speak, the possibility of a distortion occurring in the development, so to speak, of our economy, and in general in the whole socioeconomic situation. After all, does not the phrase that 62 billion [rubles (R)]—or more than over the three preceding five-year plan periods—were spent on centralized measures alone testify to anything? So, everything had to be done in order that commodities might increase in such a flow. We saw and knew that this was, probably—in any case, if we were going to be realists—that this goal was delusive. If that was so, then we should have proved to society that we must not embark on such steps, that this is where this will lead, and that the profit obtained, an increment of several percent, will lead to the kind of situation when these negative processes will develop, accompanied by shortages, and this money, this increment, will be insufficient, it will turn out to be useless. And this state of deregulation, the panic buying, the shortages, these corrupt elements, speculative elements, got into motion and aggravated to a very high extent the socioeconomic

situation in society. This, perhaps, is the greatest error of the country's leadership, the greatest error. There was a desire to be democrats, perhaps; well, not a desire, but a need. We saw the need to find solutions.

Well, listen. We have solved the issue. First, there used to be pensions of R30, 40, or 28. We decided that the matter should be solved at the very beginning of the five-year period. You remember the situation with doctors and teachers. We found possibilities to raise, in one case, R3.5 billion, and, in the other, about R5-6 billion. We sought and solved the problem. You remember what stipends students used to get, and so on. And other things, too. You know the state culture was in. We added there, we added for housing. All that had to be done, correct? Yes, it is correct. But a good deal went to the market. In addition to this, freedom was given to enterprises, and this freedom—we did not counterbalance it with specific mechanisms—led to a situation in which, first, the amount of money dropped and the profits made by enterprises were spent mainly on remuneration, on increasing remuneration, not on development, not on structural modification or modernization, but was channelled there. It went to the market, too. In earlier times commodity turnover grew by 10-12 billion, yet nevertheless, one managed somehow to control the market.

In 1989 it grew by R25.5 billion, last year by R37 billion. This year it will probably grow by a further R42-43 billion. That is four times more than it has been increasing to date. And what state is the market in? I think this is the greatest error committed by the country's leadership: It did not address this question on an integral basis. This has to be recognized; we can see this. Well, we can repent, so to speak; but we have to learn the lessons. I think we are now attaining new forms of economic life, and in this connection, we have linked this transition as a movement toward the market. This, comrades, is not an invention, it is not an invention. It is simply the logical development of our economy along the path on which we have embarked.

On what path have we embarked? Democratization, decentralization in the economic sphere, and the transfer of rights and economic initiative to the primary collectives themselves. So, we have to proceed to the end, go further. We have seen that economic initiative does not work out; we will not spark any interest unless we reform our ownership. If there is such total domination of state ownership, under which—however else it might be—it is not the people, it is not the working people who are in charge. [sentence as heard] And this is in the country of the working people.

People have been pushed aside from the means of production, from real influence. They do not feel themselves to be the owners at their enterprise; they do not feel themselves to be confident masters; they do not run things; and, the main thing, they do not get the chance to dispose of the final results. How is this to be done? It is always only the owner who can do it. So, ownership relations have to be reformed; so we will take this road. This will be state ownership; it will be joint-stock enterprises, the working people; it will be cooperative, leasehold, collective farm ownership; agro-firms; and so on and so forth, right up to small-scale private ownership, where it is necessary, where it is necessary, and where we can see where the state sector—these large enterprises—are not doing the job. That is the owner, ownership relations; but if that is so, comrades, if that is so, if all of these owners are to enter the economic sphere, then a market is needed.

Until now everything has been distributed, from nails to rockets; everything has been distributed by the state, the government. Now this has to be done within the framework of market relations. This is why the market is needed. Having embarked on the road to spark people's interest, material interest, by reforming ownership, without doubt we had to come to the market.

Are we finding this difficult? Yes, it is difficult. In general, for our society this will be the greatest trial; but we have to endure it, otherwise we will be wasting resources, wasting resources. We expend one and one-half, two, two and one-half, and even three times more resources, power, metal, cement, and so on per unit of national income than developed countries.

We were swimming in these resources. Our work force grew. The state ran like this. It also used the difference—or rather the high oil prices on the world market. This suplemented us and made up for everything which we were not doing, our bad management, our negative view of technology.

I remember as secretary of Stavropol Kray party committee and as Central Committee member, when about 18 and even more years ago, the question was put—you will now help me and we will remember this together—when Comrade Brezhnev announced that we must hold a plenum on scientific and technical progress. They announced it, prepared for it for almost a year, and postponed everything. This happened when structural reorganization was taking place throughout the world. At that time we said: This is capitalism; look, 30 million thrown out of work in Europe alone and in certain other countries alongside Europe, and so on. You remember the miners' and steel workers' clashes in the FRG, England, and so on. Those were structural policies taking place. These countries were entering a new technological epoch.

Together we said that here we are, everything is fine; but no—everything was bad, and we continued this way until recently. And now this inertia is strangling us. We expend more resources—I said something like this during my conversation with the comrades. When I go to a country I am given statistical data, comparisons. I look: per capita resources in the USSR, per capita resources, for example, in Finland, and even the United States. And I see that in the majority of cases we have more resources per capita, apart from plastics, paper, some of those kind of things, so to speak, new, maybe, quality things. But,

when I look at the end, the national revenue, or the gross national product, or goods in dollars, so to speak, then it is two and one-half, three times less. That is exactly how everything is going on. We have as much or more resources, but they are all exhausted here because we have no resource-saving technology. Our metal is lost as waste, and we know the degree to which we refine our oil, and so on and so forth. Comrades, if we continue like this, then we are going up a blind alley. So we have to change everything and go along two paths: bring into play the human factor through man's new status as an owner in the economy, as a genuine boss, from the beginning of the process to the selling of products and their arrival on the market. And at the same time man begins to think that there is more—well, the price is going like this; so for me to gain, I must reduce my outlay, and in order to reduce it then it is necessary to think, and even steal technology, as they do. There exists a whole industrial espionage system in the market economy, you understand; and here now the whole system which has functioned up until the present, and has functioned all these decades, (?rejects this).

This always has to be restructured, you have to think of this, all of this—we were living only on our resources, on the current world economic situation [words indistinct]. We added vodka, too—we added R100 billion by increasing the production of vodka and alcohol. At the expense of what were we getting by? Is this normal? Is this a market? You see, if we want to resolve things by commodity turnover alone, then we will not resolve them. Throughout the world at the present time, you see, colossal increases are occurring in services. At the present time, in the majority of countries, there are already fewer people working in material production than in the services sphere. And in our country? Everything is the other way round, you see.

If we add to this the fact that we have turned out to have one of the world's militarized economies, and that we have competed with America, whose economy is nearly two and a half times bigger than ours—by the way, America is not managing to bear this arms race, it is not managing to bear it, it has also taken the road whereby it will ensure life by different standards, completely different, in this context—but America is not managing to bear this race, either. We had 75 percent of our scientific sector working for the military-industrial sector of the economy. The best funds were there and the best materials. Look, all this has to be changed. People have to be given an interest, and the economy has to be developed in the direction of people. Will this be easy? Dear comrades, even if you shoot me, even if you crucify me like Jesus Christ, all the same it will not be easy for us; we will not find it easy, but it has to be done. Otherwise we will be going into a historical dead-end.

And so, when I hear that Gorbachev, as ARGUMENTY I FAKTY has just published in the latest edition, is an agent of imperialism sent here, they have given me a prize for this, [laughter] you know that he has ruined the Union, wrecked the party, you know, he has eliminated the socialist system and so on; I shall tell you straight: I forgive ignorant people, people devoid of the possibility of understanding all that is happening, I can understand this. But when this is done by people who understand what is at issue, then we are dealing with discrediting, wrecking, hampering, because whatever else, this transition has to farm out a great deal to the localities, everything to the localities. Everyone has his role, beginning with who is worth what, what he is worth in government circles and in the whole power structure, and ending with what the man at the workplace is worth. Would you not agree with me that in this sense we have the most complex society? Take and analyze the labor situation, attitudes toward labor, from a standpoint of conscientiousness, attitudes to the job. Oh! how much we will find! On our adherence to free-loading, to everything—to redistribution!

What are we always talking about? Mostly, it is redistribution first and production only after that. But now we are starting to talk about production. It is in essence a healthy process that is going on now. We only have to understand that we are in the last trenches on many questions, at the last line. After that, disintegration, discord, and chaos will begin if we do not sustain the situation and do not make positive decisions on many issues.

Take for example the Union. This was a unitary state. I do not know how many problems it had accumulated. As soon as the situation was democratized, all that was flushed to the surface. Could we have acted in a better way? As every Russian, I now see that we could have acted in a better way. But we are always wiser [after the event]. We could have, but in principle we are on the right track. To be exact, we should make it so that in this community of peoples, each person, all people can feel their place, to feel assured that the people will not disappear, that the language will not disappear. We cannot accept such things as, for example, what happened in the Ukraine, where the Ukrainian language itself is already threatened. How could this be possible? Such a great people, you understand. Well even a small people need protection and the same status, the more so because they are subject to a greater extent to all the influences.

When I visited Krasnoyarsk Kray, I saw the living standard of 6,000 inhabitants there—living side by side with the metal works in Norilsk, resplendent nearby. Well, with all the shortcomings, Norilsk is still a beautiful town. A lot has been done there, although there are enough problems too. But these people were neglected. And this on the same land, next to the enterprise making a profit of 1.071 million [rubles]. Tell me, what is this anyway, is this normal? Then, at a meeting in Krasnoyarsk, one writer, a representative of these northern people, says: Mikhail Sergeyevich, let us create a reservation, if only to preserve the people!

Therefore, the Union is all the peoples—the less numerous ones and the large ones—and they all need

this country to be restructured and perfected. This means including our Russia. The Russian Federation. Here, around Moscow, are the roots of Russian statehood. What is happening here? The roads that cannot be found, the deserted villages, the lands that have been abandoned and are overgrown with bushes—6 million already [not further specified]—the beautiful lands where there is enough water and harvests could be gathered, meat and milk could be produced. People have abandoned this Russian land and left for the cities to get something. What is this? It means that all have been affected by this. This means that the Union should be changed radically, so that all people have a sense of identity and self-assurance.

This being the case we cannot achieve anything just by touching up or similar measures, comrades. So this concept has taken shape of a union of sovereign states with maximum devolution so that sovereignty is full-blooded in the sense of power—control of the economy, resources, culture, and so on and so forth. All this is necessary and correct. But if we look further, what is beyond a union of sovereign states? A collapse is already beyond it. And this will cost... this is the greatest danger, which I mention openly and straightforwardly everywhere. This is the greatest danger.

We must stop those who push us toward this collapse and put them in their place. We already have nowhere to retreat to, as the saying goes. This union of sovereign states will provide an opportunity for unfolding the potential of all peoples but at the same time on the basis of cooperation and by preserving this cooperation on a new basis. Therefore, there should be sovereign republics and a full-blooded center in the interests of these republics and all peoples.

If we move beyond this then the following will start: We will divide people and families; we will look for borders. Only 30 or 40 percent of our borders are defined by the decisions of rural and rayon soviets. We will start dividing them. We will take up ketmens [type of hoe used in Central Asian] and will fight one another. There used to be the Reds and the Whites and now the Blues or others may emerged.

All in all who is able to divide all this? This is what I have said more than once. Who is pushing us and to where? Just look, as soon as a negative attitude to preserving, to staying in the Union, was stated in official documents in Moldavia, as soon as this thought was mooted, everything was set in motion. Now... well last night after I left you I dealt with that and now the situation there—how is it to be held together? We are organizing talks with various groups. We are saying that the republic should be preserved and answers found. I think that we are close to this. Everybody already understands and is worried.

You see, someone has tossed up in the Ukraine—our huge and beautiful republic—someone has tossed up from somewhere that slogan of separatism [preceeding word in Ukrainian: samostiynost] What is the result? Everything has been set in motion, both the Crimea—I went for a vacation there and after two days I was handed a petition on a free zone—and Odessa where there is talk about Novorossiya [New Russia, a historical region in southern Ukraine]. If someone from the Union is urging the Ukraine to leave the Union, then a Krivoy Rog-Don republic is already emerging. Some people have recalled that it existed at one time.

Listen, can these processes help us to solve all the issues? Are these the issues to be stimulated? This will ruin our whole cause, the great cause of rejuvenating the country in the interests of the people, when we have perceived ourselves as citizens and can do what is needed, having rid ourselves of everything, both of all kinds of euphoria and of the scum that has surfaced and is appearing for the time being, but we will embark upon a new society nevertheless.

That is why we, so to speak, have to say directly, on all the issues that this is a last-ditch stand. To retreat further, on the one hand, will mean to change the social system. And those who suspect that Gorbachev is against socialism—I have already... [changes thought] Am I supposed to swear an oath on something? I do not know on what. I am against barrack-like socialism. I am against socialism when a totalitarian state suppresses the individual. Is that what you call socialism? [applause]

This is not socialism. It is the perversion of the idea of socialism. After all, socialism is justice. It is equality, it is freedom, it is making people aware of themselves. Of course, this society is organized, and here democratic institutions are built so that there are mechanisms that preserve and maintain legal order. We are still far from it. But we should not, under the impression of all these troubles that accompany us, get lost, panic, and lose our heads. We have to adhere firmly to these values.

Well, in the coming months, in the coming months, in the next six months our most important issue will be resolved, because the most complicated thing is the transition—this year-and-a-half or two years—and the Basic Guidelines are designed for this transition. The market itself, a full-blooded market—when we, so to speak, get down to it and sort things out within our own enterprises, when we do something and adjust—that will take a minimum of 10 years. A minimum of 10 years.

But we have to carry out this transition now to stabilize the market. Life will begin to take a more or less positive course and will continue to do so. I am absolutely confident of this. But if somewhere it turns out, especially during the period of stabilization, that there is a distortion of some kind—either we cannot at all come to grips with the situation, or somewhere, I mean, a certain industry or a group of the population will suffer a blow—then we will have to maneuver.

We will be holding consultations; we are now elaborating on mechanisms for that. Somewhere we may have to undertake extraordinary measures. This might become necessary. This too might become necessary. That is why

we are setting up institutions in which all republics will be represented. We create these opportunities to be in touch with all groups of working people. In this respect, I will return to the most important issue, the issue I began with.

It will not work without the trade unions. It is very important for us to secure understanding, for us to cooperate with each other at this stage. Nevertheless, there is one proviso: If you force us to our knees, nothing will be achieved. Nothing will be achieved. You must support us in this decisiveness and firmness. Its motive will not be ill-intentioned or bloody-minded in any way. It will be dictated by real economic processes. If we want, if we do it any other way, the process will be lengthy and everything will come undone.

I will conclude my address by saying that you can count on the president and the government being attentive and geared to a different type of relationship and to changes, to holding regular meetings, discussions and exchanges of views, different from what has been criticized here as being unsatisfactory. We must get accustomed to listening to people's views. So long as everything falls within the framework of the law and the Constitution, we must cooperate with everybody and listen to views.

If you accept a position, this can be... [pauses] yes, you can join a coalition, if you want to do so. That is how it should be in a normal society. But certain people are claiming—originally it was the CPSU that claimed a monopoly, but now other forces are claiming that they see the truth while the CPSU and other social forces, like the trade unions, allegedly understand little about life, about what is going on. That is how things are. We see how people, who until recently were democrats, have become dictators before our eyes and now claim a monopoly. [applause]

I believe that the democratic process should develop, that all views should be heard within the framework of the Constitution, that we should listen to each other, and that we should find ways to reach an ultimate accord on the principles and goals that we are pursuing.

Thank you. [applause]

Ryzhkov Addresses Congress

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[Speech by USSR Premier Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov at the 19th Soviet Trade Union Congress in Moscow on 24 October]

[Text] Esteemed comrade delegates: The work of the congress graphically reflects the most acute political and economic processes taking place both in the country and in the trade unions, the most massive public movement of working people. We were fully aware of this mood—of giving the trade union movement a new lease of life—during the work of the congresses of the individual trade unions, which were attended by all members of the government, and also at the meeting held recently in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from all this is that the trade unions wish—not in words, not formally, but genuinely—to become an organization that really expresses and defends the social and labor interests of the working people. I want to say straight away that we fully support these wishes of the trade unions, especially as consolidation is particularly important in such a very complex period as the transition to a market economy.

The situation in the country is extraordinary. For the first time in many decades we have minus indices of industrial production, gross national product, productivity of labor, and commissioning of basic assets. Calculations show that in 1990 the national income will probably fall by nearly 30 billion rubles. The loss, as you see, is a substantial one, and it means that the country is getting poorer, and the possibilities of resolving vitally important economic and social tasks are being restricted.

Against the background of an economic mess, crime, profiteering, and the theft of state property have assumed unprecedented proportions. I see the main reason for all this is in the fact that in the last two years the difficulties in the development of the economy have been augmented by and intertwined with elements of a political and state crisis. As a result the efficiency of production and the manageability of the national economy, and, one can say, of society as a whole have deteriorated sharply. The situation has also been substantially complicated by separatist tendencies and tendencies fostering local interests in the Union and autonomous republics, in krays and oblasts. The process of the restoration and strengthening of the sovereignty of Union republics, which has healthy roots, is going beyond sensible limits and is being accompanied by considerable socio-economic and political distortions. We are already running into situations where the republican and local oblast soviets are complaining about the presumptuousness of rayon and town soviets. All this is extremely destabilizing for the situation and hampers the resolution of urgent problems.

The government does not relinquish responsibility for the situation that has come about. It really is a difficult one. Meanwhile one must not consider that nothing at all has been done during this time. By comparison with the preceding five-year plan, the scale of construction of housing and other social-cultural projects has increased, there has been a rise in the production of non-food goods, and major social programs are being implemented. About 62 billion rubles are to be put into the reform of pension provisions and improvement of the situation of families with children alone; that is, as much as was put into all social programs over the three preceding five-year plans taken together. We have resolutely embarked on the conversion of defense industries, and although there is no little criticism on this topic, one cannot fail to see that this is beginning to produce results and has made it possible to increase the production of

consumer goods in this sphere by 25 percent in the current year alone. To this must be added the fact that, together with the governments of the Union republics, we are reorganizing about 300 machine-building enterprises and other complexes for the production of goods in higher demand. We consider that we are thereby creating the foundation for a considerable subsequent stepping-up of production of these.

However, just stating all this can hardly produce satisfaction, because efforts to saturate the market and eliminate the deficit amount to nothing because of the profound disarray of finances and of money circulation. The deteriorating situation in the national economy shows that attempts to halt the negative processes under the existing system of economic management are without prospects. We need decisive changes in economic relationships. The path to this is the transition to a socially oriented market economy. The understanding of the need for such a step has already matured.

At the same time, the trade unions—like society as a whole—are worried about what price will have to be paid for this transition, how it will affect the people's standard of living, and whether it will encroach on the very important rights of the citizen. These are key problems. Without the support of the people, the planned program cannot be implemented. It is important for the government and the trade unions to work closely together on these problems.

The prerequisites for this exist. We have a joint interest in a strong economy, the saturation of the market with goods and services, an increase in the welfare of the people, and the fulfillment of the social program. We are in favor of strong unions that act constructively and are capable of standing up for the interests of the workers. I am convinced that a strong Union government—which has real opportunities to carry out the obligation which it has taken upon itself and to firmly implement social programs—is also in the interest of the trade unions.

What, in essence, comprises the state's social policies under market economy conditions?

We proceed from the fact that for all those capable of working, the main social guarantee should be the opportunity to prove themselves in their work and—receiving remuneration for intensive and high-quality work—to provide a worthy living for themselves and their families.

At the same time the socially vulnerable members of society—that is, those who are not yet or no longer capable of working—are the main object of state protection. They, for objective reasons, may find themselves in straitened material circumstances.

As you see, this is a fundamentally new way of putting the issue. It is intended fully to exclude all possibilities and any loopholes for sponging and levelling down which inflict severe economic and moral damage on our society.

How does the government see our joint activities on the implementation of the new social policies?

It is quite natural that guarantees of the implementation of the right to work should rise to the forefront here. The government's position on employment issues is expounded in the draft of the appropriate law. The USSR Supreme Soviet is now discussing this draft law. We hope that it will be adopted in November this year.

Immediately after this we will have to develop the organization and implementation of special all-Union and republican programs on the employment of the population.

Of course, the temporary fall in production forecast for 1991 will render this problem more acute and the unions must be prepared—together with the government—to take measures to reduce the acuteness of the situation. What paths are being considered here?

People can be protected from unemployment in different ways. It is one thing not to permit dismissals in several, including when the release of an employee is dictated by objective necessity. It is another to prevent mass dismissals on the basis of fuller utilization of equipment, the expansion of useful production, and an increase in the shiftwork coefficient of the work. We are in favor of the second route since ther are a huge number of unoccupied jobs in the country—more than 10 million. A fuller utilization of the production potential which has been created and on which the country has expended huge resources would permit production of consumer goods in the first instance, to be increased. We hope, in relation to this, for the support and the help of the trade unions.

Now about the problems of inflation, probably the most sharply discussed problems in society at present.

It would appear that an understanding has been reached that inflation can be restrained only by conducting an austere financial and credit-monetary policy. Now, after the adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market Economy, a stage of resolute and practical actions has arrived.

Essentially, the question is this: Either we begin to base our lives upon our possibilities and strictly link the growth in the population's income to an increase in the amount of goods and services entering the consumer market, or we offer scope to unbridled inflation, thereby devaluing all the social programs that we are adopting and which we shall implement.

It is also well known that an imbalance between the growth in money supply and the goods available is the main factor disrupting the consumer market.

From next year a tax upon the consumption fund will come into effect. This is a new economic regulator for us. It is called upon to ensure a balanced growth in the payment of labor and material resources. However, I

must say that we have not yet managed to introduce it, but numerous requests and demands are already coming in from industries and enterprises about granting all kinds of privileges. This is being done abruptly, in the form of an ultimatum, going as far as the threat of strikes.

But if we are to make concessions like these once again—something for which the government is frequently criticized, incidentally, and is accused of inconsistency in its actions—then we shall find ourselves in a very grave situation because of the further imbalance of the market. A failure to understand this means a failure to see that all of our misfortunes ensue from this, including a breeding-ground for the black economy, bribery, speculation, and other forms of social parasitism. I think it would be worthwhile for the trade unions to define their position on this issue, which is very important for the whole people.

It is often claimed that we are conducting a policy toward restricting growth in salaries. I should say that this is fundamentally at variance with our policy. We want to make enterprises' labor payment fund directly dependent upon final results. But the salary of each worker should not be restricted by any maximum limits. The government believes that the working man who is producing goods needed by society should earn as much as he can in production. But we are categorically against incomes that are not in accordance with labor, that reach fantastic amounts, and we shall wage an irreconcilable campaign against them. It must be said directly that the sharp operators of the black economy are now making wide use of the loopholes in our legislation, which ought to be eliminated as quickly as possible. Public opinion is resolutely against those who live at the expense of all. Therefore I have no doubt that the government will find the full support of the people in its actions to curb the sharp operators and criminal elements who have overstepped the mark.

The second fundamental condition for restraining inflation is a considered approach to the issue of price formation. What do we need to devote our attention to this? Voices are heard, including those of a number of industrial trade unions, saying that all prices, including those for the output of the basic branches of the economy, must be set free right at the first stage. I shall say frankly: If we are to undertake this now, along a wide front, inflation will be given such a spur that it will subsequently be extraordinarily difficult to stop it. Prices for output of the base industries which are at the start of the production cycle would drive forward a wave of price rises for all forms of final production, including goods for the population.

For this reason we consider that in these industries, should there be an objective need, it is better to preserve subsidies than to allow prices to get out of control. Undoubtedly we must approach the reform of retail prices, especially for goods in daily demand, with the maximum of caution and circumspection.

The strengthening of the ruble occupies a special place in the system of measures to combat inflation. All our difficulties, both in production and in the sphere of consumption, are engendered by the constant fall in value of the ruble. So long as there continues to be a shortage of material resources, goods, and services, without a shortage of money, the problem of restoring the country to financial health cannot be resolved. In the final analysis, the fulfillment of this task depends on how we succeed in implementing measures to stabilize the national economy. After all, a devalued ruble strikes directly at the population's living standards. Protection of citizens' purchasing power must also become an important sphere for cooperation between the government and the trade unions. Indexing of the population's incomes—that is, proportional increases in these in connection with rising consumer prices—is the central link in the mechanism of such protection. This is new for us. We have made plans to examine minimum consumer budgets together with the trade unions in the near future, on the basis of which the assessment of the changes in the cost of living will be carried out, which is required for the indexing of incomes.

I would like to dwell on the most burning of social problems: the normalization of food supplies for the population. The situation in this is constantly deteriorating, and everyone can sense this for himself. No one is satisfied with the rate of growth in output of food products, the worsening shortages in the shops, and the sharp rise in prices in town markets. A way out of this situation is possible only through the development in rural areas of various forms of economic activity, the social restructuring of the countryside, the accelerated refitting of the processing industry, and the radical transformation of trading in food. It is quite obvious that, despite the complex problems in all branches of the national economy, we must ensure priority for the development of the agro-industrial complex. Today we can see that the measures adopted in this area even recently have been clearly insufficient. What must now be done? What will the priority constitute? Of all the variety of tasks involved in this, I shall name but a few. First, the social restructuring of rural areas. To this end we must embark on decisive action to redistribute material resources and construction capacities in favour of the agro-industrial complex. In the next five-year plan, the rate of social restruction of the rural areas must be stepped up by 50 percent. The peasant has to have a life worth living some time.

Particular attention is demanded by the processing industry. This year's harvest should teach us a great deal. We have again stumbled on problems of processing and storage, and the criticism which has been heard here at the congress is quite justified. It is true that, two years ago, a good resolution was adopted which tackled the issues of technical re-equipment of these industries comprehensively. But regrettably it is being implemented only poorly. The defense industry and the builders have also contributed to this, having failed to fulfill the tasks

set out for them, and the republics, too, of course. It is difficult to explain why in conditions where agro-industrial production and construction capacities were handed over to them, dozens even of imported complete production lines are lying around in stores. It is now time to move from talk about independence to the practical realization of it, and first and foremost to tackle vital problems such as food.

We will help actively. Recently, the USSR Council of Ministers specially examined the question of material and technical backing for the agro-industrial complex in conditions of the transition to the market. Considering the significance of this complex in supplying the population with food products and its specific features, we decided to establish a state order for next year for the main material resources and equipment supplied to agriculture. Despite criticism from both left and right, we shall pursue this line unswervingly.

Comrade delegates: A complicated process of perestroyka is now underway, both in the central bodies of administration of the national economy, and in the trade union movement. The functions of trade union leadership are changing, the role of their sectional and regional organizations is growing, and the center of trade union work is shifting to the labor collectives. This with all acuteness poses the task of defining the circle of problems of cooperation, of joint elaboration of its mechanism and forms. The government is ready for such constructive work.

In our view, the functions of interaction of the bodies of state administration and the trade unions must be clearly demarcated between the center, the sectors, the regions, and the enterprises. This sees a sharp growth in the role of the collective contract as a major element in the social protection of the working people. From a formal act, which it used to be, it must be transformed into a real regulator of socioeconomic relations, a powerful lever for raising the effeciveness of production and the working people's living standards.

The profound restructuring taking place within the trade union movement, in its relationship with the state, sectional, and territorial bodies of government, the employers and administration, undoubtedly needs reliable legal backing. I have no doubt that it would be possible to avoid many conflicts between the trade unions and the government bodies if the sides were to clarify their attitudes, based on the foundation of a law precisely regulating the rights and duties of each of them. Unfortunately, owing to the absence of a juridical formulation of the new realities, not infrequently the emotional surge of the mob gains the upper hand, along with nihilism toward the law and an unwillingness to hear out and take into account the conclusions of one's opponent.

Therefore the position of the Government of the USSR is such that a law on the rights of the trade unions is not only needed, it is vitally necessary. Taking into account the results of the work of the individual trade unions' congress, your congress, and the meetings in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, we need in the next few days to get together and discuss possible supplementary proposals on this law and submit them to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

This is especially important as we are moving toward market relations. The position of both the governemnt and the trade unions is becoming different. Forms of ownership are changing, freedom is opening up for all forms of economic management, and a new layer is emerging—the entrepreneur. This is a new real force in society. This is a fully empowered part of the social partnership. Both the state bodies and the trade unions must build their relations with the entrepreneurs correctly.

The benefit will only come when the state, the entrepreneur, the trade unions will not impose their will or dictate to others. That will be genuine cooperation, a real social partnership, without which no market economy is possible. It looks as if everyone is beginning to realize this.

In the draft law, at the meeting of trade union leaders and with members of the government and here at the congress, the question of concluding a general agreement between the government and the country's trade union center has been raised. We are in favor of this. But it requires very profound elaboration. It should be a document in which each side assumes both duties and responsibility. I think that this agreement should emphasize joint action to implement social programs, to elaborate draft legislation to defend the vocational interests of the working people, and to improve and make healthier their working conditions.

I would particularly like to say a few words on this topic. Now, more than ever, the role of the trade unions in dealing with these matters must increase. Look at what has been happening. As soon as enterprises received the freedom to dispose of funds, literally within two years investment in improving working conditions fell on average by 20 percent and even by 40 percent at some enterprises. Injuries at work increased substantialy, as did occupational illness, and so on.

Labor safety inspections, however, have not been a great barrier to these processes. Moreover, it is not seldom that trade union organizations help the administration to buy off the working people by introducing various pay increases for working conditions, and so on and so forth.

We have many examples in which money intended for the tackling of social problems is being spent for different purposes. Including expenses for the preservation of managerial apparatus, which is becoming extremely swollen, for the acquisition of expensive motor vehicles and other expenses which it is quite possible to do without when very serious social issues are knocking at the door.

Finally, before I complete my speech, I would like to dwell on one more, very basic issue.

The nonmarket sector—culture, health care, education, and basic science—causes much anxiety and concern. We share this concern. We must not, in any circumstances, lose sight of these spheres. This is the present and the future of society. Material pragmatism, which is characteristic of the market, should not affect the intellectual dimension and genetic stock of the peoples of our great country. The government is completing the preparation of special decisions on social protection and support for these industries in the conditions of a market economy.

Comrades!

In conclusion I would like to go back to what I was saying in the very beginning: Your congress is the reflection, maybe even a heightened reflection, of the life of the state. Of course, we realize that by joint work we have to overcome possible friction and disunity of viewpoints on particular problems. But in a situation in which the destiny of the people is really being decided, the USSR Government calls on all members of the most massive organization of working people to undertake joint constructive work for the common good.

Council of Trade Unions Disbanded

LD2410173390 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Agabekov, Leonid Vorontsov, and Vladimir Yegorov]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—The USSR Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) ceased to exist as of today. The 19th congress of Soviet trade unions, now in progress in the Kremlin, disbanded this structure, which has existed for over seven decades.

In the opinion of the overwhelming majority of delegates, the AUCCTU was unable to handle the social and economic protection of workers as the Soviet Union becomes revitalised and switches to a market economy.

The decision to disband the AUCCTU was made after a two-day debate on the role and place of trade unions in society.

Most delegates representing the interests of over 140 million members of the largest organisation in the country favoured the establishment of a new Union centre that will represent a voluntary alliance of sovereign industrial and regional organisations with their own programmes and rules.

Congress participants believe that the most acceptable name will be the general confederation of Soviet trade unions.

Delegates were unanimous about the need to consolidate the organised labour movement and set up a strong Union centre to defend the interests of working people. Congress participants called on the Soviet parliament to accelerate the adoption of a law on trade unions, since its absence hampers the renewal of an organised labour movement in the country.

The delegates to the congress, which is expected to work until Saturday [27 October], will decide on the establishment of a new Union centre, adopt its rules, elect governing bodies and define priorities of future work.

Ryzhkov Meeting With Trade Union Leaders Assessed

914D0017A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Oct 90 p 1

[Report by TRUD political correspondent V. Golovachev: "Dialogue Without Compliments: How the Meeting Between the Trade Unions and the Government Went"]

[Text] **We have already reported that a dialogue between the trade unions and the government was held on 16 October in the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]. N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, together with certain members of the cabinet, met in the Palace of Labor with leaders of the AUCCTU and sectoral and republic unions.**

In the past 12-18 months leaders of the trade unions have repeatedly strongly upheld the interests of the working people and their position in the USSR Council of Ministers. Why, then, was there such interest two days ago in this working meeting-dialogue in the Palace of Labor? Not, in fact, because the leader of the Council of Ministers had for the first time gone to the AUCCTU (although even this fact, of course, points to the growing role of the unions today). And not only because, I believe, the discussion was sharp and open (who today is surprised at the sharpness of the presentation of issues?). But I would like to mention something else also. Against the background of the gathering storm clouds, confrontations, and conflicts, and the profound economic and political crisis a strengthening of contacts with the unions has become particularly necessary for the government also, which finds itself in a difficult position. The levers of control of the economy are virtually inoperative, and many regions are essentially beginning to switch to a rationing system, which we had forgotten since wartime, and the outlook for the immediate future is very nebulous....

Society needs harmony like it needs air. Its achievement is unthinkable without such an "aspect" as strong, independent unions. And this also is an argument in support of a constructive search for such harmony.

Was it achieved? The discussion was useful, there is no difference in opinions about this. But this was a start and entry into a permanent equal dialogue on urgent problems affecting the interests and needs of the working people. Just after the meeting even I heard such assessments as: "There were enough questions, but precise answers to many of them were not obtained. On such fundamental disagreements with the government, for

example, as the amounts and timeframe of the payment of unemployment benefit, compensation to individuals for losses due to price rises, the situation in the field of labor safety...." Yes, one would like all the "i's" to have been dotted, of course, but it also has to be considered that the government does not as of this time have answers to all the questions. Whatever the case there, for almost two hours, trade union leaders put to the prime minister and members of the government requests and proposals on the most troublesome areas of our life. And the landmarks that were posted will be very important on the subsequent path of difficult negotiations with the Council of Ministers.

Outlining the main contours of the dialogue, V.P. Shcherbakov, deputy chairman of the AUCCTU, expressed the unions' extreme concern at the state of affairs in the country, in the economy, on the consumer market, and in the food sector, at the unchecked price increases, and at the sharp decline in people's living standard. The situation is increasingly deteriorating. Enterprises' economic relations are being severed, there are no raw materials, plans and factories are coming to a halt, and disarray and chaos are intensifying. Executive authority is virtually paralyzed. Against this background profiteering and organized crime are flourishing.

What measures does the government contemplate implementing to return to the people in the future their lost trust and confidence? What is planned in the period of stabilization to fundamentally improve the provision of the populace with food and merchandise?

The dialogue between the unions and the government affords an opportunity for the efficient interaction and cooperation of the USSR Council of Ministers and the trade unions in the solution of labor, socioeconomic, and legal questions affecting the interests of the working people and the work force. The mechanism for such cooperation could be the annual conclusion of a master agreement between the government and the country's trade union center and agreements between sectoral organs of administration and the leadership of sectoral unions—within their jurisdictions.

V.V. Kuzmenok, chairman of the Fish Industry Workers Union Central Committee, A.P. Kashirkin, chairman of the Automotive and Agricultural Engineering Workers Union All-Union Council, and others also spoke of the urgent need for a precise mechanism for the unions to interact with the Council of Ministers and managerial structures. Proposals were expressed in this connection. The emotional intensity frequently reached a peak. No one attempted to find "rounded" phrases and to somehow tone down the situation; on the contrary, they sharpened their opinions to the utmost. "There is no cooperation yet," K.Yu. Matskyavichyus, chairman of the Water Transport Workers Federal Independent Union Council, maintained. "The unions' demands are frequently simply ignored. Do we need each time to appeal to international organizations and for the working people to strike?"

All the speeches by trade union officials paid particular attention to the people's social protection under the conditions of transition to the market. What, for example, will happen to people working in the unprofitable base sectors—the foundation of the economy? This most urgent problem was raised by A.M. Kovalevskiy, chairman of the council of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the Ukraine, and N.N. Karnaukh, chairman of the USSR Mining and Metallurgical Industry Workers Union Federation. V.I. Goncharik, chairman of the Belorussian Trade Union Federation Council, spoke with great concern about why the "Chernobyl" program was being implemented inadequately and slowly. The serious situation in the field of labor safety was analyzed by AUCCTU Secretary G.F. Sukhoruchenkova. She opposed the transfer of the functions of technical labor inspection to the state. And on another issue—social insurance—she emphasized that it is the trade unions which should be administering this system.

AUCCTU Secretary A.M. Yakovlev dwelt on problems which are today worrying everyone. The absence of trade of low-price merchandise has pushed more than 80 million persons with an income of R75 and less into poverty. But using the ILO classification, the insufficiency level is equivalent to two-thirds of the average wage. For our country this is R165. Thus, over 160 million persons (more than half the country) with an average per capita income of up to R150 a month are below the sufficiency line. In this situation it is essential to clearly and precisely tell the public about the timeframe for the introduction of compensation and other social protection measures.

A sharp discussion presupposes straight talk on both sides. And, like the trade union leaders, the leaders of the government did not look for smooth wording either. And it began with their observations concerning the restructuring of the trade unions.

"There has been much talk here," N.I. Ryzhkov observed, "to the effect that the unions are working in the new way. I believe that you are only just starting out on the new path. If we look at the papers you are giving us, they are, in my opinion, still quite far from the ideals of the union movement. You are still 50-percent business managers, of the most business-manager type....

"Rebukes have been heard today that the government is meeting with strikers and negotiating with them, but not with the unions. But why so? Take a self-critical look at why you were left on the sidelines of the strike movement and why it passed by, and you lagged behind, as they say. And then began to 'catch up.' If you do not wish to be 'rubbed out,' take up your positions...."

N.I. Ryzhkov went on to say that the government was in favor of cooperation and constructive dialogue with the unions. The chairman of the Council of Ministers touched in his speech on a broad range of issues. He spoke about the reasons for the loss of control of the economy, the proposed pricing reform, the need to

continue subsidies to the unprofitable base sectors (coal and oil production and so forth) and to intensify the fight against crime. He expressed his opinion concerning the expediency of the implementation of reforms now in the housing sphere, and so forth.

Twenty-four people spoke in the course of the meeting. No specific decisions were adopted, nor was this the intention. Each side explained its positions and obtained much information for subsequent analysis. This is something in itself, of course. But this should, nonetheless, in the future (and it was the common opinion that such meetings should become systematic) lead to tangible, specific results.

A mechanism for the trade union center's relations with the government has to be formulated as soon as possible. A most important component of this mechanism should be a system of agreements between the country's trade union center and the USSR Council of Ministers, beginning in 1991. The draft of such an agreement (not final and requiring additional work, possibly) was submitted by the unions at the meeting. It is now up to the government.

Coal Miners Hold Second All-Union Congress

Gorbachev Appeals for 'Discipline'

PM2410092990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

["Appeal from USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to Delegates of the Second Miners' Congress"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades, I greet you, delegates to the second miners' congress.

I know that anxiety and concern over the situation in the country and the coal industry and the future of Soviet miners have brought you to this congress.

You are well aware—we have spoken about it repeatedly at our meetings—that I fully share your unease at the crisis situation which has now developed in the coal industry. It must be radically changed, and we are at one on that.

I have to admit frankly that not everything the government, the sector leadership, and trade unions planned in order to improve miners' living and working conditions is on target. A number of urgent, well-justified demands made by the previous congress have remained unfulfilled.

The reasons for this are diverse. But life thereby delivers us all a stern lesson. The point is that fundamental changes for the better can only be achieved by concerting our efforts—the government and the miners themselves. Dialogue and cooperation rather than confrontation are the key to success.

And I firmly believe that it is this joint search for realistic ways to overcome the crisis that will form the main content of this congress, since normalization of the political and socioeconomic situation is what we most need today, together with an atmosphere of civil peace and accord.

Miners have always been known for their unity, discipline, and poltical awareness. And I urge you, dear comrades, as I urge all the country's miners to show at this crucial period good will and support for the measures designed to normalize the situation in the country, effect the economy's transition to market relations, and enhance people's lives. I hope that your support for these measures will be businesslike and will show itself in strengthening economic ties, organization, and discipline.

I want to thank you for inviting me to your congress. To my regret, I am unable to accept. You will know how important the affairs now being examined in Moscow are. In actual fact we are tackling the same problem both there in Donetsk and in the Kremlin. And I hope our actions will be coordinated. You may be certain that everything useful and genuinely pro-perestroyka generated by your congress will form an integral part of our common program for the further renewal of our economy and society.

I wish you fruitful work.

Miners Reserve Right to Strike

LD2310214390 Moscow TASS in English 2100 GMT 23 Oct 90

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondents Anatoliy Gordeyev and Vladimir Yurkevich]

[Text] Donetsk October 23 TASS—Delegates to the second all-Union congress of miners, which is in session for the second day here, described the creation of an independent trade union of workers as their all-important task.

The first day of the congress was devoted to organisational and procedural issues. The discussion of items on the agenda opened today.

Several speakers said that most of the points of the resolutions adopted by the first congress of miners were not implemented. This applied, first and foremost, to the demand for a resignation of the USSR Council of Ministers. They think that the resolution adopted by the country's government following miners' strikes last summer was also being implemented too slowly.

Delegates proposed that an all-Union strike committee be formed on the basis of the Donetsk strike committee with divisions in other coalfields of the country.

Some speakers demanded that Donetsk pit workers recall "their reactionary deputies" from the Ukrainian

Supreme Soviet. Calls sounded to bar Communist miners from a new trade union.

Delegates included in the draft of the first resolution a demand for the resignation of the Union government, immediate rotation of the USSR Supreme Soviet members and the national election of the country's president.

Participants stated that miners reserved for themselves the right to strike.

Miners Express 'Dissatisfaction'

LD2510011790 Moscow TASS in English 2124 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondents Anatoliy Gordeyev and Vladimir Yurkevich]

[Text] Donetsk October 25 TASS—Many delegates think that the congress of Soviet miners, currently in session in Donetsk, Ukraine, repeates the mistakes of the previous miners' forum: by skipping from one thing to another, the congress returns now and then to repeating what has already been said.

"Miners' dissatisfaction with the proceedings of the congress is mounting," Amangeldiy Ramazanov, a stoper from the Karagandaugol association, told TASS.

"We have been working for three days but have done actually nothing. We have got an impression that each of the delegations tries to tear the congress apart. The weak presidium facilitates these efforts. Certainly, the issue we are trying to solve here is very complex. However, the trade union cannot be fragmentated, which some delegates are out to achieve. We think that only a strong and united trade union is capable of defending the working people's interests," Ramazanov said.

There is no consensus either in the independent trade union itself. Even after a draft of the programme statement was read, several speakers asked once again whether it made sense to create a new trade union.

The disagreement prompted the delegations of miners from Kuzbass and western Ukraine to use the 15-minute break envisaged by the working procedures, thus impeding the work of the congress. The Presidium's inability to control the audience forced delegates to replace the chairman of the session and organising committee member Mikhail Krylov.

A declaration of the principles of the Mining Industry Workers' Free Trade Union and two draft projects, which were proposed for consideration by the organising committee, sparked a stormy debate.

Just as at the first session, debates flared up around the main principle governing the creation of the trade union. The delegation from Kuzbass favoured the confederative foundation, categorically rejecting the proposed variant of the federative principles.

Most representatives of Ukraine's coal associations declared for drastically re-organising the existing miners' trade union.

Debates on the main issue seem to drag on. About 40 people registered to take the floor. Speaches by Soviet and foreign guests, who were invited by the organising committee, also take much time.

Gorbachev Adviser Sees Danger of Attempted Coup

LD2510000790 Hamburg DPA in German 2152 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Vyacheslav Dashichev, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser, sees the danger of an attempted coup in the USSR if the supply situation deteriorates further. In an interview with the NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG (Thursday edition) Dashichev said that if there are fresh outrages within the next two years there will be the threat of a revolution from below. In this event the military might intervene in order to restore order.

An authoritarian regime however might have much worse consequences for the development of the economy. The Polish example has shown that economic problems can in no way be solved by authoritarian power and certainly not by violence. Neither the military nor Gorbachev's conservative critics have a clear concept of how the country can be led out of the crisis, the head of Moscow's Academy of Sciences Department for International Relations stated. [as received]

Dashichev strongly supports Germany being a permanent member of the UN Security Council in the interview. "It is a new superpower on the continent of Europe, a democratic state with a highly developed economy, democratic traditions, and the will to do everything in order to promote stability, peace, and cooperation in Europe. Germany can contribute to these values that prevail in other regions as well."

Ambartsumov: Sacrificing Ryzhkov 'Only Way Out'

PM2310152390 Paris BUSINESS IN THE USSR in English No 5, Oct 90 p 13

["A Political Angle" column by Yevgeniy Ambartsumov: "The Urgency of Reform"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] This spring, trying to find a way out of the vicious circle of increasing shortages, the Ryzhkov government suggested, against the will of the people and Parliament, that the reform should be started with price hikes, while still maintaining the state monopoly. History shows that such things never helped eliminate shortages but only caused popular outrage.

At last an anxious Gorbachev responded to the advice and calls of consistent reformers; jointly with his rival, Boris Yeltsin, he formed a team of experts independent of the government, charged with preparing a really

radical and consistent economic reform—headed by Academician Stanislav Shatalin.

Significantly, this plan was made possible because the leader of perestroika made a long-awaited shift to the left, that is from the right-wing "partocracy" to the reformers. Attracted by the anti-state and centrifugal orientation of the Shatalin plan, even the Baltic Republics, which want to move towards independence, expressed their willingness to remain in the Union's economic space. Thus it became possible to prevent disintegration of the Union by transforming it into something like the European Community.

But Mikhail Gorbachev is wavering again. I am worried that this chronic disease of indecision may turn into a fatal illness. He is trying to keep afloat Ryzhkov's sinking ship, which is overloaded with ministries and ministers and designed according to the irrational plan of the pre-perestroika era, on the basis of the command economy which does not work any longer. The premier is a nice man, but a captain used to quieter waters cannot steer an obsolete and patched-up ship across a stormy ocean.

The President may be held back by his position as general Secretary of the firmly conservative, albeit deteriorating, Communist Party, or he may be hindered by his own roots as an old apparatchik, devoted to a certain type of leadership. But the "Sacrifice of the Prime Minister" is the only way out. Gorbachev has already been told openly that artificial prolongation of the life of the doomed government will shorten accordingly the political survival of the President.

The alternative to consensus of the republics is accelerated deterioration of the Union, accompanied not just by tobacco riots.

PRAVDA Chief on Future, Resignation Rumors

LD2410162490 Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Ruben Shirinian]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—PRAVDA editor-in-chief Ivan Frolov told a news conference here today that he will continue on in his post and denied recent rumours about his resignation.

Heated debates reflect the staff's concern about the newspaper's fate, he said, especially in view of the latest data about the drop in subscriptions, which is indeed distressing. The number of subscribers is likely to fall off considerably in 1991, mainly due to price rises, Frolov confided.

Despite the difficulties, PRAVDA's circulation will remain high and it will continue as a world-class newspaper, Frolov stressed.

He said the staff has drawn up a plan to form a combine, or association, and the plan has been approved by the Central Committee Secretariat. The new association will be economically independent from the Central Committee business management, which earlier dealt with the newspaper's financial and other problems.

The new association intends to create its own television studio and engage in advertising. PRAVDA has already started publishing advertisements on its pages and plans to generate millions of dollars in profits for advertising already contracted. The money will go to renew printing equipment and expand housing construction for staffers.

Frolov also disclosed plans to launch an international edition of PRAVDA in collaboration with major American, British, French and Japanese newspaper publishers.

IZVESTIYA Details Publication, Subscription Plans

PM2510092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 90 Union Edition p 7

[Editorial office announcement: "Only Until 1 November Can You Subscribe to IZVESTIYA for Any Period"]

[Text] As has already been reported, the cost of a year's subscription to IZVESTIYA for 1991 is being increased to 22 rubles [R] 56 kopeks. Our index number is 50050.

The increase is due to a considerable increase in expenditure on paper, typographic services, and distribution costs. Yet even with such a high price the income from publishing the newspaper will decrease more than eightfold; this clearly shows that we do not intend to shift all the burdens onto subscribers' shoulders.

There is also another change. Next year we plan to publish six times a week—three days in eight pages and three days in six pages. In total this will correspond to the current number of pages per week.

We remind you that you may subscribe to the newspaper for a shorter period—for six months, three months, or even one month, with a subsequent extension. This would cost R11.28, R5.64, and R1.88 respectively.

We remind our readers that subscriptions close 31 October.

Regarding the SOYUZ weekly published by the IZVESTIYA publishing house, the cost of a year's subscription to it will be R20.80 and the retail price per issue will be 60 kopeks. The NEDELYA weekly will continue to be sold retail only; its price is now 40 kopeks per issue.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Registers as Party Newspaper

PM1910084990

[Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 October 1990 Second Edition carries on page 1 under the headline "SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Registered as the Russian Communists' Newspaper" a 500-word editorial announcement regarding

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's change in status. The Second Edition masthead differs from the format used up to and including the 16 October First Edition and states "The Newspaper of the Russian Federation's Communists"; "Founded by the CPSU Central Committee" instead of "The Organ of the CPSU Central Committee and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers."

The editorial announcement reads as follows: "The following publications were registered yesterday, 15 October 1990, at the USSR State Committee for the Press: SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA—the CPSU Central Committee newspaper for the Russian Federation's Communists; the journal NASHE NASLEDIYE (Cultural Foundation); SOTSIALNAYA ZASHCHITA (USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems); and VOPROSY IZOBRETATELSTVA (USSR State Committee for Science and Technology State Committee for Inventions).

"Our newspaper's readers have been waiting for this day for a long time. Over the last three weeks the editorial office has received roughly 2,700 cables and letters insistently demanding: When will SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's orientation be determined once and for all, and should we subscribe to it or not? After all, there is only just enough time.

"We are sincerely grateful to those readers who expressed a firm desire to continue their links and cooperation with SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA as a party publication. They are in the overwhelming majority. We also treat with understanding and benevolence those people who decided to make a different choice. We think that yesterday's registration is in the readers' broadest interests. An important step has been taken in strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation. The CPSU Central Committee and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers agreed that both Russia's Communists and Russia's supreme legislative organ and the republic's government should have their own press publications. The CPSU Central Committee will provide all the necessary assistance in the publication of the new RSFSR Supreme Soviet periodicals.

"We SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA journalists cannot imagine our future work without its providing an extensive portrayal of the entire spectrum of the activity of soviets of people's deputies of all levels, and we will publish the highly important documents adopted by the Russian parliament and government. We have one aim—the good of Russia and the good of all its peoples.

"In forthcoming issues the editorial office will set out the program for its work in what remains of this year and, of course, for 1991. Here we are bound to say a tremendous cordial thank-you to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's devoted friends. The tremendous mailbag with which the editorial office is currently dealing contains a wealth of advice, thought, and constructive criticism. From this mine of collective wisdom we will derive inspiration and courage, and sustain our unswerving desire to faithfully and truthfully serve Russia's peoples.

"So, thorough discussion lies ahead. Now let us thank you for your support once again; we hope for it in the future, and greet you on an event of importance for you and us—the registration of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA."

ROMAN-GAZETA Editor on 1991 Publishing Plans

LD2010060590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 19 Oct 90

[Interview with V.N. Ganichev, editor in chief of ROMAN- GAZETA, by correspondent N. Shakhova, place and date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text][Shakhova] Valeriy Nikolayevich, ROMAN-GAZETA is perhaps the publication with the largest circulation [samoye massovoye izdaniye]. Now there is a lot of news in the editorial offices. What is your attitude to this subscription? What are the complexities and what suprises might there perhaps be?

[Ganichev] Well, for us 1991 has perhaps three points of bearing. The first—and I think this will come as good news to readers—is that we are not increasing our subscription price. We are becoming... [changes thought] We are taking part now in the literary process together with two organizations—the USSR State Committee on the Press, and the USSR Union of Writers. Whereas the State Committee on the Press was our publisher in the past, the USSR Union of Writers is now becoming our co-founder, and this is very important. I think we will preserve this combined foundation while being an organ or publication of the USSR Union of Writers.

[Shakhova] How were you received by the Union of Writers?

[Ganichev] They received us very well. We have always had strong creative ties. After all, we have in our editorial board writers such as Dudintsev, Granin, Bondarev, Rasputin, well-known critics, and so on.

[Shakhova] What about the journal's contents for 1991, Valeriy Nikolayevich?

[Ganichev] Well, it seems to us that the contents are shaping up to form a broad range, giving a wide panorama of our literature. First and foremost, the readers are interested in historical subjects: the books of Dmitriy Balashov are very popular indeed, and he was one of those who [words indisitinct] readers. Just like the late Valentin Pikul: we are presenting his famous novel "Force of Evil," which once caused a sensation. We are now publishing that work with no cuts. We are publishing contemporary Soviet classics: Vasiliy Belov's (?Canons), Astafyev's "Lyudochka," and Rasputin's "Siberian Cycle" this year. In 1991 we are starting regular printing of foreign fiction and, of course, Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Isayevich. At the suggestion of

Zalygin, a member of our editorial board, we will be presenting the novel "August 1914."

News Conference on Employment Prospects Reported

PM2410113790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by T. Kirillova: "Unemployment: Hopes and Fears"]

[Text] As is well known, the country's legislature adopted the draft Basic Principles of Legislation on Employment on the first reading. This was the subject of a news conference held yesterday at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. V. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems; R. Ubaydullayeva, deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions; and A. Yakovlev, secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; answered questions put by Soviet and foreign journalists.

Opening the news conference, V. Shcherbakov described the present situation in the labor market and the possible consequences of transferring to a market economy, particularly stressing that the so-called "Swedish model," the essence of which is to prevent unemployment, served as the starting point in the preparation of the draft Basic Principles.

At present there is no official statistical data on the number of unemployed people in the country, but rough estimates put the figure at 2-2.5 million. This is the only more or less realistic figure that can be used, because the hypothetical figure of 35-40 million mentioned by V. Shcherbakov (for the umpteenth time) is more and more obviously serving the aim of proving the advantages of the government program for switching to a market economy.

It transpired during the news conference that there is still not even a clear definition of the concept of "unemployment" and it is not known how to differentiate between the rights of a hired worker and a property owner, which criteria should be used to calculate the amount of temporary unemployment benefit, or how to coordinate regional redistribution of labor resources with residence regulations.

So, how is it proposed to achieve the desired balance in the labor market? Primarily by filling the existing 7-8 million vacancies. True, A. Yakovlev specified that, according to their data, there are some 17 million vacancies and a substantial proportion cannot be filled for the night shift. Although trade unions are aware that night work causes some damage to people's health, they are forced to support this measure under pressure of circumstances.

(In parentheses I would like to point out with regret that a very interesting question—namely, how advisable it will be to have vacancies in the conditions of a market economy—was left unanswered).

Great hopes are being pinned on alternative forms of employment and the development of cooperatives, individual forms of labor, and small-scale enterprises. But the main burden will fall on state employment services: The government is currently working on creating these. As this—possibly the most important—aspect of the problem was not enlarged upon during the press conference, one can only guess how the new services will retrain working people released from their jobs and select suitable options, and who will finance their activity and how.

In answer to the question of what kind of funds will be needed for the package of unemployment prevention measures, V. Shcherbakov said that 4-6 billion rubles will be needed in 1991 for direct payments (i.e. benefits) alone. Some 12 billion rubles will be needed in all. But the sources of financing have yet to be established: There are various views on this, and the optimum solution will be achieved in the process of finalizing the draft Basic Principles of Legislation.

The following question was also asked: How will the problem of employment for Soviet citizens abroad be resolved within the framework of the new employment legislation and the law on leaving the country?

"I have discussed this problem with 16 labor ministers from various countries," V. Shcherbakov replied. "They all said that 'the idea is interesting' but none of them expressed a desire to accept Soviet working people in the European labor market. Moreover, some countries (Sweden, Norway, and Finland) have made a decision not to offer work to Soviet citizens. Germany has limited the possible influx by setting a quota of 15,000 people. Talks with the United States and Canada are still in progress and it is too early to talk about results.

"Moreover, under the terms of the International Labor Organization Convention, we will be setting up a state service to protect the interests of Soviet people working abroad.

"The current practice of placing people in work abroad via cooperatives and joint enterprises will be stopped," V. Shcherbakov stressed. "People who sign contracts in circumvention of the appropriate state service will forfeit the right to forms of social protection envisaged by the laws on pensions, employment, and so forth."

Decree on Armed Groups' Implementation Detailed

PM1910150590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[F. Ivanov report: "Time Running Out, But Weapons Remain in People's Hands"]

[Text] The deadline set for the implementation of the USSR president's decree on banning the creation of armed formations and confiscating weapons is running

out. What have internal affairs organs done to carry out the decree? This was discussed at a routine briefing at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] conducted by Lieutenant General Internal Services Nikolay Demidov, deputy minister of internal affairs.

According to him, the last two months have been particularly busy with regard to the surrender and confiscation of weapons. This was after the decision was made to extend the period of the decree's operation. During this period 20,200 firearms, 3 tonnes of explosives, 700,000 rounds of ammunition, and more than 100 radio sets and other communications equipment were surrendered or confiscated and 711 stolen vehicles returned. At the same time 24 paramilitary groups and formations—in possession of 146 assault rifles, 22 machine guns, and other kinds of weapons—were disbanded.

From 26 July through 18 October 6,603 firearms, including 2,550 rifled weapons, nine machine guns, 43 assault rifles, and 376,000 rounds of ammunition were surrendered or confiscated in the Ukraine. In Kazakhstan 2,421 firearms and quite a lot of ammunition and explosives were returned to law-enforcement agencies. The figures for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] are as follows: 6,240 firearms, almost 207,000 rounds, around 100 kg of explosives, and 38 radio sets.

Investigations are under way in 364 criminal cases concerning the seizure of weapons and attacks on internal affairs organs and military units with intent to seize weapons.

Moreover, 132,000 different "dumps" where more than 1 million firearms are stored have been checked. More than 500,000 weapons have been confiscated from training establishments, DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] organizations, and enterprises. Some 34,000 arms stores have been closed because of serious breaches of rules on the storage of weapons.

Unfortunately, despite the measures being taken concerning the surrender and confiscation of weapons, the situation (particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan) remains tense. Population centers, road transport, internal affairs organs, and military units are still being fired upon and attacked. The new Armenian leadership has taken steps to disarm and disband the armed formations of the Armenian National Army, the Independence Army, and the Combined Forces Movement, but numerous armed groups continue to operate in the republic. It has not proved possible so far to confiscate most of the firearms previously stolen and seized.

It is not easy in Georgia either: Three armed formations are openly operating and people have many weapons.

The operations being carried out are, according to the deputy minister, coming up against serious opposition. In the course of carrying them out 56 people have died, including five law-enforcement agency staffers.

According to USSR MVD figures, there are currently 11,993 rifled and smoothbore weapons plus more than 2,000 weapons seized directly from Armenian units and subunits in criminal investigation departments in the country.

In order to fully carry out the presidential decree, the USSR MVD is hoping to establish constructive cooperation with Union republic councils of ministers and local organs of power. Only with such collaboration can law and order be maintained and bloodshed averted.

Decree's Term Expires

LD2410104690 Moscow World Service in English 0810 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The term of President Gorbachev's act for illegal armed units to surrender weapons has expired. Deputy Minister of the Interior Nikolay Demidov elaborates:

[Begin Demidov recording] The great majority of constituent republics, except Armenia and Georgia, have no armed units. The new Armenian leaders have helped disarm and disband 24 armed groups of the Armenian National Army, the Independence Army, and the Allied Forces Movement. Premises were returned to whom they had belonged. We follow the principle of a maxinmum of legality and minimum of violence. We will continue trying to abide by this principle, despite the casualties we have suffered. During the two months of operations we lost 55 men, including five law enforcement officers. Twenty thousand-odd small arms were either confiscated or voluntarily surrendered nationwide. [passage omitted]

In Armenia, units of the National Liberation Movement are still acting on agreement with the leaders of that southern Republic, but political settlement is under consideration and as far as we know, the Armenian Supreme Soviet will shortly disband these units, too. [end recording]

KGB Man Fired for Exposing Saratov Corruption

PM2410172490 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 42, 16-22 Oct 90 p 44

[Unattributed report from the "People" column: "No One Writes to the Lieutenant Colonel"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Kichikhin, who works at the KGB department for the defense of the Soviet constitutional system, has joined those who are standing outside the Rossiya Hotel. In this way he is trying to draw the attention to the fate of Soviet Germans who, in his opinion, are falling victim to the mafia and the party machine in Saratov.

Lieutenant Colonel Kichikhin had to deal with Soviet Germans as part of his work. While studying problems connected with the restoration of German autonomy on the Volga, he realized that anti-German sentiments in

the Saratov Region were being purposely fanned. Neglecting the customs of secret services, he wrote an open letter to Gorbachev, Lukyanov, and Soviet and Russian deputies, saying that "corrupt circles in the Saratov Region are trying to stay in power, conceal economic crimes and malfeasances and hide behind the backs of the people they provoke to unlease an ethnical conflict. The entire campaign is headed by the leadership of the regional and some city party committees."

As a KGB man, Aleksandr Kichikhin must be well aware of the ties of the local mafia to the party machine. He preferred to give up attempts to influence the situation backstage (the way the KGB usually acts) and take up open political struggle. He addressed Germans and Russians and openly discussed his views with them, which raised an alarm at the KGB headquarters in Dzerzhinskiy Square. His boss left for Saratov to reassure party leaders that the Lieutenant Colonel was speaking only on his own behalf.

Kichikhin has received no reply to his open letter and was dismissed from his job at the KGB. Most probably, he will soon lose his shoulder straps too.

Kalugin Lawsuit Against KGB Chief Begins

LD2310230690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2132 GMT 23 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The hearing of the lawsuit brought by Kalugin against KGB head Kryuchkov started today in Moscow City Court.

[Correspondent E. Dzhafarov] This is the second phase of the litigation of former KGB Major General Kalugin. Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB, did not appear in court. He sent trusted representatives. The court sitting was adjourned until 11 November. The reason is the absence of necessary documents in the case, including those proving that Kalugin really did have the rank of KGB major general. The former general will now have to prove that he really is Kalugin and also that he was formerly a general.

[Kalugin] There will always be hope, of course.

[Unidentified correspondent] What are you counting on?

[Kalugin] On the common sense of the court.

[Dzhafarov] The length of Kalugin's third lawsuit against Gorbachev is still unpredictable.

[Kalugin] The president has not replied. He was asked for the documents four months ago.

Counterintelligence Officers' Role Described

PM2410142590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Major General Grigoriy Maksimovich Kazimir, chief of the USSR MVD Administration for USSR KGB Special Sections Within the Internal Troops, by Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka; date and place not given; under the "We Report for the First Time" rubric: "Internal Troop Security Officers"]

[Text] [Semenyaka] Grigoriy Maksimovich, the history of our state's military counterintelligence begins in December 1918. Have its tasks changed in conditions of perestroyka and how are they resolved by the personnel of the special sections within the Internal Troops?

[Kazimir] The activity of military counterintelligence as a component of the USSR KGB is geared to ensuring the security of the country and its Armed Forces and defending the Soviet Constitution. Our administration and its organs in the localities exercise counterintelligence functions directly within the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops and resolve a broad spectrum of tasks, including protecting personnel against intelligence and other subversive activity on the part of foreign special services, ensuring the security of state and military secrets, and combating organized crime and terrorism.

The data at our disposal allow us to assert that the Internal Troops are of intelligence interest to foreign special services. They try to track the trends of troop development and use, along with the processes taking place within troop collectives.

Today military counterintelligence organs strive to help troop commands ensure the safekeeping of weapons, munitions, and combat hardware. During this work the administration's staffers have exposed and suppressed numerous attempts by criminals and extremists to obtain weapons and munitions from servicemen or steal them from troops.

They engage in deception, flattery, intimidation, and bribery of servicemen. Thus, one serviceman on active military service was offered 19,000 rubles [R] in an endeavor to induce him to assist in procuring weapons.

Unfortunately, we do not always succeed in stopping such things in time. Five submachine guns and seven pistols were stolen from the dump of a troop unit deployed in Fergana City. "The clients and vendors" were identified as the result of operational investigation measures alone and the weapons removed and returned to the unit. The servicemen who stole and the civilians who acquired the weapons will appear in court.

Military counterintelligence officers combat organized crime and destructive forces' nationalistic influence on servicemen in a number of regions of the country.

Naturally there have been changes in the functions of the special sections and changes in the forms and methods of performing tasks as our society has changed. The principles of democracy and glasnost are practised more widely in our activity.

I want to say a special word about this. Glasnost promotes understanding and support for the activity of state security organs among working people and ensures their links with the masses, which ultimately boosts the effectiveness of intelligence work. However, glasnost has its limits in our work. We cannot disclose all the methods and resources at our disposal. We would thereby be involuntarily informing the people against whom they are directed.

[Semenyaka] Have there been cases in which criminal proceedings were instigated against servicemen for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"?

[Kazimir] Since the special sections were organized within the Internal Troops in 1984 criminal proceedings have not been instituted against any servicemen under what was Article 70 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code. Where necessary, when the actions of individuals showed signs of conflicting with the interests of state security or affected the fundamentals of the country's constitutional system, preventive measures were taken against them.

[Semenyaka] In "hotspots" personnel are increasingly conscious of pressure from nationalists. They try to estrange servicemen on national grounds. I observed this tendency in Osh Oblast, Kirghizia, for instance.

[Kazimir] The exacerbation of the domestic political situation in the country has not bypassed the Internal Troops. As part of our society they are feeling the effects of all the current processes. What is more, servicemen are being subjected to ideological pressure when performing patrol and sentry duties, ensuring the curfew, and fulfilling other tasks.

We must take into consideration the fact that there also people among the young recruits who were previously involved in various associations and groups engaged in dubious activity. These young men have given rise to a tendency toward increased negative actions within troop collectives.

In conjunction with the command it has proved possible to avert in a timely manner tension in relations between servicemen, which, given their access to weapons, may have tragic consequences, you realize.

Military counterintelligence personnel do not overlook nonregulation relations, physical insults, and humiliation of the individual. Priority is given to preventing negative processes occurring and developing at an early stage.

[Semenyaka] Over the last two years many troop units have spent months outside their areas of permanent deployment. What are military security officers engaged in at this time?

[Kazimir] Special sections' operational personnel are always with unit personnel and operate directly within their combat formations. In emergencies they perform tasks of essentially protecting the troops and personnel from intelligence and other subversive activity and helping the command to ensure that servicemen successfully fulfill their professional tasks.

In a complex operational situation where events generally develop rapidly and often unpredictably, anticonstitutional forces, various quasi-military organizations, and foreign special services try to obtain information regarding the quantity and affiliation of the units, their tasks, types of service, regime, areas of operation, command plans, availability of arms and special means, and the political state and morale of the personnel.

Military counterintelligence officers are also at this time working with KGB territorial organs to flush out the organizers of mass disturbances and their active accomplices, who are not giving up their extremist acts against troops and are also trying to induce individual servicemen to steal weapons and munitions. Law-enforcement organs also provide assistance.

Military counterintelligence officers act boldly and resolutely in complex situations. I will cite two examples from the service of our staffer—operational worker Captain V. Zolotov.

It happened in the Caucasus. A military convoy unexpectedly came under intense fire. Most unfortunately, two servicemen died and 14 were injured. In this situation in order to avoid further casualties, Capt V. Zolotov, together with Lieutenant Colonels A. Morozov and V. Sokolov, managed to get into talks with the extremists and persuade them to cease their fire.

A serviceman went missing. Capt V. Zolotov decided to meet with representatives of the nationalist group. They appeared with weapons. They behaved aggressively. Then there was a second meeting and a third.... It thus proved possible to ascertain who had made the attempt on the serviceman's life and shot at him.

[Semenyaka] You have already cited some of the characteristics or, more accurately, qualities of a counterintelligence officer. In this connection I have the following question: Are you conscious of a cadre shortage? You will, after all, agree that not everyone will be able to consciously put himself in the firing line and risk his life in peacetime.

[Kazimir] Indisputably it is difficult to do this. But in a critical situation these actions on the part of our personnel are the result of a heightened sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of their professional duty.

As for cadres, I can say that the special sections are fully staffed today as regards leadership and operational personnel. They all have a higher education, along with the requisite special and legal training. Moreover, two-thirds of our personnel come from USSR MVD troops.

[Semenyaka] Individual citizens and groups of people have criticized KGB activity of late. The incident with the republic KGB building in Tbilisi puzzles me. How do you regard events of this kind?

[Kazimir] Hiding behind populist and demagogic slogans, extremist elements are trying to denigrate the activity of the Armed Forces, MVD organs and troops, and the KGB.

Given the unstable political situation they are using any forms of attack, including overt attack, as was the case in September—an attack aimed at capturing the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] KGB building.

We regard such manifestations as an endeavor by antisocialist forces to compromise and paralyze the activity of law-enforcement organs and the KGB, which represent a kind of obstacle preventing them from achieving their ambitious, sometimes criminal aims.

Feature Article Examines Gordiyevskiy Case

PM2310152190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 p 3

[Feature comprising O. Belan article datelined London-Moscow, and A. Vasilyev article: "Defector"]

[Text] **The Case of "Double Agent" Oleg Gordiyevskiy Remains a Mystery in the KGB's History**

I was writing these notes, and all the time felt as if someone was looking over my shoulder. I pushed the paper aside, went out for a stroll along the street so as to get rid of this persistent feeling, but I still felt that this "someone" was following me. Oh hell, I thought with vexation, deep down we all are slaves of fear, and yet I really have nothing to fear.

I met Oleg Gordiyevskiy on a warm September day in London, in the lovely public garden outside the Houses of Parliament where Churchill, cast in bronze, gravely watches over Westminster. We—brought up on books and movies telling us that intelligence operators are brave and courageous people while spies are malicious and deceitful renegades—for a long time perceived the world only in sharp black and white images, without even a hint of halftones. Now, able to somewhat better recognize the other colors with which, as we have found out, life really abounds, we are becoming increasingly aware of how much we had missed and how much we had lacked in this black-and-white world, how much more complex and wiser this world is, even though it is also much more tragic—certainly much more tragic....

It was only this year that Oleg Gordiyevskiy's name started appearing in newspapers. The former KGB colonel, who mysteriously disappeared from Moscow in the summer of 1985, was mentioned in sensational revelations by former staffers of the powerful organization which was kept a secret from us for a long time. Later on, the central press reported briefly and quite incomprehensibly a press briefing at the USSR Embassy in London. Reading between the lines of dry text, one could guess that Soviet journalists accredited in Britain had been obliged to write these reports without being given an opportunity to take a closer look at what had actually happened.

Who is he, Oleg Gordiyevskiy—spy and traitor to the motherland? What forced him to bring himself to public notice again, five years after his phenomenal flight? And what actually happened in the summer of 1985?

I would ask my readers to bear with me a little longer, while I turn back to 1975. Still a student, and having joined the capital's youth newspaper to gain practical experience, I met and later on got friendly with Tanya (her name has been changed—O.B.), also a student but from the Moscow State University's Extramural Department. Just over a year later, she left to take up a job with the WHO in Denmark.

I received the occasional letter from her, and in 1979 she telephoned me from Moscow and happily announced: "I have gotten married."

We sat in a cafe somewhere along Gorkiy Street and Tanya, eyes shining, told me about her husband. They had met in Denmark, where he had a job with our embassy. He was older than her, previously married, but fortunately they had had no children. This was a great advantage both for the divorce and for his future professional career. He was brilliantly educated, spoke all Scandinavian languages, history was his hobby, and he had a unique book collection.

Her husband was Oleg Gordiyevskiy.

Later on they had two daughters, and moved to London where Oleg was given a new assignment. She wrote the occasional letter, but it was more a case of greetings cards on holidays. But the thread was not broken, it remained. Thus, toward the end of 1985, when I gathered that they might be on leave in Moscow, I telephoned her. Tanya answered...

We met. True enough, she immediately warned me: You might have some unpleasantness after our meeting.

Her story was reminiscent of an eerie and incredible spy thriller, and I had to force myself to believe that it was true.

...Gordiyevskiy was recalled to Moscow in February 1985. He returned to London on a new assignment, saying that he was about to be promoted. He was recalled again a short while later. He was worried when he left, it was unclear what had made the Center request its

staffer's presence again. Soon afterwards she received travel orders to return home.

Back home, Oleg spent a lot of time with the children, appeared cheerful, happily welcomed visitors, and was planning to go to a sanatorium. One evening, however, he took her out on the balcony and whispered: "Something dreadful has happened. The telephone and the apartment are bugged. Something most unexpected might happen to me. But remember one thing: You and the children are the sole purpose of my life." He has gone mad, she thought in horror.

But he could not tell her any more at that time. How could he explain to her on the balcony how and why he had started working for British intelligence, what he had felt on realizing that he was under suspicion, what lay in store for him in the event of being exposed? No, this is impossible to explain in a few words even to someone close to you.

Tanya and the children left to go to the South, Oleg went to a sanatorium near Moscow. They agreed that he would join them immediately after his rest. But he never arrived in the South. He did not answer the telephone in the apartment. Returning to Moscow ahead of schedule, Tanya found her home deserted. The KGB, which she immediately approached in her alarm, pacified her: After all, your husband is still officially on leave, he might have gone off somewhere. But the point was that she knew Oleg well: He was not the type to just "go off somewhere." She spent several days in alarm, expectation, and total ignorance. She was then informed: Your husband is a traitor and a spy, he has fled to Britain.

Their apartment in Leninskiy Prospekt was searched. Thoroughly searched. The search lasted several hours. Books, possessions, crockery were examined. After the initial shock mixed with joy ("He is alive! He is alive!"), she felt almost numb: What to do next, how to carry on living? She gazed with dry eyes at her home which had been turned inside out, silently listened to what she was being told. They told her: Think of the children, they must change their sonorous surname, you need a divorce. She already knew that KGB staffers were "keeping an eye" on her around the clock, and that all her contacts were being recorded—be it with friends, relatives, or even casual passersby who were unlucky enough to approach her in the street. As a matter of fact, contacts were becoming fewer and fewer—not just her acquaintances but even her neighbors and other people in the block had even stopped exchanging greetings with her. She was promised: As soon as you file for divorce, the shadowing will automatically become redundant. It is done for the time being for the purpose of your own safety.

Only later on did she realize that neither a change of name nor any other "obedient behavior" would relieve her of responsibility for what her husband had done. Whatever happened, she would always be Gordiyevskaya for the KGB, all through her life.

...Oleg Gordiyevskiy's career had been more than just successful. Having graduated from school with a silver medal, he enrolled in the International Relations Faculty of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. After graduation, he spent another year studying at the KGB Intelligence School. That was in the early sixties, when Khrushchev had announced his intention to make society democratic and humane. "Even then I shared the views of those who were to be dubbed dissidents later on. When you are in your twenties, you really want to believe in changes"—this is how he recalls the past. "But the first few years of working abroad convinced me that there could not be even talk about any democratic changes. The universal suspicion, the shadowing of one another, the buildup of the agents' network abroad, and the endless expansion of the apparatus in Moscow actually indicated the contrary. Everything was decided for me in 1968. I knew Czechoslovakia very well, I loved many of those who were subjected to terrible repressions, and I was expelled from the country. I realized that our society was democratic, developed, and civilized only in words. In reality, it was a country which terrified other peoples with its mindless implantation of ideas and had already led itself to a state of collapse."

"Back in 1968 I firmly decided to break with the Soviet regime. But how? Get out in Red Square with slogans against the occupation of Czechoslovakia? But being a KGB officer, I was perfectly well aware of the fate of the insane bold spirits who were immediately packed off to camps. Pick the path of a solo fighter without joining any underground currents? But I was only too familiar with my department's work methods and knew that I would be sent to a psychiatric hospital as soon as I had uttered the tiniest sound of protest."

One option remained open: To become a nonreturnee, to cross the street outside the Soviet Embassy and to sever forever the ties with the motherland. This would have been the honest but hard path. Gordiyevskiy chose another. Maybe now he would like to create a better impression than then, 16 years ago, but here are his exact words: "Having lived virtually all my conscious adult life in the West, I believed that I could not and did not have the right to be a burden to that society. And I decided to work for it. Let me emphasize again: I consciously started working against the Soviet regime."

An opportunity presented itself in 1974. And so Oleg Gordiyevskiy became a collaborator of Britain's Intelligence Service.

Intelligence services will exist for as long as politics exist—and they will exist forever. And intelligence services have always relied and still rely on the recruitment and re-recruitment of agents. This has always been the case and, while wrapping the aura of heroism around the famous "double agent" Kim Philby, the former high-ranking British diplomat Donald Maclean, or the "double agent" George Blake, let us not forget that, as far

as their own people are concerned, they were just ordinary spies and traitors of the motherland. Nonetheless, their own memoirs and books about them are widely published. I would be really reluctant to be accused of vindicating traitors. As a matter of fact, when I asked him "Are you aware that you have betrayed the motherland?", Oleg Gordiyevskiy replied: "The motherland was betrayed by the party and the KGB, which brought it to poverty and degradation."

The USSR Supreme Court's Military Collegium sentenced Oleg Gordiyevskiy to the ultimate punishment—execution by firing squad. He succeeded in escaping—this is what happens in spy thrillers.

...And Tanya remained in Moscow. She heard virtually nothing about her husband for two years. Gradually, she and her children moved to live with her parents. She could have coped with her own alienation. But some of her softhearted neighbors actually forbade their children to have anything to do with her daughters. Fear for her children drove her out of her home.

It was then, in 1985, that Oleg sent via his sister the first parcel and the first money transfer. Everything was returned to London. He tried on several more occasions to send money and presents for his wife and children—the result was the same. Was it the sister, scared of family ties that were no longer of any use to her, who sent everything back, or was it the KGB that stopped the parcels from reaching the addressee—this is difficult to determine now.

Her mother-in-law died in November last year. She had to approach to the KGB with a request that the son be notified of his mother's death. "If you refuse," she added, "I will be forced to approach the British Embassy." A telegram from Oleg, expressing condolences and grief, arrived a day later.

He telephoned her in February this year. And the first thing he said was: "I am doing everything possible to bring us together." And a few days later, some staffers of the British Embassy in the USSR visited her at home. They confirmed: The British Parliament is concerned because she and her children are unable to meet her husband; they promised help and support. But there were no more visits or telephone calls. Embassy Counsellor Roderic Lyne, one of her visitors, was officially told by the Soviet side: He would be immediately expelled from the USSR unless he terminated all contacts with the escaped intelligence officer's former wife. Lyne himself refused to comment on this occurrence.

...In a half-empty, typical English pub in the crowded Oxford Street, Oleg Gordiyevskiy and I spoke for several hours on end. (The interview with him was published in issue No. 42 of the weekly SOBESEDNIK—O.B.) While speaking in Russian, every now and again he would use a few words in English—I was the first to speak to him in his native tongue in five years. He is perfectly well aware of everything that is happening in our country. He has a high opinion of General Kalugin's courage: "He is certainly a valiant man."

A bystander would have found it difficult to figure out who was interviewing whom. While answering my questions, he would suddenly break and eagerly ask about his family. I had seen Tanya and the girls before my departure, and our meeting was described to him umpteen times. The way his wife looked, what the girls were wearing, how their hair was styled—long or short. He listened to me, and I watched his eyes flood with tears and turn red. An experienced intelligence officer, who had risked his life on many occasions, familiar with events and planning 100 moves ahead! Therefore, there are still values which rank higher than politics, money, states, laws, and borders... And these values are the price we ultimately have to pay for everything of which we may or may not be guilty.

"I knew what I was doing. But back then, in 1978, when I met Tanya and fell in love with her, how could I have told her everything about myself? She, just like your entire generation, religiously believed everything that appeared in newspapers or was officially said from the rostrums.

"I never had any doubts about what I was doing. But you have to have lived my life and none other in order to understand my choice and the path I took. Even back in the sixties, there were people working at the embassy in Denmark with whom it was possible to hold a more or less frank conversation about matters which were normally passed over in silence. Some would pursue the conversation, others would at worst say: 'You had better not babble about this, old man.' The breath of the recent thaw could still be felt among us, people living in the rather closed circle of a colony abroad. The atmosphere in Britain was completely different. Some 10-12 years had passed, and it was not safe to even think, let alone talk, about our system's shortcomings. Total shadowing of one another, denunciations of every petty detail, it seemed to me that Stalinism had again reared its head and was gathering strength.

"To be honest, I felt that Russia was dead. Its best people were exterminated, the economy was in a desperate state, corruption and decay had penetrated all spheres of life—that was obvious even then, back in the seventies. The KGB was a terrifying police machine that had permeated all of society's pores. I no longer believed that, after all this, Russia could liberate itself and stand on its feet again. My decision to serve another society was perfectly conscious. It makes me laugh to hear or read that the British bought me for large sums of money. For years on end I risked my life every day, and this risk is not worth any sum of money. One can run a risk only for the sake of an idea, even though I realize that you would hardly believe that I am an ideological traitor."

Knowing what is happening in the country now, has he changed his views, does he believe in a renewed motherland? Oleg pensively shook his head: "On the one hand, people in the USSR make all that noise about democracy but, on the other hand, they strip Kalugin of the awards he has earned. They proclaim themselves to be a rule-of-law state but do not let my family join me. Society is as unfree as ever, people are still the bonded slaves of mindless monsters who head the party apparatus and the KGB. I realize that my family is being kept in Moscow to set an example for others: If you dare to rise, you will lose the most precious things in life. This department has always thrived on fear, intimidation, and baseness, and you must clearly realize this if you really want actual changes."

I leafed through my notes and thought to myself that no matter how damning the definitions and facts mentioned by Gordiyevskiy might be, none of this was news, sensation, or subversion any longer. Things that might have appeared absurd, weird, and unreal only five years ago are now known to be part of a terrifying and tragic reality. Actually, a book written by Oleg Gordiyevskiy jointly with Cambridge University Professor Christopher Andrew—"History of the KGB's External Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev"—is due to be published shortly, at the end of October, in Britain, America, and France.

We parted. He put me in a taxi, and asked me to take a parcel to his children—shoes, purses, pants. I agreed. "Aren't you afraid?", he asked. Indeed, won't they confiscate them at customs? And yet I would be carrying neither weapons nor drugs!

...The KGB called on me a day later. They did not intimidate, they did not pressure, they did not curse. They only counselled me to write so as to present a graphic and accurate image of the "traitor of the motherland."

I wrote it as it is. The only point was that all the time I felt as if someone was looking over my shoulder. And it was impossible to dispel this persistent fancy...

You Are a Big Liar, Gordiyevskiy!

I became interested in Gordiyevskiy's case a long time ago, as soon as the first articles about him appeared in the Western press. A careful study of these materials and conversations with Soviet Intelligence staffers give me, in my view, the right to express my own opinion on this matter.

Two remarks to begin with. First: I am not taking on the task of figuring out whether Gordiyevskiy's wife has the right to join him or not. This is a topic for a separate article. Second: I refuse outright to charge my "hero" with being partial to women and wine and to debunk him on this basis. We all are human, and even KGB staffers do not all live according to the behests of "Iron Feliks." Not every traitor was a womanizer and drunkard, and not every worshipper of Bacchus and Venus is prepared to forsake the motherland or the party membership card for their sake.

And now about the essence of Gordiyevskiy's statements.

I would make so bold as to conclude that they were specially prepared and considered by his current employers, taking into account the present psychological situation in the Soviet Union and gearing them to several million unsophisticated readers. In the confidence that the KGB's response will be, as always, clumsy. What do you expect, the [British] intelligence service has always been famed for its inventiveness.

Having read the text of an interview given by KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov to America's ABC-TV ("We have told Gordiyevskiy that he can return to the Soviet Union. We will drop all criminal charges. We will guarantee him a job, life in Moscow, apartment facilities..."), I would like to ask: Comrade Army General, do you yourself actually believe what you are saying? Who gave you the right to treat the law so lightly and abolish Article 64—"Betrayal of the Motherland"—under which Gordiyevskiy was sentenced to the ultimate punishment? And how can you, after all this, look into the eyes of your staffers, the overwhelming majority of whom would not offer a hand to the "prodigal son"?

Gordiyevskiy is trying to present everything as if he had worked for British intelligence for ideological reasons, thus struggling against the socialist system. But foreign publications indicate that he did work for money, and for sizeable amounts at that. As a matter of fact, he himself makes no secret of this: "...Having lived for many years in the West, having seen for myself that a democratic and civilized society has actually been built here, that everything here actually serves man's well-being, his happiness and prosperity, I could not and did not want to live as a parasite in this society" (SOBESEDNIK, issue No. 42).

All Western specialists on the KGB have admitted the impossibility of recruiting a Soviet intelligence officer on an ideological basis. Only for money or compromising material! Explaining the motives of his action, Gordiyevskiy uses the language of the late eighties: "I realized that, by working against the Soviet regime, I would help to generally undermine the socialist system which has brought incalculable sufferings not only to the Russian people but also to many other peoples." And yet, if his own words were to be believed, he was recruited in 1974. (Actually, this last reservation is not accidental. The Western press has given a different date of recruitment—1969, in other words the time when Gordiyevskiy was still working in Denmark. And even he himself says: "Everything was decided for me in 1968." It would be interesting to know what really happened.) At that time, the obvious horrors of the socialist system were not clearly visible to everyone. They could hardly have been visible to the son of an NKVD staffer, younger brother of a KGB staffer, and

graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International relations, who later became a promising young intelligence officer. After all, the situation was completely different then, and the West certainly did not look like the "promised land." Let us recall the young people's riots in the late sixties, the war in Vietnam, and the "Watergate scandal." At that time, even the greatest thinkers of the time felt that the West was on a course of self-destruction. Gordiyevskiy would hardly have been able to see clearly through the fog of successive five-year plans [skvoz tolshchu pyatiletok].

But why did he nonetheless decide to apply for a job with the KGB? "Don't forget that this was back in 1962. The 22d party congress had just been held, and not just I but also people in their thousands and millions believed that the country would finally take the path of civilization and progress... At that time Khrushchev proclaimed the democratization of security organs, they were joined by fresh, young, and healthy cadres." Another strained interpretation. Those whom Gordiyevskiy describes as "young and healthy cadres" were actually party and Komsomol [Communist Youth League] apparatus officials. The CPSU was striving to establish its own control over the organs. A noble task, but... This odd combination of "healthy" party apparatchiks and rank-and-file operatives and collaborators of Lavrentiy Pavlovich [Beriya] turned the state security organs into a system that was alien to Gordiyevskiy, a young idealist who was "brought up on the works of Solzhenitsyn, Pasternak, and Brodskiy." If he were to be believed, of course...

When the British started showing Gordiyevskiy to journalists earlier this year, he declared that he had saved the world from a nuclear catastrophe by passing on to the West the plan for the launch of a nuclear war by the Soviet Union. But, in view of the position he held, Gordiyevskiy could not have had any knowledge of any plans. Intelligence services operate on the principle: You must have only the information that is necessary for your own work. But Gordiyevskiy spent virtually all his working life abroad, where our intelligence officers draw information about their own country from the same source as ordinary people—the newspapers.

There is a naive sound to Gordiyevskiy's words that in the fall of 1985, already after his flight, he used the ordinary mail to send letters to his wife and a parcel to his sister. Being a cadre KGB staffer, he must have been aware that any postal communications from a traitor to the motherland would never reach the addresses.

Simpletons are also the intended audience for his story about how he discovered that his apartment and telephone were bugged, and how terrified his wife was when she found out. Any junior operations officer with the USSR KGB's First Main Directorate knows that its structure includes a subdivision one of whose tasks is to prevent the recruitment of Soviet intelligence officers by the opponent's intelligence services. Chekists lovingly refer to this subdivision among themselves as the "Torture and Execution Section." So much for their humor. And so, as I was told, every now and again this section takes preventive measures—telephone tapping, shadowing—toward First Main Directorate staffers. Don't be hasty in your indignation. This a practice accepted by all special services in the world. All Chekists know about it, and so do their wives, and one must be a total idiot to divulge personal secrets over the telephone. Especially if you work not only for Soviet but also for British intelligence!

Had Gordiyevskiy really wanted to destroy the "world socialist system," he can be justifiably proud: He has made his contribution. The long years of his work for the British have caused enormous damage to our state—counted in millions for the time being. Economic, moral, political damage...

It may well be that quite a few human lives rest on his conscience. Early in his career he worked in a subdivision which deals with illegal intelligence gathering. This means that he has sold people to the British—Soviet "illegal" intelligence officers who are the golden assets of the First Main Directorate and who deservedly enjoy tremendous respect for their labor. Their work has been only superficially covered in movies like "Seventeen Moments in Spring," "Dead Season," and others. And Gordiyevskiy handed them over...

Intelligence services have always existed and will always exist for as long as states exist, in any international conditions. People's attitudes toward the intelligence service depend on the state of mind of the nation whose interests it protects. And a healthy nation treats traitors as traitors—without exception.

Bogomolov Interviewed on Democracy, Pluralism

AU2310164590 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Oct 90 p 7

[Interview with Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Moscow International Economic and Political Research Institute, by Gyorgy Jozsef Farkas in Strasbourg; date not given: "It Is Not Enough To Merely Declare Democracy"]

[Text] One can increasingly hear Russian being spoken in the headquarters of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Guests from the Soviet Union can frequently be seen in the meeting hall, and Russian translation is also available now. Our correspondent visited Strasbourg recently and interviewed academician Oleg Bogomolov, a member of the Soviet delegation at the international conference entitled: "Ways to Democracy."

[Farkas] What practical steps are you taking to improve cooperation in Europe? Has your presence in the Council of Europe led to any concrete results?

[Bogomolov] We have already joined, and we are also preparing to join a series of European conventions, and, in my view, our membership here will soon be on the agenda. Naturally, this does not depend only on our will and wishes. Nor does this depend on the intentions of

our republics which, by the way, are increasingly independent in the diplomatic arena. The transition to a really democratic system is one of the conditions for such broad cooperation. The Council of Europe shows particularly keen interest in this humanitarian sphere. The process of democratization has begun in our country, but it is far from ending, although progress is quite discernible.

[Farkas] A pluralist society, that is a multiparty system is one of the basic requirements of the Council of Europe. What is the situation in the Soviet Union?

[Bogomolov] It seems that we are taking over the bad examples of many of our neighbors, including the Hungarians. In my opinion, there are a few dozen political parties in the Soviet Union, too, and, although no law on public organizations has yet been fully adopted, such organization have already appeared de facto. Some of them are ready to be registered. I repeat, I am not sure that this is a positive aspect of pluralism. Concomitantly, this also leads to the breaking up of radical and democratic forces, while the conservative part of our society remained quite united. However, I can propose nothing else to replace this because this is a basic issue of political style. While our society lacked a political style and democracy in the past, increased rights can also lead to the strengthening of extremist manifestations. Naturally, we would welcome the existence of some sort of a "political awareness course" before each and every citizen decides on what or whom to choose.

[Farkas] In connection with the economic and political mood, how radically and rapidly is it worth dealing with the economic aspects of this problem?

[Bogomolov] As for what is more important: political or economic decisions, to a certain extent, this reminds me of the dilemma of the chicken or the egg. One thing is certain: We have become convinced of the fact that it is impossible to shift to market methods without previously repelling the political opposition. This opposition is rather strong in the Soviet Union. To a certain extent, the political forms preceded the economic ones in the Soviet Union. It is enough to give you the example of the elections. For example, a democratically elected local leadership took over the local council both in Moscow and Leningrad; however, there has not yet been a democratic restructuring in our economy. This is a dangerous situation because the old economic mechanism could deprive the new and democratic public administration of its legitimacy. I am convinced that we must solve most of our problems, including our economic problems, by means of political decisions. We should provide freedom to individuals, guarantee the freedom of enterprises and collectives, and create the conditions which make it possible for talented people to develop and make it possible for the moral basis of our society to improve and also make it possible for privatization to take root. Privatization, and the elimination of obsolete forms of property are the main conditions for transition to a market economy. We must create a broad social basis to guarantee human freedom, and this will guarantee restructuring. It is impossible to create such a basis without providing ownership rights to the people. When they become owners and begin to feel independent, we will approach our goals. To declare freedom and also refuse to create the economic conditions that are indispensable for the implementation of this freedom is nothing but fraud.

[Farkas] The inefficiency of the Soviet economy in recent years is striking. As far as one is able to evaluate things from abroad, the people are increasingly impatient. Could one hope that the political restructuring will end before some kind of social explosion occurs?

[Bogomolov] You are right. We have no more time. We lost too much time. Therefore, we must now make immediate decisions on urgent issues and make people feel confident that things can be improved. Things can be improved, albeit not immediately, but in the near future. However, many decisions cannot be implemented because the existing political structures simply do not make that possible.

[Bogomolov] Take, for example, private ownership, at least partially, of agricultural land. At present, agricultural land is owned by the state; that is, in practice, it does not belong to anyone. If you like, these lands are in fact the property of the kolkhozes and local leaders, chairmen, and directors. These people received the lands for eternal and free use, and naturally, they do not want to give them away to anyone. Apparently, the issue of privatization of agricultural land is obvious, but the decision is delayed. Gorbachev proposed a referendum on the issue. However, this would not only slow down the decisionmaking process, but the outcome would also be questionable because the population is simply not ready for this new situation. For decades people have been told that the current situation is the most favorable one; in reality, this very thing took us to the brink of the abyss.

Many similar contradictions could emerge in a democracy. On one hand, every decision should be approved by the majority; on the other hand, there are decisions that could definitely bring results, but the population refuses to support them. Only the more educated strata of our society would agree with these decisions. What should one do in such a situation? It is essential that we should have a strong executive power in democracy, along with democratic supervision. The people should authorize the president and the government to take measures. Such a strong government can then also make unpopular decisions which would also enjoy broad support later when they lead to results. There were such things in the West as well. For example, De Gaulle was given special rights, and he made many such unpopular decisions. A similarly tough position was made by Margaret Thatcher. That is life....

[Farkas] In conclusion, I would like to ask you about your past field of activity: cooperation among the former socialist countries. What are the prospects for such cooperation?

[Bogomolov] The situation is critical. Just like the Warsaw Pact, CEMA has practically ceased to exist, at least in its previous form. In my opinion, this is a positive development in itself, but it does not mean that we should not maintain certain elements in the future, elements that previously connected the member countries. It is utopian to think that CEMA countries could immediately join the activity of the European Community. The other side is not prepared for that either. Although the European Community does not reject this in principle, it will be a long story. It is rather difficult to enter Western markets, and for this reason we must make greater use of the previous contacts between former socialist countries and should not let these contacts wither away. However, unfortunately, the general crisis of these countries also led to a crisis in our mutual relations, and we lack confidence.

This primarily refers to us, the Soviet Union, which is in a particularly difficult situation, partly because of mistakes made by our leadership during restructuring. This deep crisis, which practically means economic disintegration, has had a very serious effect on our relations with many countries, including Hungary. We must now seek new forms and possibilities to try not to lose everything we had before. On a government level, our opportunities are minimal, but there are other solutions. For example, Hungary will directly contact some of our republics, Hungarian enterprises will contact enterprises in these republics. It is expedient for us to support such cooperation. These contacts will no longer be made between the various ministries. Various organizations could also emerge on the basis of stock corporations, and the Soviet enterprises could seek partners in Hungary and develop direct trade with them. I mean here primarily cooperation of trade organizations, but one could also imagine the establishment of Hungarian enterprises on Soviet territory, and vice versa.

All-Union Komsomol Plenum Results Reported

Resolution on Actions

91US0030B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 p 2

[Resolution of the Third All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Plenum: "On Practical Actions of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee With Regard for the Situation Evolving in the Country and the Situation in the All-Union Komsomol"]

[Text] The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Plenum resolves:

1. To propose to all parties and movements in the country that they announce a moratorium on political actions destabilizing the situation in the society, and that they develop joint actions to surmount crises and to attain civic concordance.

2. To carry out the following practical actions:

- submit, to the USSR President and to the supreme soviets of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics, the *proposals on protecting the interests of the young in connection with transition to a market economy, implementation of the military form and other actions*, and ensure that these proposals are accounted for in programs of transition to a market economy and socioeconomic development of the country and its regions;
- in order to implement measures of social protection of the young and pursue an integrated state youth policy, propose formation of state youth affairs organs within the structure of the administrative organs of the republics, krays and oblasts of the country;
- propose to all political parties, trade unions, public associations and religious organizations that they provide material, financial and other support to government organs in developing state youth policy;
- deem it necessary to utilize the financial resources and material base of the All-Union Komsomol to create a system of social protection for the young in the country in the new economic conditions. Approve the proposals to create the "Youth Social Service" state-public information system and the "Labor Exchange" youth employment society. Allocate 100 million rubles for the system's creation as an All-Union Komsomol contribution. Establish that the nature of investment of assets (their transfer to the soviets, establishment of joint ventures and other variants) is to be determined by the subjects of the federation with the consent of the corresponding state government organs;
- in order to include the young in the actual work of establishing new economic relations as quickly as possible, initiate a program of apprenticeship and retraining of young specialists abroad, and create a young businessman training system. Provide support to the International Youth Exchange Fund, created with the assistance of the USSR President, in this connection. Allocate 20 million rubles to the fund as the contribution of the subjects of the federation, and instruct the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau to examine the issue of transferring a number of All-Union Komsomol facilities to the fund;
- in order to ensure wholesome rest of young people, implement additional steps to develop youth tourism in the country. Allocate 125 million rubles to the development of youth tourism.

3. The plenum appeals to youth enterprises and organizations created with the participation of the All-Union Komsomol to channel their efforts into producing additional consumer goods, expanding services, and

changing production specialization when necessary in order to support measures to stabilize the consumer market.

To allocate 25 million rubles as a charter-member contribution in order to enlarge the production program of the "Development" joint-stock company associated with increasing production of new games and toys for children requiring social rehabilitation.

4. To allocate 5 million rubles for the creation of a special fund for the support of youth organizations. To establish that the fund is to be disposed of by the subjects of the federation with regard for allocation of assets in support of implementation of centralized projects in an amount of 500,000 rubles.

5. To deem it necessary to conduct the 22d All-Union Komsomol Congress in spring 1991. To instruct the Bureau of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee to summarize the results of the congress for the subjects of the federation, and to submit specific proposals to the next plenum on the time and agenda of the Komsomol congress.

Zyukin Presents Financial Plan

91US0030A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Excerpt from a report by All-Union Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary V. Zyukin to the Third Plenum of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee: "The Komsomol Divides Its Money"]

[Text] **The Third Plenum of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee initiated division Komsomol property and assets. It was decided to make major capital investments into youth politics.**

Since 1939 the Komsomol has allocated more than 856 million rubles to the construction of youth facilities. Of this amount, 539 million were its own assets. The total value of the All-Union Komsomol's property is around 712 million rubles. Nine hundred seventy million is in the form of cash. This includes 650 million in Komsomol Central Committee accounts.

The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Plenum decided to allocate:

100 million rubles for the creation of the "Youth Social Service" state-public system and the "Labor Market" youth employment society;

20 million rubles for a program of apprenticeship and retraining of young specialists abroad;

125 million rubles for the development of youth tourism;

25 million rubles as its contribution to the charter fund of the "Development" joint-stock company;

5 million rubles for the creation of a special fund supporting youth organizations.

In deciding to convene this plenum and defining its agenda, the Bureau of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee based itself on the need for immediately adopting and implementing practical measures of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee with regard for the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation that has evolved in the country, in our union.

Given the anarchy, the deteriorating living conditions, and the dissatisfaction of the young not only with tomorrow but also with today, we must be more concerned not with internal union reforms directed at preserving our organization, but with the fate of the young. National conflicts and political extremism are not the only things that are suffocating today's young people: There is also the elementary shortage of everything—from sugar to tobacco. And all of this is overwhelming those who are "just starting out in life," as the old expression goes.

The total lack of trust and the absence of civic concordance are advantageous to both the extreme left and the extreme right, which is something we need to reckon with. The goals are different, but the method is the same—to rock and upset the boat, and thus sink one's opponents.

If the anarchy in society continues into the future, it is the young people, who have grown tired of the promises, the constant stress, that may become the main motive force behind a social explosion in the country.

Such is the situation in which the society finds itself at the threshold of transition to a market economy. All the more so because both in the youth environment and among Komsomol members, the attitude toward the impending changes is far from homogeneous. This is fully understandable, since young people are ignorant of the price that will have to be paid for the decisions that are made, and the absolute majority hardly believe it all in the fairy-tale contentment of tomorrow's market economy. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau supports the transition to the market as being the sole possible way of achieving an economic breakthrough. But our support must be combined with the demand that all authorities heed the position of the young, and develop and defend their measures of social protection of the young. The supreme soviets and presidents of all republics and of the country must realize that in today's conditions, absence of a strong state youth policy harbors serious political consequences. Any ill-conceived, half-truthful, inconsistent step, every unfulfilled promise is grounds for a possible explosion, for complete destabilization of the society, for disaster in implementing perestroyka. I am not saying this just to frighten some people. We stand in favor of the market economy, but we also demand that those who are to make these decisions must be responsible.

This is precisely why we feel it necessary to examine and adopt proposals at the plenum on protecting different

categories of young people in connection with the country's transition to a market economy, with the forthcoming military reform and with other actions that will worsen the social health of the young, and why we must send these proposals to the USSR President and to the parliaments of the country and the union and autonomous republics.

We feel it fundamentally important today not to limit ourselves just to requiring the authorities to concern themselves with the young; they must also utilize their own organizational, material and financial possibilities for this purpose. Proposals on forming the "Youth Social Service" state-public information system and the mechanisms of its implementation have been submitted to the Central Committee Plenum. This time around, we are not talking about creating another monster controlled from the center. Quite the reverse. Such a service needs to be created in each republic, oblast and rayon on the basis of local need. But most importantly, centers must arise throughout the entire country containing a youth labor exchange, a vocational orientation center, psychological and educational assistance and legal protection services, legal consultation offices for juveniles and the young, and a drug rehabilitation service. They should also have dormitories and asylums for juveniles and young people who suffer conflicts at home or who are homeless and unemployed, for disabled persons referred to the center for rehabilitation, and others. We propose allocating 100 million rubles for these purposes by a plenum decision.

In addition the Bureau of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee feels it necessary to initiate a program of apprenticeship and retraining of young specialists abroad and to create a young businessman training system in order to include young people as quickly as possible in the actual work of establishing new economic relations. The bureau proposes supporting the International Youth Exchange Fund created for this purpose with the assistance of the USSR President, allocating 20 million rubles to it as a contribution in the name of the federation's subjects, and foreseeing transfer of a number of All-Union Komsomol facilities to the fund to support implementation of approved programs.

The problems of social protection of the young are not just the concern of the Komsomol alone. Political parties and movements and public and religious organizations could participate most widely in their solution. The first step was taken at the 28th CPSU Congress—a resolution on youth policy was adopted. You all remember that not all proposals of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee were reflected in it. And today we once again appeal to the CPSU Central Committee to use its material and financial possibilities to solve the problems of the young. To change the profile of some of the party schools so that they might form the country's new intellectual fund, and train young managers, businessmen and politicians. To send talented young people who will be the society's leaders tomorrow for training abroad at the expense of the party budget. Young people have the right to expect not only pleaant-sounding statements but also real support in solving their problems from the CPSU, if it really wishes to improve its failing political report card.

In addition the Central Committee Bureau proposes that the plenum also take a number of specific actions that are in the mainstream of decisions of the 21st Congress.

First of all we propose that 125 million rubles be allocated to development of youth tourism in order to create conditions for wholesome rest for the young. This means significantly improving the material base and quality of services.

In addition we must also concern ourselves with development of All-Union Komsomol projects which are already providing the society with specific benefits today. The "Development" joint-stock company manufacturing toys and consumer goods for children and young people, established a year and a half ago by the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee, is now responsible for a sixth of the country's toy production. It has now initiated very interesting programs for the manufacture of endoprostheses. We propose allocating 25 million rubles to support this activity.

There is one other fundamentally important issue. We have proclaimed the existence of pluralism in the youth movement and welcomed it on several occasions. Having been the sole youth organization for decades, in behalf of the interests of the young the All-Union Komsomol must offer its "friendly rivals" seed capital in order to help them with their start-up problems. Having proposed allocation of 5 million rubles to create a fund supporting new youth organizations, the Central Committee Bureau in no way views this step as crumbs from the master's table or as an attempt to buy protection against criticism from without. No. The main thing is this: The more real youth associations there are, the more real actions will be taken in behalf of the young.

I would like to dwell on another two aspects of the problem of the transition to a market economy.

First. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Plenum could support the need for state government organs to implement extraordinary measures to balance the consumer market and saturate it with goods. Otherwise any program of economic reform would come to a halt as soon as it collides with another bread revolt.

Second. Implementation of any program of transition to a market economy is possible only in the presence of civic concordance in the country. Waves of spontaneous rallies, attacks by different political forces upon each other and elementary provocations and lack of restraint in mutual complaints are a good nutrient medium for the creation of a situation of universal chaos, in which implementation of economic transformations becomes an unrealistic dream. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee might ask all political parties and movements to declare a moratorium on senseless ideological

conflict and on political actions that destabilize the situation in the country. This pertains to everyone—both the CPSU and other forces. I think that serious politicians need to understand that deepening of the interparty struggle in the present situation, especially in the soviets, would lead to creation of yet another party—the party of the deceived young.

Here is the next aspect of the problems we are considering. A year and a half ago, at its 21st Congress, the Komsomol assumed the path of fundamental reorganization, of change of its countenance. The most important thing is for each subject of the federation to be free. Free to determine its activities, priorities and work goals. Free to choose its ideological and political reference points. Free to acquire its own countenance.

As we predicted in our congresses, a number of the federation's subjects have changed the names of their republic organizations, and proclaimed the priority of republic standards over all-union standards, points of view and a number of other factors.

In addition the framework of the All-Union Komsomol's program goals no longer fits the entire diversity of political and ideological reference points being adopted today by the subjects of the federation.

I need to emphasize once more that this process is objective, and it confirms the transitional nature of the decisions of the Komsomol congress. Also natural is the fact that presently occurring transformations are accompanied by further decline in the membership of the All-Union Komsomol, by the demise of many primary Komsomol organizations, by their inability to adapt to the breakdown of the work-based principle of the union's organizational structure, and essentially by the cessation of all activity of the administrative staff of Komsomol committees, except that directed at self-preservation. It was precisely toward these new realities that instructions of the 21st Congress on developing a new procedure for utilizing Komsomol property were oriented. And so, let's consider the proposed solutions.

First. Implementing the principles of the federated structure of the All-Union Komsomol, considering Clause No 34 of the All-Union Komsomol Charter as it relates to Komsomol property, and taking account of adoption of the USSR Law "On Property Ownership in the USSR" and development and adoption of programs to convert the national economy to market relations, we propose giving the Komsomol committees the right of ownership of those Komsomol facilities and enterprises which were built and created at the expense of the Komsomol or with its participation.

Second. We propose switching the largest Komsomol enterprises to progressive forms of property ownership, orienting them on satisfaction of the needs of young people. For example we propose, in particular, implementing an entire complex of measures associated with priority development of youth tourism—the most important component of an organization having social functions.

Fundamental changes are to be made in the "Young Guard" production association as well.

Such are the proposals of the Bureau of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee concerning property ownership problems. The alternatives are as follows: either to divide everything, extending the life of the Komsomol apparatus for a certain time, or fundamentally reforming economic relations within the union and forcing the All-Union Komsomol's monopoly on property ownership to work in behalf of the interests of the young. I think that political and moral responsibility will guide us to the correct choice. The choice in the interests of the young and the future of the organization.

Fundamental renewal of the All-Union Komsomol is unavoidable, and our task is to make this as painless and civilized as possible. The outlines of the new Komsomol are already defined by the subjects of the federation themselves. What are they?

First. Obviously, the future organization must have a form that reflects the essence of a union agreement between sovereign states.

Second. This must be an organization with a clearly expressed function of social protection.

Third. The matter of the union's name, which must reflect the essence of the organization, has to be discussed.

Such is our possible alternative to the old, centralized all-union Komsomol, now fading into the past. But this of course is the prerogative of the Komsomol congress.

The logic of political development raises the issue of convening the 22d All-Union Komsomol Congress—such was the plan at the 21st Congress as well. This next congress would provide us a chance to make these changes. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Bureau feels it necessary for this plenum to decide on the political suitability of convening a congress in spring of the following year.

Commentary on Finance Plans

91US0040D Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 1

["Official commentary": "The Komsomol Distributes the Money"]

[Text] The Third Plenum of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee examined the question of new principles of utilization of the VLKSM material and financial base. Besides the resolution published previously in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the development and financing of major social programs, decisions were adopted which change the established procedure for the use of assets

and activity of VLKSM enterprises within the organization itself. Over the course of decades, Komsomol enterprises, institutions, and facilities across the country were created by decision of the VLKSM Central Committee, and until now the Central Committee has been their proprietor. The new federative structure of the Komsomol and new economic conditions determined a decision of the Central Committee Plenum: to transfer enterprises and other economic facilities that were built or instituted using VLKSM funds to the ownership of local Komsomol committees.

At the same time, the plenum presented to VLKSM committees a proposition for joint use of Komsomol enterprises by the local soviets of people's deputies. This would apply not only to the localities but to the center as well. Thus, having approved the establishment of a fund for the development of on-the-job training and retraining programs for young specialists abroad, the plenum stated its support for transferring to this fund a number of facilities previously used for retraining Komsomol cadres and serving as a rest and relaxation home for the VLKSM Central Committee. In essence, the Central Committee plenum itself has begun the process of "removing the state" from VLKSM assets, while considering it a matter of principled importance to preserve these assets for use in the interests of youth.

In addition, the plenum adopted a decision on the need to transfer the "Sputnik" Bureau of International Youth Tourism of the VLKSM Central Committee, and the publishing-printing association "Molodaya Gvardiya," over to new forms of management under market economy conditions. Proposals were made to the effect that the interests of their labor collectives be taken into account without fail during the reorganization process, as also those of the soviets of people's deputies.

Delegates Discuss Youth Press

91US0040A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by A. Aleynikov: "The Third Plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee Discusses Problems of the Youth Press—'Today We Have Held Our Own. But Tomorrow?'"]

[Text] In essence, the question boils down to whether or not we will have VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] newspapers and magazines. And that is no exaggeration. Even today we see sad instances of children's and youth publications closing down. The circumstances are different in each case but the precedent itself is significant, something we have not previously known. It must be said quite directly that the youth press has done quite a bit for the emancipation of social consciousness. And how paradoxical it is that the youth press today is paying for its support of a policy of renewal. Threatening the youth press today is the real danger of being crushed in the confrontation between new and departing structures of power. How is this manifest? On the one hand, in the fact that youth publications have been deprived of the patronage of the Communist Party, with its virtual monopoly on the youth publications printing industry, and on the other, in the fact that they have received no sympathy—to say nothing of concrete assistance—from the new soviets.

Today we have held our own. But what about tomorrow? Today we have the party publication houses. We have the opportunity, although it is difficult, of reaching an agreement. But the party itself is in a difficult position, including its publishing base. We must therefore look ahead. Clearly we will not be able to make do in this difficult transition period without outside economic support.

We cannot allow the youth press to collapse under the pressure of market realities. It makes no sense, of course, to publish newspapers that are uninteresting, boring to the reader, and are incurring great losses. Possibly we should now be thinking about publishing regional youth newspapers. It is important that we get local organs of power on our side, that we effect co-institution of publications involving the soviets or collectives on youth affairs, the printing and papermaking combines, and the youth centers. The Bureau of the VLKSM Central Committee sent a letter to the president of the country proposing that legislative measures be adopted in the center and in the localities enabling guaranteed provision of paper at state prices during the market transition period to children's and youth publications, and to publishing houses oriented toward publication of books for children and young people, and that the question of advantageous tax provisions for them be resolved. Today youth and children's publications contribute millions in profits, on the whole, to the Komsomol. Next year, in view of a new taxation policy, profits will be sharply reduced. It would therefore be appropriate for the VLKSM Central Committee to adopt a resolution on establishment of a resource fund for youth publications, which will be able to cover next year's losses. I think with all the multimillions in allocations in recent times to the party budget, the CPSU Central Committee could also participate in the establishment of this resource fund.

Resolution on Youth Media

91US0040B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Third Plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee "On the Youth Mass Media"]

[Text] The Plenum recognizes it necessary:

—prior to 1 January 1991, to introduce for consideration of the Bureau of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee proposals on the establishment of an all-Union information agency, whose main task must be the collection and dissemination of information on the life and problems of young people and of Komsomol and other youth organizations of the country;

—prior to 1 April 1991, to study the possibility of establishing television channels and programs of the VLKSM Central Committee;

—beginning 1 January 1991, to begin operation of a VLKSM Central Committee radio station, allocating to this end—after resolution of necessary legal issues—2.432 million rubles in 1990-1991.

The plenum advocates the development of publishing activity on the part of Komsomol committees, their acquisition of printing equipment, and the establishment of their own publication centers engaged in publication of newspapers, magazines, and books for youth.

The plenum considers it necessary to introduce changes into the nature of relationships between Komsomol committees and editorial collectives, taking into account the USSR Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media" which has entered into force, and proposes that federation entities and Komsomol committees carefully examine proposals on co-establishment with publishing houses, printing and papermaking enterprises, soviets of people's deputies and their executive structures, labor collectives of publications, state and social organizations, associations, and unions, which set tasks not in contravention to the program goals of the VLKSM.

Resolution on Youth Paper

91US0040C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Third Plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee "On the Program (Basic Principles) of Activity and Editorial Regulations of the Newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA"]

[Text] The Plenum of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee resolves:

1. To ratify the program (basic principles) of activity of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

2. To ratify the editorial regulations of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in their basic form. To instruct the Bureau of the VLKSM Central Committee to insert into the text of the regulations, upon coordination with the newspaper's journalist collective, necessary changes in accordance with the USSR Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media."

3. To instruct the Bureau of the VLKSM Central Committee to conclude an agreement between the editorial office of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the PRAVDA Publishing House of the CPSU Central Committee.

Paper Declares Program Aims

PM2410185390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 p 4

[Unattributed boxed announcement]

[Text] From the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editorial Statutes:

"The founders of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA are the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] in the shape of the Komsomol Central Committee and the editorial office's labor collective."

Thus KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's labor collective is one of the newspaper's founders.

The explanation for our step is simple—we ourselves want to be masters of our own words and our own intellectual property. We want to guarantee our own independence ourselves.

From the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA program:

Our main tasks are to:

Defend human rights.

Create a civil society.

Achieve national consensus.

Economic

Conference on Transition to Market Economy Held

LD2310221490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Text] A conference in Moscow today in which scientists, economists, and representatives of the central economic departments took part has discussed what the first specific steps of transition to the market economy should be. The initator of this meeting is the department for analysis of socio-economic under the president's office. The participants stressed that immediate and resolute steps are needed to implement the main directions for stabilization of the economy and transition to the market. In their opinion, this requires primarily a definition of those structures which will facilitate the implementation of particular decisions. Of prime importance are the state property fund, the antimonopoly committee, and the committee for supporting enterprises.

At the meeting stress was laid on the special role of the fundamentally new interrepublican administrative bodies. The participants emphasized the need for the urgent creation of a service for forecasting the possible consequences of decisions being made. In their opinion,

this would make it possible to avoid the frequent scenario in which what seems to be a correct decision leads to the opposite result.

The meeting stressed the need for the urgent creation of a system for training cadres for the market, because, as one of the participants said, incompetence is for us no longer a risk factor but a ruin factor. In the future it is planned to make such meetings regular, in order to ensure the study of varius points of view on such a major problem as transition to the market.

Petroleum Workers Seek 'Economic Freedom'

PM2410091190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 22 Oct 90

[Report of an interview with Ye.V. Bolshagin, chief of No. 1 oil extraction workshop, by A. Shtetsov and V. Lunev; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The mass media reported that Samotlor's petroleum workers had scheduled a strike for 20 October. Our correspondents report from Nizhnevartovsk that this strike did not take place. But there is nonetheless still a tense socioeconomic situation here in the oil-bearing middle reaches of the Ob river.

[Reporter] I would remind you that this spring the collective at the sector's largest association, Nizhnevartovsk's "Neftegaz," entered into a labor dispute with the government. Then there were frequent appeals to the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and to Kryuchkov and Gorbachev directly. Give us economic freedom—that was the crux of the Siberians' demands. Given corresponding material and technical backup this would make it possible not only to fulfill a sensible—let us stress that—state order for oil and gas deliveries, but also in many respects to resolve the extremely painful and numerous social problems of the region. The command system whereby oil was taken at any price reduced the sector to deadlock. This is visible today to the naked eye, so to speak. Oil extraction is declining; this year alone the shortfall from Nizhnevartovsk has totaled more than two million tonnes. Equipment is standing idle, getting broken, cities still lack housing, kindergartens, hospitals, and schools. Now that we are transferring to the market, god himself seems to have directed the petroleum workers along their chosen path. Literally a few days ago the latest group of envoys—this time representatives of the middle echelon, workshop chiefs, team leaders, and foremen—returned from Moscow empty-handed. The familiar bureaucratic round of assurances, promises, and no concrete decisions.

[Bolshagin] Today it must be said that we have reached the point where we cannot really live like this any longer now.

[Reporter] That is, there is no concrete talk in your workshop of stopping oil extraction completely?

[Bolshagin] No, there has never been any question of that: I do not even want to say the word "strike," and many people have asked me about it repeatedly. This has not been and is not at issue. I think, probably everyone thinks that we should shut down those units that should not be in service. Those units that can operate, are in the proper condition, and for which there is a demand can and should be operational. Once again, I am not talking about a strike but about a precautionary shutdown of all those sectors that are in an emergency situation.

[Reporter] Just those that definitely cannot function?

[Bolshagin] Well, we cannot work like this. We will reach a point where what happened at Ufa and at Chernobyl—the same kind of accident, the same kind of danger, or possibly greater—happens here, and I would not want that.

[Reporter] The government still has an opportunity to help the Samotlor workers and other Tyumen fields. There may not be this chance tomorrow.

[Announcer] We will try to tell you in our coming programs how this conflict is resolved and what Samotlor's petroleum workers decide.

'Mafia' Involvement in Meat Shortages Rumored

PM2410110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Fedor Ivanov under the rubric: "Direct Line": "Moscow UBKhSS: Neither Meat Nor Mafia"]

[Text] Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] Internal Affairs Main Administration—The rumors that have recently circulated concerning the involvement of some sort of mafia groups in the Moscow meat shortage have been resolutely refuted by Militia Colonel Mikhail Shestopalov, chief of the Moscow UBKhSS [Administration for Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation], at a briefing held at Moscow Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration.

You can hardly believe what you have heard lately in waiting lines or on the subway and what you have read in other newspapers: The mafia is not allowing meat into Moscow; criminals are stopping food trucks on approach roads to the capital and are forcing drivers to turn back at gunpoint or else have their whole load thrown onto the ground. An unprecedented Moscow UBKhSS operation completed the other day, involving over 1,000 internal affairs staffers, was to confirm or disprove these rumors. They investigated dozens of meat combines and procurement stations located in oblasts surrounding Moscow: Tula, Ryazan, Kursk, Voronezh, and Lipetsk. They were trying to establish whether the meat kept there and destined for Moscow is being dished out "under the counter." Unbeknown to the drivers of the big trailers

delivering meat to the capital, militiamen escorted the trucks 24 hours a day right to the Moscow stores.

During duty with State Automobile Inspectorate staffers at 40 control points located on the Moscow Beltway, UBKhSS personnel questioned over 300 drivers, asking whether anyone had stopped them on their journey and whether there had been any attempts to buy their load from them.

In addition 619 Moscow meat-trading stores, nine cold stores, and seven meat combines were investigated. As a result of the operation it was ascertained that there were not and are not any cases of major theft, roadside detention of drivers, or buying up or redirecting meat products. Only isolated cases of theft or concealment of products were established. In the Moscow UBKhSS chief's view, there is no question of any organized mafia's deliberately not allowing products into Moscow. Of course, there is still insufficient control over the storage and distribution of meat produce. Many of the trade's enterprises are thieves' dens. However, the reasons for the Moscow meat shortage are much more prosaic.

The primary reason, in the words of M. Shestopalov, is the shortfall in scheduled meat deliveries to Moscow. In the first nine months of this year the capital received 11-14 percent less than the planned amount—that is thousands of tonnes of meat and meat products. In addition, the UBKhSS chief thinks that there is also another reason. As is known, in order to regulate the Moscow-bound passenger flows, Moscow City Soviet adopted a decision on the transfer of meat stocks to surrounding oblasts which are the capital's main meat suppliers. As has been ascertained, only 20 percent of these stocks have actually gone to these oblasts. The remaining 80 percent has apparently been sent to the state stocks. So, as before there is no meat in the outlying districts and the inhabitants of surrounding oblasts still have to travel to Moscow to get it.

Machinebuilders Union, Government Clash

914D0016A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by A. Kozlov: "To Act Only Together—Decided the Delegates of the Congress of the Trade Union of Automotive and Agricultural Machinebuilding Workers"]

[Text] The stormy debates at the congress of the trade union of automotive and agricultural machinebuilding workers, it would seem, were sidetracked at first. The delegates kept trying to establish that their central committee was guilty of something. For example, many words were said about the percentage of the membership fees that should be transferred to the central committee. According to the statements of some of them, it seemed that the "bureaucrats" were trying by any means to steal the money of the "local organizations" in order to use it to create "the good life" for themselves. These speakers completely missed the fact that without funds the central trade union organization could not do its work normally, which means it could not perform the protective functions assigned to it by the congress.

The crisis phenomena in the branch have been aggravated recently. The production volumes and people's wages are decreasing and working conditions are not improving. The high taxes on the enterprises and the strict regulation of prices for machine building products, which rule out the possibility of technical retooling of production and further social development of the collective—all this has evoked and is evoking serious dissatisfaction from the workers, including with their trade union. They are hearing many declarations to the effect that it is prepared to defend their interests, but they are not feeling very protected.

Many delegates came to the congress with these attitudes. But the machinebuilders soon understood that you cannot achieve your goals by criticism alone. If this congress had occurred several years ago, it would have been called innovative simply because of one factor—how pointed the discussions were. But this congress had different criteria. The main one was its attitude toward the market economy; it was necessary to determine how to live and continue the struggle.

"We are not raising doubts about the need to change over to market relations," said a fitter of the Kharkov tractor plant, V. Morev, "but we need to know how we are moving toward the market. What are we losing? What will it give us? And, above all, we must determine what a labor market is. We hear a great deal about social protection of the population and various future subsidies and stipends, including for unemployment. But all this is still just words.... For me social protection is having a job and the possibility of earning a good life for myself and the members of the society.

And this is why the delegates demanded that their opponents be not only the minister and leaders of the trade union central committee, but also the leaders of the government, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and other state organs. They needed a personal dialog.

USSR Minister of Automotive and Agricultural Machinebuilding N. Pugin, intended to speak in the final stage of the discussions. It seemed that it was more convenient for him to hear everyone before sensing the mood of the delegates and responding to their complaints.... But the delegates demanded that he speak "among the first": Let him speak and we will listen and discuss and evaluate what has been said.

They heard and understood only one thing—the minister is firmly in favor of retaining the ministry, and there is no clearcut program on how to solve the rest of the branch's problems. To concrete questions regarding technical policy, elimination of interruptions in material and technical supply, and changeover to the market economy N. Pugin responded evasively: Much will have to be revised, he said....

Then the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, I. Belousov, came to the minister's aid. He tried to reassure the machinebuilders by saying that the government has the situation in the branch under control and there was nothing to worry about.

"Nothing?"—chairman of the trade union committee of AvtoKRAZ Yegorov was surprised. "Practically all 23,000 of our workers are idle today. They tell us there is no metal or other materials, but on television they show how customs agents at the border are holding up the cast bronze that we usually use and of which we are in short supply....

V. Natarov, an electric gas welder of the Ural automotive plant, addressed I. Belousov, "How many years have we been trying to get the right pay and we do not have a solution to this day. We had placed our hopes in the USSR Supreme Soviet: They would handle the country's needs, but the people's deputies are wasting their time and energy mainly on political "brawls."

Questions for I. Belousov "spilled out" from all the microphones installed in the hall. He answered them, as they say, as best he could....

The more the delegates "dissected" the problems of the branch, the more frequently they wondered about the groundlessness of various economic decisions, concepts of changing over to the market economy, and the lack of guarantees for the workers.

In general, the delegates "did not agree" with the representatives of the government and, therefore, they concentrated on developing a policy for protecting their own interests and drawing up the corresponding congress documents.

After heated debates these documents were approved. The concrete tasks earmarked in the main areas of trade union activity over the next five years in the production-economic and social spheres, in the area of protection of the labor and life of the workers, questions of legal protection, and so forth, give one reason to think that the intentions of the congress delegates are serious and under the conditions of market competition the trade union can give its workers full protection that corresponds to today's goals of economic transformations.

"I think the program that was approved is convincing," said a delegate from Bryansk, A. Chekrygin. "The question is whether or not we will have the forces to carry it out. But the fact that we are ready for this was confirmed by the three days of work of the congress. We understood that we can only act together. There is no other way."

Joint-Stock Company Established 16 Oct

PM2410145890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by I. Georgiyeva: "Yet Another Exchange"]

[Text] The founding assembly of the "Moscow Commodity and Raw Material Exchange" joint-stock company was held in Moscow on 16 October. It is the future competitor of the Moscow commodity exchange, which is already operating. The founders of the new joint-stock company include state structures, some of which appear to have little or nothing to do with commercial transactions, such as the Polytechnical Museum, the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Energy, enterprises and organizations in the nonstate sector of the economy, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, cooperatives, two joint enterprises, and five private individuals.

The Moscow commodity and raw material exchange will conduct wholesale trade in material and raw material resources, scientific-technical products, and consumer goods and will also carry out transactions involving securities. The company's authorized capital is 33.3 million rubles.

Committee Views Method of Payments for Imports

914B0007A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 14 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by TASS parliamentary correspondent A. Dzyublo under the rubric "In the Committees and Commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet": "You Cannot Print Dollars—How Are Imported Foodstuffs to be Paid For?"]

[Text] A 12 October meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Agrarian Issues, which considered the issue of payments for imported foodstuffs, ended in a peculiar manner. After chairman A.M. Yemelyanov had adjourned the meeting, the representatives of foreign economic establishments issued a warning: Esteemed deputies, all the statistics cited here are not to be publicly divulged....

Let us not argue about how secret the data that figured in the discussion are; as they say, the specialists know best. However, this is what I thought: Did we not arrive at the disintegration of the financial sphere, which we are now sorrowfully ascertaining, because information on the affairs of the treasury was thoroughly withheld from not only the public but also the legislators themselves? In this case, what is the explanation for reaching an agreement with America on long-term grain purchases literally over

the head of the Supreme Soviet? A question concerning this, which was put to A.M. Yemelyanov, was left without a clear answer.

It is in no way the ambitions of the deputies which explains the intention to shift the conversation to this plane: The desire to dwell on what appear to be the professional nuances of the problems is caused by the aspiration to also determine the role of the parliament in its solution. This is why a provision appeared in the final document to the effect that proposals on the volume of exports and imports of agricultural commodities and raw materials should be considered in the future with the participation of parliamentary committee members. What is the situation at present?

Once again, we will not get by with our own resources. This was clear when the plan was compiled for this year, and it has become an altogether vital axiom in the process of implementing this plan. It is enough to look at the state storage facilities or examine statistical summaries of the operation of food industry enterprises, or, easier yet, go to a nearby grocery store. All you hear is: What is going on, what is the government doing? This is what it is doing. This quote is from an official Supreme Soviet document: "The 1990 plan and additional instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers envisaged convertible-currency purchases of meat and processed meat, powdered milk, butter, and vegetable oil worth...." Complying with the request of the establishments, we will omit the statistics, noting only that it was a large number.

The main point is different. Foodstuffs are being purchased, and a large part of them have already been delivered to the USSR. However, there is a problem with payments: The issue of funds for paying debts is not being resolved. Alas, the hard-currency purse is lean, to put it mildly. T.I. Alibegov, deputy chairman of the board of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, even used the unusual word "bankruptcy" in his presentation. Hard currency is not rubles, and it cannot be printed at a Goznak [Main Administration for the Production of State Papers, Coins, and Orders of the USSR Ministry of Finance] plant. Due to payment delays (the following is once again a quote), "many suppliers have announced the suspension of food deliveries; a number of companies intend to file debt-collection claims through international arbitration...."

Our domestic merchants have made a truly Herculean effort under the circumstances. Yu.N. Chumakov, USSR deputy minister of foreign economic relations, referred to operations conducted in the foreign market as unique: Indeed, go there and try to both delay debt payments and purchase products. Ultimately the payments will have to be made. Participants in the meeting believe that funds for this may yet be found.

Let us note proposals made at the meeting by a neutral expert, A.A. Ivashchenko, chief of the department of agricultural commodities market of the All-Union Research and Scientific Institute of Trends. He believes that, taking into account the decline in confidence in our solvency on the part of Western creditors, it is necessary to strictly inventory food imports: After all, we frequently buy the wrong thing in the wrong place at the wrong price. Among other things, we should temporarily authorize the export of licensed goods "against imports of foodstuffs" in order to overcome the existing hard-currency situation.

From the multitude of assessments heard in the discussion, let us point one out: The Bank for Foreign Economic Activity should play the role which economic laws set for it rather than merely being a window for paying out money. A new banking law, the first reading of which was heard in the parliament several days ago, is called upon to attain this goal.

Currency is an issue all right, but we have got to reduce food imports. This primarily depends on how rapid and effective the reform of our agriculture is going to be. As far as the short-term replenishment of state stocks is concerned, an important role is envisaged here for an optimal incentive arrangement for producers of output.

Designer Explains Project for High Speed Trains

PM2410101090 Paris BUSINESS IN THE USSR in English No 5, Oct 90 p 11

[Unattributed item from the "8 and 1/2" roundup of news stories from "The Four Weeks in September, The Four Weeks in October, Three Days in November": "Fly by Railway"]

[Text] The Soviet Union with its vast spaces, underdeveloped transportation facilities and millions of people who try to get a better living by way of seasonal and changing migrations, has long dreamed of joining the club of countries with high-speed trains. There have been plenty of projects and there is even a train, the ER-200, running between Moscow and Leningrad, but it has failed to reach full speed over six years because of the overcrowded route.

"It is quite clear that we need a different track and a different train," said Sergey Zhabrov, one of the designers of the new project, to a BU reporter. "A special track will run from Moscow to Leningrad, 10 to 15 kilometres away from the existing one. A train of 12 wagons carrying 120 passengers each and towed by a double-unit locomotive with a total power of 17,600 kW will run at 300-350 kilometres per hour. These 'planes on rails' as we have nicknamed them will be controlled from one automatic centre. The pilot operation may be started as early as 1998 if we get 2.5 billion rubles of subsidies."

All sorts of demagogues demanding all the time that "the people must be fed first" (try to feed them without railways!) are rendered speechless with anger when they hear about such money. But the problem may be solved soon.

Seventy percent of Russian railways were built at the turn of this century with the money of joint-stock companies, part of whose capital was provided from abroad. This alternative may attract the attention of the participants in an international conference on high-speed travel, to be held in Leningrad on November 18th to 21st. Over 50 representatives of major companies and railways of the USA, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and other countries are expected.

Military

Underground Nuclear Test at Novaya Zemlya

LD2410180190 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—The Soviet Union staged an underground nuclear explosion at its test site in the area of the Novaya Zemlya islands at 18:00 Moscow time today, it was announced here.

The blast, which had a yield of between 20 and 150 kilotons, was set off to confirm the reliability and increase the safety of nuclear weapons.

Radiation levels in the test area are normal.

Armed Forces Proposals for Market Transition Drafted

PM2410191090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Oct 90 Union Edition p 3

[Report by INTERFAX, IF, correspondent under the rubric: "INTERFAX": "The Military Intend to Submit Proposals in Connection With the Transition to the Market"]

[Text] As an "IF" correspondent reports, the group of military experts formed on the order of USSR Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov is completing the drafting of an outline plan for the Armed Forces' existence in market conditions. One of the group's members informed "IF" that the need to prepare such a plan sprang from the lack of a detailed study of defense questions in all the economic programs previously discussed by the country's parliament. In this connection the Defense Ministry intends to propose to parliamentarians new approaches in the military budget's formulation and in the nature of mutual relations between the Armed Forces and defense industry sectors. Furthermore, it is planned to closely coordinate the forthcoming troop and arms cuts with the country's economic potential and the implementation of social protection programs for servicemen and members of their families.

The experts' work is being directed by Army General Arkhipov, chief of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services. On 19 October the prepared document will be handed over to the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security.

Yazov Speaks at Foundation of Heroes' Club

LD2410163290 Moscow TASS in English 1555 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—"The establishment in Moscow of a club of heroes of the Soviet Union and people awarded the order of glory of all three degrees will provide the basis for consolidating all patriotic forces of Soviet society," Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov said today.

He was speaking at the foundation meeting of the new club at the Soviet Defence Ministry's club.

The newly established society will have a membership of about 1,000 veterans, now residing in Moscow and Moscow region.

According to Yazov, the establishment of the hero club is taking place at a very complex, critical moment in the development of the Soviet Union.

"Crisis has affected society's life at many levels: The situation is critical in the economy, order and discipline are shaky," Yazov said. "All this affects the lives of tens, nay, hundreds of thousands of servicemen. Social and everyday problems have been aggravated. Under the impact of unconstitutional acts and anti-Army propaganda, the prestige of Army service has been undermined. The people's defence consciousness is being unbalanced.

"Under these conditions," Yazov said, "unity, cohesion, endurance and firmness are of particular importance".

Yazov noted that the new organisation's prime task is "active, militant propaganda of friendship among the peoples of our multi-national country, fostering loyalty to motherland, internationalism and patriotism and readiness to do one's military duty".

Leader Sign Col Gen A.A. Maksimov Obituary

91UM0051A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Obituary of A.A. Maksimov]

[Text] Colonel General (Retired) Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Maksimov, participant in the Great Patriotic War, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize and State Prize laureate, candidate of technical sciences, has died suddenly at the age of 68.

A.A. Maksimov was born on 29 August 1923 in Moscow. In 1941, he voluntarily joined the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces, where he traversed a path from student at an artillery school to colonel general.

When participating in the Great Patriotic War, A.A. Maksimov displayed boldness and courage, for which he

was awarded combat honors. In May 1943, he became a member of the CPSU, and he remained loyal to its ideas to the end of his days.

During the postwar years, A.A. Maksimov graduated from the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy and all his subsequent service activity was devoted to the development, production, assimilation, and operation of space rocket technology. He was for many years head of the space section in the USSR Ministry of Defense. He played an active part in the preparations for and execution of the missions of the first artificial Earth satellite, the first cosmonaut, the universal "Energiya-Buran" space rocket transport system, and many other manned space vehicles, satellites, and interplanetary stations.

In all the posts to which he was assigned, A.A. Maksimov applied all his strength, knowledge, experience, and organizational ability to enhancing the country's defense capability and consolidating the position of Soviet cosmonautics. He was distinguished by a high level of competence and sense of responsibility for his assignments, an exceptional love of work, a sense of principle in resolving the tasks set for him, and also fine human qualities; a generous soul, loyalty in friendship, and attention and concern for his subordinates.

A.A. Maksimov played an active part in sociopolitical life and was elected as a delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. A.A. Maksimov's services were highly valued. He was awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor and was decorated with two Orders of Lenin and many other state honors, and also with orders and medals from foreign states.

The bright memory of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Maksimov, loyal son of the Soviet people and true and ardent patriot of the socialist homeland, will live forever in our hearts.

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, A.N. Lukyanov, N.I. Ryzhkov, Yu.D. Maslyukov, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, L.N. Zaykov, I.S. Belousov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, N.I. Shlyaga, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, V.N. Chernavin, V.M. Shuralev, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, V.F. Yermakov, Yu.A. Yashin, O.N. Shishkin, A.N. Soshinkov, V.L. Ivanov, I.I. Kurzhinyy, G.S. Titov, S.N. Yermak, V.M. Ryumkin, G.F. Lysenkov, D.D. Maslyukov

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Returns From Hungary Visit 24 Oct

LD2510092590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Report by ELTA special correspondent Romualdas Cesna]

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, returned today from a three-day visit to Hungary.

Before his departure from Hungary, Vytautas Landsbergis briefly described the results of his visit to Hungary.

The visit was short but full of meaning, he stated. I had an official meeting with Hungary's President Arpad Goncz, and the Gyorgy Szabad, chairman of parliament. We agreed on further actions to develop and consolidate cooperation between Lithuania and Hungary. We agreed on an official visit during which the signing of interstate documents could take place. To my proposal to renew diplomatic relations, the Hungarian leaders replied that they did not see any obstacles to it. This will also be the topic of the preparations for the future visit. I was invited to take part in a ceremony at the Rakoskeresztur cemetery, where the Hungarians honored the known and unknown martyrs of the communist regime.

In the lobby of the world congress of freedom fighters I had an opportunity to renew my acquaintance last year with the present Hungarian prime minister, Jozsef Antall, and talk to him about the cooperation between Lithuania and Hungary.

Lithuanians residing in Hungary helped organize my trip and meetings, Vytautas Landsbergis concluded. I am very grateful to them, he said. I think that now and in the future they will make a very significant contribution to the development of relations between the two countries.

Reportage on Visit

WA2410184790

For Hungarian reportage on the visit by President Vytautas Landsbergis to Hungary, including reports on his talks with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, please see the Hungary section of the 24 October East Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Swedish Delegation Visits Lithuania for Talks

LD2410203490 Moscow TASS in English 1559 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius October 24 TASS—A Swedish delegation arrived here today. It is led by Michael Sohlman, the Foreign Ministry's deputy secretary for foreign trade. Upon the arrival in Vilnius he said that the Swedish Government allocated a sum of money for aid to East European countries restoring democracy. Part of these funds will be granted to Lithuania.

The delegation which includes repesentatives of the Foreign Ministry, as well as the Ministries of Industry, Agriculture, Transport and Finance, and Swedish banks, wishes to study the situation and to analyse with Lithuanian authorities the most rational ways of using the allocated [words indistinct].

Cooperation between Lithuania and Sweden has become more intensive recently. Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene visited Sweden last week. She had conversations with Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, with heads of the Foreign Ministry and with industrialists.

The Lithuanian prime minister told a news conference upon the conclusion of her visit that the implementation of specific projects begins. Sweden intends to help Lithuania with oil extraction and refinement, with the construction of enviromental protection facilities etc.

The Swedish delegation met members of the Lithuanian Government today.

Improved Diplomatic Relations Sought

PM2510090590 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Oct 90 p 7

[Report by Kaa Eneberg: "Lithuania Seeks Conflict Over the Baltic Sea"]

[Text] Lithuania intends to take part in the work of cleaning up the Baltic Sea only as an independent state and not as part of the Soviet Union.

This was the clarification given by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene in Stockholm yesterday when she ended her three-day visit. She had been invited by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson.

At a final press conference she said that Lithuanian representation will be discussed at the talks with the Soviet Government which begin Saturday [20 October]. She herself will take part in these talks along with President Vytautas Landsbergis and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

The prime minister also declared most unambiguously that Lithuania does not want a Swedish visa office in Vilnius along the lines of the Swedish presence in Estonia and Latvia. She dislikes such an arrangement because it would be a subsidiary of the consulate general in Leningrad and therefore linked to Sweden's representation in the Soviet Union.

Instead the Lithuanians want a "Swedish interest bureau" in Vilnius and a Lithuanian counterpart in Stockholm. She described their intended activities as very broad, from the coordination of trade deals to the

exchange of visits—clearly embryonic forms of the diplomatic representation to be expected once the Balts succeed in their independence negotiations with Moscow.

On the subject of the economic cooperation with Sweden discussed during her visit, the prime minister said that she sees Svenska Petroleum as a probable trading partner when it comes to oil production and oil prospecting. Cooperation is also desirable in connection with safety at the Ignalina nuclear power station which is now the responsibility of the Lithuanian Government.

Next week a Swedish Government delegation will travel to Vilnius to discuss cooperation. Possible projects include water purification in the old capital, Kaunas, and the port of Klaipeda.

Lithuania Sets Conditions for Military Parades

LD2410184590 Moscow TASS in English 1802 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius October 24 TASS—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet ruled that military parades in the Baltic republic may only be staged with the permission of the parliamentary presidium.

The resolution said that such permission will be issued "upon request by the self-administration authorities of the republic's cities and districts".

Burkevicius, Moiseyev Discuss Military Conscription

LD2410234190 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] After yesterday's teams of experts' meeting in Moscow, progress was reported on Lithuanian youths serving in the army of occupation.

According to Audrius Burkevicius, Defense Department director, who heads Lithuanian experts on this issue, the Soviet Union will not apply coercion to Lithuanian youths who refuse to serve in the Soviet Army during the period of negotiations.

Quite recently the Defense Department director confirmed in the press that not a single case of Soviet Army officials resorting to violence in such situations has been reported.

Another much more painful problem concerning those youths who have withdrawn from the army will be discussed during the following meeting.

The team of Kremlin experts was led yesterday by Moiseyev, the Soviet Union's Chief of General Staff.

'Polish Faction' Set Up In Lithuanian Council

LD2410130790 Vilnius International Service in English 2230 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Text] A new Polish faction was set up in the Lithuanian parliament. Among its goals is the analysis of the problems of the Polish ethnic minority, the striving for legal consolidation of the rights of ethnic minorities, and the promotion of the dialogue between Poles and Lithuanians in the country.

Coverage of Latvian Supreme Soviet Proceedings

Law on Income Tax Adopted

LD2410205190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] The deputies of the Latvian Supreme Soviet have decided to find new sources for bringing extra funding into the republic's budget themselves, having considered that the center does not satisfy many financial demands. Today they adopted a law practically without any discussion, according to which the entire deductions from the all-Union state turnover taxes and the population's income tax go into the republic's public coffers.

Privatization Discussed

LD2410164790 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga October 24 TASS—Latvia has taken the first step towards privatising state property. The principles and programme for this process are outlined in the documents that the government has submitted to the republican parliament. Their discussion is included in today's agenda.

According to these plans, the republic's economy will be based on private initiative. State property will be privatised by selling or renting it with the right of subsequent redemption. The emergence of a stratum of new owners could start by next year. This will be preceded by the registration of enterprises, land and means of production.

The Supreme Soviet is to fix a deadline for former owners to declare their rights. They are to repossess their former property as it stood immediately after the Second World War.

The draft documents outline only the basic principles. One of them stresses that "Latvia's national wealth must remain mostly in the hands of the indigenous population."

Their representatives and the organisations they set up will enjoy a priority in buying privatised property. The draft concept reads: "The state must control the part of property purchased by the government, corporations and citizens of foreign states, including the USSR."

Nobody doubts that the forthcoming process will be a difficult one. Therefore, one of the articles says: "Neither the administration of enterprises, organisations nor work collectives have the right to obstruct privatisation."

Fifteen laws and several acts are to be passed to legalise privatisation. Parliament yesterday amended the republic's constitution, which now states that Latvia may now own any state property on its territory that is necessary for socio-economic and cultural development.

Ryzhkov Decision 'Invalid'

LD2410204490 Moscow TASS in English 2019 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga October 24 TASS—The Latvian parliament ruled today that a decision by the Soviet Government published today in Latvian newspapers is invalid in this Baltic republic.

The document signed by Prime Minister Ryzhkov on October 19 says that the All-Union Government transforms enterprises, amalgamations and organisations, which are subordinated to the All-Union Government and located in Latvia, into joint stock societies.

The decision says that fifty-one per cent of shares of these enterprises will be sold to work collectives. The other 49 per cent will be held by the state and handed over to a state intersectoral joint stock amalgamation.

According to the decision, this new body will run all-Union property in Latvia.

The Latvian parliament made an amendment to the republican Constitution, under which any state property in the republic which is necessary to ensure social, economic and cultural development, is Latvian property.

Latvian Law on Holidays Called 'Witchhunt'

LD2410133690 Moscow TASS in English 1321 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—The RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper reported today on the aggravation of the political situation in Latvia in light of the law "on holidays and memorial dates" recently passed by the republican parliament.

The "equality" faction of the Latvian Parliament declared in this connection: "We have every reason to believe that the adoption of this law officially marks the beginning of a 'witchhunt' against the communist idea and Communists in general".

"The hastily adopted law," the newspapers says, "has dropped the October Revolution, Victory Day, and March 8th holidays from the republic's calendar. The memorial dates now include the victims of Communist Terror Commemoration Day. The Victory Day holiday was replaced by the Second World War Victims Commemoration Day.

Plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party and the Riga Party City Committee, enlarged meetings of the Latvian United Work Collectives Council and the Legal Defence Committee have declared: "The anti-communist offensive in the republic has made a new very dangerous spiral. The recent congress of the Lativan People's Front has added dramatic impetus to this deliberate escalation." This is why special importance is now being attached to the current anniversary of Latvia's liberation fron Nazi occupation. Party committees and factory councils have urged the working people to stage a large manifestation on that day at the monument in Riga's Victory Square. It was decided to mark the October Revolution Anniversary in the same way. The newly formed law-enforcement bodies (including the self-styled "National Procurator's Office", for instance) immediately served warning against these plans. They noted that November 7 was a work day and demonstrators would be punished as deliberate absentees.

The final phase of the 25th congress of the Latvian Communist Party is scheduled for December. It plans to adopt a new party programme and rules. The chances of 100,000 latvian comunists to form a "constructive opposition" are dwindling. The republic's government has refused to take part in the drafting of a federal treaty and the parliamentary majority is about to pass a law on public organisations, which will practically outlaw the communisty party as "an offshoot of a foreign party."

The government fears such an opposition. It refuses to hold a referendum on Latvia's state status because it fears to lose it. More than 400,000 people have already responded to the call of Comunists and have signed the appeal for a nationwide poll.

Latvia Holds Briefing After Nordic Council Talks

PM2410153390 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Oct 90 p 7

[Report by Sven Svensson: "'Small Steps Forward, But None Backward"]

[Text] Riga—Today Latvia is doing nothing to provoke Moscow since the situation is very sensitive in several different ways. In addition a major Soviet military parade is to be held in Riga 7 November against which the Latvian parliament has protested strongly.

This was the picture of the situation in Latvia which leading Latvian parliamentarians headed by President Anatolijs Gorbunovs gave to the Nordic Council's seven-man delegation, which yesterday visited Riga to look into various joint cooperation projects.

"We want to take part in all international forums as a free European country," President Gorbunovs told journalists after the talks with the Nordic Council delegation. "We want free cooperation between the Nordic Council and the Baltic Council and cooperation between the Nordic states and the Baltic states."

Gorbunovs, who acted with great authority, believes that Latvia could become a full member of the Nordic Council.

"But before that we have to be an independent country according to the rules of international law," Gorbunovs said. He was very pleased that the Nordic foreign ministers think that the Baltic states should be given observer status at the CSCE meeting in Paris this fall.

"For diplomatic recognition certain conditons have to be met," Gorbunovs pointed out. "That is why we have no interest in discussing this before we have solved our problems with Moscow," he said emphatically.

"What is happening now is merely preparatory consultations for the negotiations which will begin soon. 'Consultations' is an unclear term and for this reason all of us Baltic states want a clear definition of our legal status."

Moscow's position is far from clear. No one has yet been given the right to negotiate with us, Gorbunovs stressed.

The Soviet Union has a strong army of perhaps up to 300,000 men in the Riga region and it also has naval bases.

"We have no contact with the Soviet Army which is directly under Moscow's control," Gorbunovs said. "We do not even have information about the size of the troop forces, despite the fact that we have asked for such information. We are aware of the troops' existence simply because we have to provide them with food and because we have to solve certain social and environmental problems. The army is a major contributor to environmental damage," he said.

Nor do other Latvian parliamentarians believe in rapid progress in the independence negotiations.

"The economic unrest in the Soviet Union frightens us," Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans said. "We do not want to do anything to spread this unrest."

Therefore Jurkans does not think that there will be any real negotiations on independence before Moscow has solved its own problems.

"We are taking small steps forward in our efforts to achieve independence, but absolutely no steps backward," Jurkans said.

The aim is that the negotiations with the Soviet Union will be raised through Baltic Council, which comprises in part the presidents of the three Baltic countries who will meet in Tallinn today under the aegis of the Nordic Council. However, the question is how this meeting will pass off. According to some reports, Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis is on his way to Moscow for talks with Prime Minister Ryzhkov.

The Latvian parliamentarians do not think that there is any point in undertaking such a trip. Ryzhkov's position is seen as all too weak and uncertain.

"Nor is it possible to hold one-to-one negotiations on independence—something that Moscow wants," the Latvian finance minister stressed. "Our market is too small for that and we have to form a larger unit. Seventy-five percent of our enterprises are run from Moscow," the finance minister stressed. Above all he wants help from the Nordic area in the fields of energy and communications systems. Agricultural equipment is also needed. There is a major shortage of paper and most sugar has to be imported from Cuba. Latvia's position in its efforts to achieve independence is also sensitive from another viewpoint. The population consists of one-half Latvians and one-half Russians. But the Russian birth rate is three times higher than the Latvian birth rate.

Georgiy Andreyev, a member of the foreign affairs committee and a doctor, fears that this could lead to Latvia's being obliterated as a state, unless the efforts to achieve independence succeed.

The opposition to the government is also strong in parliament. The opposition is led by the Latvian Communist Party which was described as having a doctrinaire approach.

"There is a permanent war going on between the government and the opposition."

Latvian Popular Front Congress Session Reported

91UN0086A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent O. Meshkov: "On the Question of Benevolence"]

[Text] Riga—*As reported, the Third Latvian Popular Front Congress has been held in Riga. More than 700 delegates took part. The "popular fronters" adopted new rules of the movement and its program.*

Having reported on the first day of the congress, a correspondent from local television emphasized that it was proceeding in an exceptionally benevolent fashion in respect to all strata of the population and all inhabitants of the republic. Of course the atmosphere of the congress that has just been held cannot be compared with that of the constituent congress, at which speeches that chilled the marrow, as they say, were heard at times. But my television colleague was still sinning against the truth, I believe. Specifically, the words of the former leader of the Latvian Popular Front [LPF] D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, who asked where can we get hold of a bulldozer that might expunge

from our consciousness the whole Soviet garbage—particularly among the student youth—may hardly be considered benevolent.

Well, so be it. It would ultimately be naive to expect that caustic remarks, mutual insults even, may be dispensed with in the ardor of political struggle. We need to be thinking about things far more serious than injured pride; about that on which people's future, the development of democracy, and a rise in the living standard at all social levels of society depend. But what are we getting currently? One delegate declared: The fact that a woman barters cigarettes at the market, this is not profiteering; real profiteering is in the official commercial stores where an umbrella costs R200 and a raincoat R600. But it is such trade that is sanctioned by the present government.

Yes, there are as yet many loose ends in real life with democracy also. The LPF program records: "The goal of the LPF is a democratic society, the basis of which is a free individual and values common to all mankind." But what is the case in practice? The Committee for Defense of the Constitutions of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the USSR recently published a long list of laws and decrees adopted by the Supreme Soviet that are contrary, in its opinion, to the basic law of the country. F. Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District, sent A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, a protest that says: "Particularly intense anger has been caused by the decree of the supreme organ of power of the Latvian SSR on the suspension on the territory of the republic of USSR Council of Ministers Ordinance 1943 of 2 November 1989. As a result of this inhumane enactment, thousands of officers serving in the Soviet Army and their families have been deprived of temporary residence permits per the location of the Army units, and simultaneously elementary human rights to labor, medical assistance, education, the accommodation of children in preschool, and provision with basic necessities. Such enactments are impermissible in a civilized society."

It is clear also what kind of guideline the Popular Front will give its faction in parliament at the time of discussion of the law on social and political organizations. The adopted program unambiguously records: "In the transition period the LPF's mission includes achievement of the possibility of the activity only of the social and political organizations that have independent status and whose highest decisionmaking body is in Latvia." It may easily be concluded that the Communist Party of Latvia would have to be considered outlawed in this case.

It would be unobjective not to see in the Popular Front program positive aspirations. Consider only the social policy section. The intention to seek a sharp increase in the financing of medical and social security and its demonopolization merits support. Is there any need to argue the following postulate: The self-governing bodies have complete freedom of action on all matters, and it is limited only by the law? Truly this is axiomatic—the self-governing bodies are, after all, part of the sovereign power of the people to which we aspire. But there inevitably arises the question: What laws will by their content limit the former's day-to-day activity? Those mentioned above?

Kozma Prutkov said: "Look to the root." And I would call the fundamental issue for Latvia's future the real equality of the whole population that lives here and that has tied its fate to these parts.

Measures To Improve Latvian Economy Debated

914A0037A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 25 Sep 90 p 3

[Report by LETA correspondent Erik Kekhris: "The Threat of Chaos Grows. A Meeting of the Latvian Council of Ministers"]

[Text] On 19 September, the government of the Latvian Republic discussed the situation in the republic's national economy together with the leaders of city and rayon executive committees and of major enterprises. The economic situation was described in a very dark light. Decline is being observed in all spheres and sectors of production, including agriculture, and this is having a direct effect on providing the population with food.

Economics Minister Janis Aboltins cited the following main factors that are interfering with the stabilization of production:

—the old system of administrative enforcement is not working but no new specific management has yet been found that could be responsible for the functioning of property;

—state enterprises, cooperatives, and kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms] are all operating within the framework of their own economic opportunities and tax and wages conditions. Guaranteed incomes, first and foremost for managers, are not providing incentive for them to engage in more efficient forms of management;

—in their activities the cooperatives at enterprises are exploiting state property;

—voluntarist pricing, with compensation for damages to the state not being paid by guilty parties. (As the most scandalous example, J. Aboltins cited the increase in lease payments for dachas in Jurmala. As a result, this summer only one-third of the area set aside for dachas was used. In a number of cases dachas were destroyed and burned, but this was in no way reflected in the well- being of those who made that decision);

—funding for nonprofitable enterprises from the state budget;

—deliberate or random differences between measures aimed at monetary stabilization. (The example cited

was the resolution adopted by a session of the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies to halt the sale of apartments).

In order to stabilize the situation J. Aboltins recommends the following:

—without waiting for the laws that the Supreme Soviet has been taking its time to discuss amidst disputes on unimportant issues, it is essential immediately to begin to privatize small enterprises in agricultural equipment, transport, and trade. It is already obvious that privatized transport and the mechanisms themselves are looking for work;

—it is essential to introduce the law on entrepreneurial activity, which the Supreme Soviet intends to debate next week, immediately after it has been passed. The conditions for the activity of state enterprises will be equal;

—use of the wages fund should be carried out in a more exacting manner, and payments for work that has not been done should be stopped;

—joint enterprises in which the share of foreign capital is less than 30 percent should be taxed from the first day of their activity;

—from 1 October realistic customs controls must be introduced;

—the activity of the financial inspection service should be organized exclusively on the basis of interest, paying inspectors in accordance with the budget revenues derived from the enterprises that they inspect.

Council of Ministers Chairman Ivars Godmanis:

—we are sliding steadily, with inflation running at 15 percent annually;

—producers settle their accounts for raw materials by delivering finished products. This must often be done under disadvantageous conditions, since otherwise the enterprise will come to a standstill. As a result, the volume of output is shrinking by only a few percent, but deliveries to the trade network are declining at much greater rates;

—enterprises are entering into direct agreements without even considering the needs of consumers in the republic. Enterprises obtain imported goods for export output and sell them to their own workers for personal use or further sale in Rumbul at prices many times higher. And the next day they demand from the government an answer to why the stores are empty. Some joint-venture enterprises that have obtained raw materials (leather) from the East are later exporting it. The enterprise is, as it were, operating and gaining satisfaction from its own activity, but there is no footwear in the stores. The same can be said of other light-industry goods. This trend must be halted. The Supreme Soviet was unable to adopt a law on property yesterday. From my standpoint, everything that is in Latvia is the property of the Latvian Republic. If the opposition faction does not yet understand this, let it go to Russia to familiarize itself with this issue. A resolution has already been adopted there. And enterprises in the military department are the property of Russia;

—tax incentives will stimulate enterprises that take part in the formation of the exchange goods needed to acquire grain, energy, and coal. Those enterprises that are sending finished goods to the other republics are asking for these products. We are finding ways to exert an effect through taxes without using assets being tested by the Central Asian republics. There they are switching off electricity and water and closing down public catering facilities at factories.

—although the central government exists only in a formal way, some enterprises in our republic are subordinate to central ministries. A minister has the right to fire a director from his post. This situation is intolerable on Latvian territory. We must change the regrettable selection of directors by altering the situation with respect to state enterprises. The only subject of ownership should be the state of Latvia, which the government represents through the ministries or other special organs. And only they will enjoy the right of appointing or firing a director. Otherwise we will find ourselves in absolute chaos;

—in the countryside we will continue our support for really profitable farms and be merciless with those that are unprofitable. The land used by unprofitable farms will be used for other forms of farming;

—it is essential to act sharply against the disorders in trade. Leading stores are just writing up invoices and receiving money, but they themselves see neither goods nor customers. The customer either goes outside the republic or to the cooperatives which have various kinds of marketing opportunities. On paper the plans for commodity turnover are being overfulfilled in the system of the consumer cooperatives and in the Ministry of Trade. Well, we will not pay wages; we will close the stores. Then we will see how our respected leading stores react. Perhaps we should establish a three-hour work day after placing all the goods we have obtained in the store windows. Let the customers themselves clarify their relations with the traders who are writing up "empty" invoices.

—privatization of small enterprises and stores should be carried out by local self-governments on their own responsibility without setting up additional structures for that purpose.

Estonia Rejects Gorbachev Military Holiday Decree

LD2410130990 Moscow TASS in English 1240 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn October 24 TASS—The Presidium of the Estonian parliament has said in a statement that that it will be impossible to fulfil President Mikhail Gorbachev's decree on holding military parades on Revolution Day on November 7.

Under the decree, the march-pasts are to take place in Moscow on Red Square, in the capitals of constituent republics and in other cities accommodating the headquarters of military districts and naval fleets.

However, the Estonian parliament Presidium earlier this week endorsed a decree on public holidays, making November 7 a working day, and the code of labour laws was consequently amended to make failure to report to work on this day unjustifiable and punishable absenteeism.

The military commander in the Baltics, Fedor Kuzmin, has said that he will comply with the presidential decree.

Russian Deputies View RSFSR-Estonia Treaty

91UN0084B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 13 Oct 90 p 2

[Report from RT, TASS, and IAN correspondents]

[Text] The Russian-speaking opposition in Estonia's parliament has called upon the Russian Supreme Soviet to refrain from signing a state treaty with that republic until its present leadership puts the newly enacted legislative acts in the human rights area into conformity with the norms of international law.

As the representatives of the opposition have stated, the Estonian leadership is nurturing the idea of dissolving the republic's Supreme Soviet and intends to conduct, during the autumn of this year or the spring of next year, an election to the state Duma. The only persons who will be able to take part in the election are those citizens who lived in the republic prior to its becoming part of the USSR and their direct descendants. According to preliminary estimates, the number of such persons constitutes 38 percent of the republic's current population.

The parliamentary minority feels that the Estonian leadership needs the treaty with Russia as a legal precedent on the path toward achieving complete political and economic independence, and that, by withdrawing from the USSR, the government denounced it as not conforming to the interests of the indigenous nation.

Estonia Issues Statement on USSR-FRG Treaty

91UN0084A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian 21 Sep 90 p 1

["Statement by the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic"—MOLODEZH ESTONII headline]

[Text] On 12 September 1990 in Moscow, as a result of a conference based on the "two-plus-four" formula, an agreement entitled "The Final Settlement With Respect to Germany" was signed. On 13 September in Moscow, the Treaty of Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation was initialed by the FRG and USSR ministers of foreign affairs. Proceeding from these documents, as well as the results of the USSR and U.S. summit meeting that occurred on 8 through 9 September 1990 in Helsinki, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic expresses its satisfaction with regard to the restoration of Germany.

The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic feels that:

1. Article 2 of the treaty that was initialed on 13 September in Moscow firmly states principles that contradict international law, which, essentially speaking, reinforce the annexation by the USSR of the Baltic states.

The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic expresses its protest in this regard in the face of world public opinion.

2. The USSR is not the legal successor of the Estonian Republic that was occupied in 1940.

3. The recognition of the de-jure legal succession of the Baltic states and the simultaneous lack of recognition of the occupation were the international guarantee of the democratic processes occurring in the Estonian Republic.

4. In order to restore the independence of the Estonian Republic, as a result of negotiations between the USSR and the Estonian Republic it is necessary to achieve the good offices of all the states that have signed the treaty based on the "two-plus-four" formula.

5. It is necessary to achieve from the countries that participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe a situation in which the Estonian Republic has the opportunity to participate in the Helsinki process, including participation in the forthcoming Paris summit meeting and in other conferences that are decisive for the fates of Europe.

Estonian Christian Democrats Join Opposition

LD2510111290 Moscow TASS in English 1049 GMT 25 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn October 25 TASS—The board of the Estonian Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) on Wednesday decided to join the parliamentary opposition.

The economic reforms being carried out by the government of Edgar Savisaar are half-hearted, an ECDU statement points out.

The proposed taxation bills will not only lead to a decline in the living standards of the population but also hamper the development of initiative and enterprise in Estonia, the statement says.

The ECDU board also decided that the parliamentary group of this small party, which is part of an influential bloc advocating the restoration of the 1938 republic, would try to avoid a vote of no confidence in the government.

The Russian-Language groups in parliament and "Independent Democrats," including a large number of former party functionaries and civil servants who have retained their influence at the local level, are also in opposition to the government.

In all, out of the Estonian parliament's 105 deputies, 48 are now in opposition: 26 Russian-speaking deputies, 16 "Independent Democrats" and now another six deputies from the ECDU.

Estonian Rightists Form United Republican Party

90UN0084D Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 25 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by L. Turpakova: "Rebirth of Conservatism"]

[Text] The constituent congress of the United Republican Party (ORP) was held on 22 September. The party is a voluntary union of like-minded individuals who share conservative convictions. Traditions and the moral political philosophy of the previous generations of the inhabitants of Estonia have been made the basis of conservatism.

The participants were familiarized with the ORP program by M. Nutt, and with the draft of the charter by A. Rayus. The ORP is a rightist party that includes the STK [Union of Labor Collectives], "Res Publica," and the independent rightist forces.

The ORP representatives feel that the party's goals and ideals—the protection of the individual's freedom and security by the democratic state and the legal system; the introduction of principles of a free economy and the encouragement of free enterprise; and the protection of the everyday and natural environment—are completely feasible only in an independent Estonia.

The basic attention was directed to man, who was created free and who does not owe his freedom to anyone.

Spiritual freedom as a prerequisite for all kinds of development must be guaranteed by a person's right to acquire knowledge and by his opportunity to realize his own individuality.

Political freedom includes the person's right to express his opinions concerning the state system and authority, and to act in conformity with his views.

A person's economic freedom is based on his opportunity to carry out private initiative under conditions of free competition. Without economic freedom, neither spiritual nor political freedom are possible.

The ORP also recognizes the sacred nature of the family, the inviolability of the family hearth; and views the nation as the highest form of the spiritual, emotional, and cultural unity of people.

The speeches made by the participants repeatedly stated the idea that the basic task is "to free man from the pressure exerted on him by the state."

Leo Starkov was elected as ORP chairman; Yu. Pyarnits, A. Eenpalu, and K. Tiilik as deputies; and Kheyno-Enn Arpo as chairman of the court of honor.

In his statement U. Nugis remarked that as long as there exists a transitional period when leftist forces prevail, after the rebirth of Estonia's independence "the rightists, including us, will govern" de-facto.

The conservatives, who view society as an organism that develops by means of peaceful reforms, deny revolution. "The successful development of society is possible only if the equilibrium is maintained between conservatism and moderate renewal"—that is the ORP opinion.

Update on Estonian Deputy Groups, Leaders

91UN0084C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 25 Sep 90 p 2

[ETA report: "Factions in the Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] As of today (25 September), 12 deputy groups are registered in the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic. Of the 105 deputies to the Supreme Soviet, 95 are members of the groups; thus, only ten persons remain outside the factions. The following is a list of the deputy groups. The first to be registered where the three 20 August groups: the Social-Democratic Faction, headed by R. Veidemann, which includes nine persons; the People's Centrist Faction, headed by I. Fjuk and 14 members; and the Independent Democrats, chairman J. Uluots, 14 deputies.

Also registered are the Christian-Democratic Deputy Group (six persons; chairman M. Laar); the Virumaa Group (seven; chairman P. Grigoryev); the "Liberal-Democratic Faction" (six; chairman J. Oisruut); the Greens Deputy Group (six; chairman V. Pokhla); the Cooperation Deputy Group (six; chairman A. Labasov); the Equal Rights Deputy Group (six; chairman P. Panfilov); the Peasants Deputy Group (seven; chairman L. Arro); the deputy group of the Estonian Rural Centrist Party (seven; chairman I. Raig); and the Communist Faction deputy group (seven; chairman L. Annus).

RSFSR

RSFSR Supreme Soviet 24 Oct Session Reported

LD2410201390 Moscow TASS in English 1939 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kozmen, and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—Russian parliament had a packed agenda on Wednesday [24 October]. The key event has certainly been the endorsement of a bill on Union acts on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Deputies think that this law, which limits Union authority, is meant to become one of the key acts aimed at defending Russia's real sovereignty.

Parliamentary committees and commissions drafted a copious package of bills aiming to revive the Russian countryside. Deputies today focused on the bills on the land reform, on a peasant farm, on the social development of the countryside as well as on the draft land code of the Russian Federation and several resolutions. These documents are part of measures to ensure the transition of the Russian economy to market relations.

The provision of the bill on land reform, which abolishes state monopoly on land on the territory of the republic and proclaims the equality of the state and private forms of land ownership is of immense importance.

The parliament decided to send all these bills, which occupy 150 pages, to committees and commissions for consideration. An extraordinary congress of Russian people's deputies will convene in Moscow late in November. The congress will concentrate on the revival of the Russian countryside.

Deputies today adopted a resolution to set up a free economic zone in the area of port Nakhodka, the Soviet Far East. They regard this zone as a step towards improving the economic situation in the republic and boosting its foreign economic ties.

The resolution that specifies the exclusive right of Russia's organs of state power to distribute pulp-and-paper industry output produced in the republic is also important against the backdrop of the unbalanced market, severe shortage of raw material resources and the present information boom.

Following many days of debates, deputies today endorsed the Russian parliament's working procedures.

Operation of Union Acts Limited

LD2410175890 Moscow TASS in English 1743 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kozmin and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow October 24 TASS—While the Soviet parliament today legislatively formalised the supremacy of all-Union laws over republican acts, the parliament of Russia, the largest republic in the Soviet Union, limited the operation of legislative acts of all- Union bodies over its territory.

The law on the operation of all-Union acts over the territory of the Russian Federation, also adopted by the Russian parliament today, states that laws and other acts by all-Union bodies of state authority "enter into force on the territory of the Russian Federation after their ratification by the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet".

A similar order is provided for acts by the all-Union Government that are to be approved by the Russian Government.

If these acts by the legislative and executives arms of government are adopted within powers delegated by the Russian Federation to the Soviet Union, they operate on the republic's territory without any restrictions.

Decisions, as well as treaties and deals concluded on the basis of all-Union acts but not ratified, confirmed or suspended in compliance with this law, are invalid.

The law entered into force upon its adoption. It is specified that it will be submitted for the approval of a special congress of people's deputies of the Russian Federation, which will convene in Moscow tentatively late in November.

Extraordinary Russian Congress To Convene 27 Nov

LD2510112990 Moscow TASS in English 1106 GMT 25 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow October 25 TASS—The Russian Parliament today decided to convene an extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, the supreme legislative authority in the largest Soviet republic, in Moscow on November 27.

The proposed agenda includes an account by the government on measures to stabilize the economy and introduce a market system, as well as a programme to revive the Russian village.

The congress is expected to discuss related bills, including those on land reform, family farms and social policies in the countryside.

Expected to last a fortnight, it is also to discuss a report by the constitutional commission on draft work on a new Russian constitution, and matters of constitutional compliance.

Political Career of Boris Yeltsin Profiled

91UN0106A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 14 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kredov: "Personality in Politics: Boris Yeltsin, We and the President—Subjective Remarks"]

[Text]

Milieu of Idols

This spring I chanced to arouse the ire of readers of our newspaper. Their attitude was expressed both in the old forms (letters, phone calls to the editorial office) and in the new, perestroyka forms (posters at mass meetings).

I was prepared for abuse in my direction for I had written a not very celebratory article about a person whose popularity rating should, it might have seemed, have cautioned the author—if only from considerations of his personal safety—against tuning in to a critical wavelength. Nonetheless, having articulated the words which had built up in my throat, I had anticipated hearing an echo of many voices. The reader, however, embarked upon castigation of me in monotone: Why had I not given him his due—he is, after all, a fighter against corruption and the mafia from the furthest of outlying regions to Moscow?!

I confess, this reaction of the general readership seemed somewhat offensive and hard to explain. The point being that at that time it was the done thing to approach the monument of my hero with explosives and miners' picks, but I however had only without servility skirted around him on the perimeter. Having cooled down somewhat and having become somewhat more used to the garb of a minor and spiteful Herostratus, I became confirmed in the opinion that the reader had been angered by its tone more than by the essence of the article, which was as he saw it too composed and detached. Speaking thus about some possessor of a high rating is a crime, many people believe.

The circumstances of last spring compelled me to meditate again and again on the perestroyka history of the fame-worthy Zelenograd, where the greatest number of emotions surfaced. It is very instructive. So much so that it has long been time, it would seem, to establish here an academic center for social psychology where, I would bet, the top science luminaries would immediately apply for TDY. After all, the word "pluralism" was not at this time being uttered, but a center of free-thinking prepared to fall in battle for anyone who in isolation would confront the bureaucratic system had been revealed in the vicinity of the "third Rome." The city is being combated, it is being intimidated, it is being knee-capped, and leading demagogues and special forces are being sent against it. In response Zelenograd is continuing to become politicized and taking the latest idol under its protection even more emphatically. It was none other than the bureaucracy itself which inculcated in the people of Zelenograd the precept: There is no time to investigate whether a sufferer is good or bad, it is necessary to pull him away as quickly as possible from the grinding millstones. So the ultra-modern Zelenograd has begun to acquire the features of a monastic order.

...Having conceived a desire to be democratic, our society first of all discovered vacancies which are occupied with "them"—democrats. Of course it waxed indignant: Excuse me, but where with us is the opposition politician? The independent judge? His majesty the honest sheriff and fighter against the mafia? And let us have them all at once! Having cast an exacting glance at the dreary plain where for decades under the sun of ideology every blade of grass which had appeared in defiance of the wishes of the supreme sower withered to its roots, society nonetheless closely scrutinized the siftings and took it upon itself to nurture them. What might result from the one or the other? God knows. The tree of life, perhaps. It could be a upas tree around which a new wilderness would form. There is no telling. The main thing is that there is no avoiding the rare shoots because resolute people are looming up distinctly everywhere with hoes.

I would like to reflect on a phenomenal occurrence of our life developing within the double ring of the sower-cum-stump puller.

Which Road Leads to Olympus?

I am not evidently a journalist who, having once socialized with B.N. Yeltsin, left a trace in his heart. But what was, was: In the fall of 1988 I had the good fortune to have had an almost six-hour tete-a-tete with him. And some original judgment took shape. Subsequently it fatally failed to coincide with the versions of his friends and foes.

There emanated from Boris Nikolayevich at that time the modest charm of the celestial being-cum-rowdy who had disturbed the quiet of Olympus and who had for this sin been sent down to Earth. It was distressing for him, and he was hurt by the ruthlessness of his Areopagus colleagues. His capacity for recovery from the blow was in doubt. But at the end of the conversation the minister in disgrace would laugh on any pretext, a booming laugh, giving himself over to laughter entirely, wiping away his tears. Vital energy had been preserved apparently, and was awaiting a release, and he would unfailingly return.... Where? As whom? In 1988 the imagination

suggested just one option: Suppose Zeus the Thunderer were once again to summon him to Olympus?

About the pretext for the laughter, incidentally. I asked my interlocutor, who had been distracted from his troubles, to sign a photograph of my one-year-old son. Learning that the boy is called Yegor, Boris Nikolayevich clucked vindictively and wrote in black ink: "Yegor, be right throughout your life! Greetings, Boris." I can no longer bear to keep this family relic secret from the Yeltsinologists.

I shall at this point leave the discussion of Yeltsin the man. An interesting subject, of course, but I would now like to reflect on the phenomenon of him.

...Here is a seemingly anecdotal true story. Last summer, at the very height of the rivalry in the Kremlin between Vlasov, Polozkov, and the hero of this tale, a Russian deputy went to the dentist in acute pain. At the dramatic moment for him, sitting with mouth wide open, he suddenly heard: "Who will you vote for?" "Yeltsin," the sufferer specified, and then understood that he had won perhaps the most important political victory in his life. He shivers still: What if he had "guessed" wrong? Yes, indeed, once the viruses of politicization had begun to penetrate dental surgeries....

B.N. Yeltsin's election as leader of the Russian Federation ended (virtually?) a fundamentally important phase of the phenomenon of him which had many irrational features that are hard to understand. I will explain which ones precisely.

Let us ponder the figure, customary for it, of 80-90 percent of votes "for." The maximum for free elections! Consequently, every Muscovite or Sverdlovsk individual who had the sense to glance at the ballot paper before dropping it into the ballot box expressed a preference for Boris Nikolayevich. He was considered their Nepman by the gray-haired Budennyy-type holdover, the clericalist and militant atheist, and the anarchist and low-level bureaucrat. Yeltsin the practical man showed that Moscow abounded in rogues. Nor would that 80-90 percent have been garnered without them.

It was by no means always points of his political program that have given rise to arguments concerning Boris Nikolayevich. Forgive us, but we had not until recently even read the text of his heretical speech at the party plenum in the fall of 1987. And having read it—what mischievous children of glasnost!—understood little. What was the cause of it all? No, without commentary, show from the text, what was the cause? The fundamental phase of the conflict had developed earlier in the chasms of the apparatus. The Moscow leader had become a foreign element in the Politburo, and he was gotten rid of on a trifling pretext. So it appears to the uninitiated.

Take a later event—Boris Nikolayevich's trip to the United States. It was not for some reason or other a question of a discussion of the essence of his speeches. The arguments were conducted at the high-quality quilted vest level: Was he an habitue of supermarkets, did television doctor video recordings of his speeches or not, and even did he "wet his whistle" or not?

Those constantly looking after Yeltsin's popularity were the forces of the bureaucracy. Now they would set up an escheat commission, and the public would worry: What are they trying to do, give him a heart attack?. Now they would bar his access to the print media and once again cause universal alarm: Where is he? What has happened to him?. Now they would put out an absurd, easily refutable rumor. Good heavens, they hoped to compromise him with the reprint of an article from LA REPUBBLICA! They offered the working people, do you see, a caricature of the "Russian bear" embarrassing Uncle Sam by his awkwardness. But the working people would be strengthened in the opinion: He is the same as us, and those trying to mock him are mocking us and our clumsiness in dealings with foreign countries.... I know that there is a specific first name and family name involved in the reprint affair. But it is not a question of someone personally. The action had a powerful client—the bureaucratic environment. I can imagine how the apostles of the bureaucracy rejoiced—for about a day—putting another nail in their own coffin.

The ideal armor was made ready for Yeltsin for the 1989 elections. It was explained: Do not touch Boris Nikolayevich, do not offend him, one attack on him will be sufficient for the attacker to become a political corpse. Who there in the Politburo was intriguing against him: Ligachev? The people took their leave of Yegor Kuzmich who had hitherto been unknown to them. Influential persons on the party's schedule of appointments were not to be envied. They were convulsively looking for motes in the eye of the rebellious candidate for deputy—and in response the electorate merely smiled caustically and with all the more firmness struck out on the ballot paper the name of his rival.

I have deliberately remained silent so far about the efforts of Boris Nikolayevich himself to forge the "armor" because I incline to an intermediate conclusion: The impetus informing phenomenon of him in the fall of 1987 was powerful. Unprecedented. In a heroic bound Yeltsin leaped into the image lovingly fashioned earlier in people's consciousness and providentially protected against head-on confrontations. The "doors" of the image closed and it proceeded into the unknown, but for the real person within to maintain his reputation he had only not to pull out the shutoff valve.

Excuse me, but has Yeltsin not on occasion contradicted his image? Have perhaps local jumps in his popularity not been observed?

When one ponders some phenomenon, especially a global and powerful one, one is amazed at how little sometimes is required of the person who gave it its name. Of what, for example, is the fame of a cosmonaut composed? He has to mount the ramp and say: "Let's

go!" We have in the evening to show his courageous smile on Vremya. Upon returning to Earth, he is supposed to give a cheery interview to journalists. What the cosmonaut did in the interludes between the happenings is of no significance to the people; even the fact that these interludes meant sweating his guts out. As the envious persons tell it, he banged his head against the side of the craft, cried "Mama!" and cursed the party and the government for having sent him into space. But his friends say that the hero never stopped smiling and hummed the anthem of the Soviet Union. The truth will be known only in the flight control center, and even then not the whole truth.

The Yeltsin phenomenon, it seems to me, has the following key moments. This politician was the first in the history of the USSR to voluntarily quit the high schedule of party appointments. Further, he did not turn aside from the burden of shadow leader—any person on the party schedule of appointments prior to him, had such a thing been suggested to him, would immediately have had a heart attack. The countdown appears as follows: October 1987, June-July 1988 (19th party conference), spring of 1989 (first wave of elections), summer of 1990. At these moments Boris Nikolayevich proved to be equal to his image. Let biographers fill in the interludes, and what a lot of nonsense they will come up with....

Unfortunately attempts are being made to depict Boris Nikolayevich's path—right from the 1970's—as a smooth rectilinear movement from good to better, from the new thinking to the latest thinking. Yeltsin, allegedly, is continually offering the Politburo and Gorbachev various useful radical measures, he is persecuted and defamed, then people act as he suggested, but time has been lost. Reading such versions, I switch off automatically. To believe some biographers, Yeltsin was fighting for fulfillment of the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program even while he was Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee secretary.

I cannot comprehend why the full-fledged laurels he has earned through suffering need such trumpery. To my way of thinking, Yeltsin-87 and Yeltsin-90 are different people in terms of their political views. Thank heavens.

Deliverance From Illusions

Let us recall our expectations when our hero's stars first ascended in the capital's firmament. "Eureka!"—the foremost minds had discovered a "novelty," Lenin's political testament. Attempts were being made to find in the views of Bukharin, changeable as the winds of May, an alternative to Stalinism. Individual osmotic thoughts do not count, there were few people who knew of them on this side of the "curtain." Carved on the tablets of society were a cleansing of progressive teaching, substitution for the false idols of leaders of the early Bolshevik type. It stands to reason that had that legendary people's commissar who fell from starvation in revolutionary Petrograd been in charge of food, it would have been all up with the "trade mafia."

It was in 1985 that the new Moscow leader gave notice of himself as the brightest leader of the above-mentioned type and as such endeared himself to the people. He would stand wearily in line, squeeze himself into crowded buses, and would experience for himself the teeth of the sharks of socialism in the provisions stores. He would then give his superiors a dressing down. However, nothing in the life of the Muscovite has changed. Whatever the explanation for Boris Nikolayevich's decision to quit the Politburo, this was also a form of recognition that his positive program of that time had run out. Another might in his place have folded up the banners and taken refuge in the apparatus. The honest Yeltsin opted for Golgotha.

The old disciples were still hoping to use him as a banner. But the out-of-favor minister was already distancing himself from them. He called Roy Medvedev—according to the historian's plausible account—and cautiously inquired as to the attitude to be adopted toward the figure of Yakov Sverdlov.... Reformers with general humanitarian programs became increasingly close to him, and he would subsequently unite with them in the Interregional Group of Deputies.

Boris Nikolayevich's role was not that he offered a sick society ready-made wise prescriptions which, unfortunately, were rejected. Yeltsin was reminiscent more of a selfless physician who has injected himself with viruses of an unstudied disease to observe its course from within. People suffered together with him, they liked him, and they put their faith in his experiment. It fell to him to shatter the myth of the messianic destiny of a leader of the early Bolshevik type. And he himself almost came to grief on this myth.

Thus far the growth of society's self-awareness had been identical to the growth of Yeltsin himself. With him came deliverance from illusions. Is this not enough for a pass into history?

A few words further about the conflict in October 1987. It manifestly did not go beyond the confines of an intrashop argument of party members. Strong associations with the Orthodox synod of 1503 occur to me here, incidentally. In both cases anathema was pronounced on the heresies of the disinterested, and the main heretics were banished to the wilderness. The educated reader will himself have noted the similarity and differences in the Nil Sorskiy-Boris Yeltsin, Iosif Volotskiy-Yegor Ligachev pairings.... Tracing how a disinterested Bolshevik Boris Nikolayevich became in a short space of time a politician of a broader orientation—such is a task for a serious biographer.

...The Yeltsin phenomenon has the deepest historical roots. The figure of a once "lawful" heir to the throne bound for the Kremlin at the head of an army of the common people for the restoration of trampled rights has since time immemorial had magnetic properties in Russia. Many martyrs might have passively suffered with him. But it was he, the divinely anointed sovereign

and victim of the evil-doing boyars, who had it within him to head a nationwide campaign against the city built of white stone. This was a leader of the maximum pluralist type. He was both against and for: He was both the enemy of the Kremlin nobility and flesh of its flesh. Everyone considered him his man.

It was not fortuitous that last spring it was in the wake of Yeltsin that the largest number of independent candidates—and frequently opposites in terms of beliefs—was elected to the deputy corps.

Yeltsin has always been perceived as a harbinger of some particularly significant events. I have repeatedly been amazed at myself: seemingly, I have heard more than enough of Boris Nikolayevich and sometimes know in advance what he might say, but the television voice barely reaches me saying "Comrade Yeltsin is speaking," and a mysterious force attracts me to the screen. I am already fed up with speakers more striking than him. But the magic of his name has continued to work. I explain this by the steadfast (and justified) presentiment that it is by him, with his participation, that some important movement in society will be started.

I believe that in a year, from elections to elections, he frequently became confused, made mistakes, and displayed nervous irritation. Such things happen to personalities on the large scale whose place in history is not yet ready or they do not yet know it. In fact, in what role might Yeltsin be productive in the Union structures—which are monopolies in terms of organization? Chairman of a parliamentary committee? Lacking in depth. Providence has determined Yeltsin's destiny: interacting equally with Gorbachev. Their figures had primordially been ranged alongside, time separated them. We have seen Boris Nikolayevich in the role for which he alone is suited.

Two Potential Perestroykas

The initial stage of the reforms, which is dragging along sluggishly, reminds me of an operation to blow up a ramshackle home in a densely populated area. Warning signs have long been posted, and the residents are in a safe place. But the leader of the undertaking is lingering. He has hesitated and instructed the inhabitants of the neighboring buildings to be brought out onto the street. Having thought it over once more, he has ordered the warning signs to be posted somewhat further away from the epicenter of the explosion.

I believe that Gorbachev is aware of the complexity and contradictoriness even of his position. The state of society today reminiscent of a detonating mixture. For this reason, each time that it is necessary to press the button and close the circuit, he does not do so, responding to the warning signals: either there is no guarantee that the gas mains have been covered and switched off and will not explode, or it is ascertained that the foundations of the building are far too monolithic, deep, and strong and that it is necessary either to increase the explosive charge or preliminarily loosen the slab-like foundations. Increasing the power of the charge is faster, but then everything would have to be recalculated: the force of the shock wave and its radius and consequences, the evacuation zone, and much else besides. The time allowance is ebbing away, and from right and left—and from the center!—coming together in his figure and increasing the already critical press of responsibility, the beam of discontent is focused: What is the holdup? But he is not foot-dragging, the president wants to act such as to prevent things "getting worse," hesitating over the detonating mixture. Although all is not that simple.

Of course caution in such matters is no bad thing, but people on the street are beginning to grow irritable and curse the man of circumspection for all they are worth. A person who will close the circuit is needed.

It is clear what role has been prepared for Yeltsin here. He was possibly not all that good at the preparatory stage. But on the other hand, he is capable of decisively closing the circuit in order that the "process get going" (in the president's pithy expression).

Here Yeltsin benefits once again because he wants the button to be pressed more quickly in order to clear the site for the new building. It would be naive to suppose that he does not realize that no demolition is without consequences. But in our expectation, weary with longing, he represents a person prepared to take the decisive step. And in the event of the channeled explosion being a success, we would connect this success primarily with the person who pressed the button. If, on the other hand, the operation were to go out of control and cause unpredictable consequences, there is always to hand in our consciousness the obliging cliche in defense of the idol: What has the person who pressed the button got to do with it here? We need to call to account those who prepared the explosion. Boris Nikolayevich is making adroit use of his advantageous position to "switch on the process."

Let us ponder the kind of qualities, aside from decisiveness, that a politician capable of really starting the "process" should possess.

I would liken Gorbachev's five years of efforts to reform the country to the buildup of positive potential at one pole of the environment. Here he has been successful, the potential that has been accumulated is tremendous, and all intellectual reserves of society have been revealed and mobilized. But the "process" is not moving: As before, the peasant lacks a plot of land, the worker stock of the enterprise. Gorbachev's power, in my view, is illusory: He can order a ministry which is obedient to him or the agro-industrial monster to do many things, but cannot command them to disband themselves—that is, that radical move which is required. Forward movement means for him the scrapping of the attributes of power, and you will agree, it is hard to expect from a person haste in such a matter. The politicians who acquire power in tearing things down will be the ones in a hurry.

According to our model, negatively charged potential was required to start the "process." The country and the republic required a reformer invested with power and the utmost opposite of Gorbachev—not for complete substitution for the president but for conflict interaction with him. Such was Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. He entered the Russian Parliament with the unconcealed desire to do everything the other way about. Gorbachev is somehow blurring things in respect of private ownership of the land? Yeltsin legalizes it immediately. The cutback in the ministries, depoliticization of the authorities, and so on and so forth—all this is being done to spite the Union authorities, as it were. And... successfully! It may now be said without irony that the "the process has gotten moving."

It is interesting to observe how the two "potentials" operate at times. Yeltsin's measures are condemned to be supported since they appear, as before, to be grabbing and snatching something from the center which has become loathsome. At the same time, however, the presence of a liberal, peace-loving opponent is not unprofitable to the Russian reformer. A considerable number of conservatives would not be averse to making short work of him. So they might be thinking: Mikhail Sergeyevich fears Boris Nikolayevich no less than our people, and will most likely be saving up some trump cards. We will wait a while....

Thus, evidently, the two subjects of perestroyka will exist in the future in mutual attraction and repulsion. Coming very close together or moving too far apart from one another are for them equally dangerous as yet.

...The Yeltsin phenomenon has had from its inception, I repeat, many irrational features. However, it has had important singularities also. Boris Nikolayevich has never concealed the fact that he aspires to power, to responsibility. He has most likely been weighed down by the fog which has fatally surrounded his intentions and conduct.

The irrational (to put it mildly) actions of certain supporters of Boris Nikolayevich at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic almost prevented him getting the better of Vlasov and Polozkov. Showing political wisdom, he spoke of the importance of compromise and dialogue with different political forces. But the Announcements Board in the Grand Kremlin Palace was meanwhile being covered with tasteless caricatures of the president, intimidating his wavering supporters. Those who prepared these products did not realize that they were now on the other side (from Manezhnaya Square) of the Kremlin Wall.

Today the Yeltsin phenomenon is open to rational comprehension. The leader of the republic has hoisted onto his shoulders a burden of colossal responsibility and specified the periods of time after which he intends to render account of the path traversed. Will Russians wish to share his burden? Or merely hasten with stopwatches toward the finish line, where it will be so convenient "to expose" the idol?

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has with powerful spurts sent his old, long-standing opponents flying. He now has to secure himself against certain friends. Legends continue to be created about him. This is the best gift his future opponents could be given.

Russian Private Property Owners Union Founded

PM2410155090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 p 1

[Report by I. Gansvind: "Ladies and Gentlemen Unite"]

[Text] The constituent congress of the Russian Union of Private Property Owners has been held in Moscow.

At the Monastery of the Trinity and St. Sergius, around 100 representatives of the growing Soviet bourgeoisie, calling themselves nothing but "ladies and gentlemen," won the support of Our Lord Jesus Christ for the noble cause of the privatization of all the Russias.

To the question "Will the current generation of Soviet people be able to own private property?" Viktor Shchekochikhin, president of the union and leader of the "Countrymen" economic association, replied: "I dream of leaving my children not a trunkful of money but capital invested in real production. They, our children, will be the pride of a revived mercantilist Russia."

Membership of the Union of Private Property Owners can be both individual and collective. The question of the procedure for paying membership dues has not yet been resolved, and consequently the union's own financial basis is rather vague. Most probably the scale of payment will depend on union members' income. Initially the new organization will seek to win the confidence of and become popular among both private owners and representatives of official state structures.

And although at the congress sessions there was a clear desire on the part of the founders to create an effective organization, it would be naive to think that anything would change fundamentally just because another union has been set up. There are so many representative associations of the alternative economy already!

One can entirely agree with one of V. Shchekochikhin's claims. Our society must recognize private ownership de jure—all the more so as it is becoming increasingly evident de facto.

As far as the rest is concerned, the aims and tasks of the new union are quite traditional. The union will provide scientific, methodological, and legal consultations as well as training for the young generation of entrepreneurs. A commodities market and a charitable international fund to support the revival and development of private ownership in Russia are at the formation and registration stage. The transition from the philosophy of poverty to the philosophy

of wealth will be promoted by the weekly newspaper CHASTNYY PREDPRINIMATEL.

'Democratic Russia' Founders Comment on Congress

LD2510092190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] A news conference devoted to the results of the founding congress of the Democratic Russia movement took place in Moscow today. It was confirmed that the main task of the forum—the declaration of the movement and the adoption of its charter—was accomplished.

The result of the founding congress of Democratic Russia, which ended successfully, reflects the aspirations of the democratic forces in the republic to coordinate efforts in helping to carry out the progressive political, social, and economic reforms with the aim of creating a civil society. According to an opinion poll which was conducted at the congress, its participants consider Yeltsin, Sobchak, Travkin, Popov, and Afanasyev as the most popular leaders of Russia. The majority of delegates spoke against the present Union government and see Bocharov, Sobchak, Yeltsin, Yavlinskiy, Slayev, and Popov as candidates for the premiership.

Unexplaind Gunfire Incident Reported in Moscow

PM2410173290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Oct 90 Union Edition p 6

[Report by V. Remizov under the "Rumors and Facts" rubric: "Moscow: Shooting...."]

[Text] In the evening of 23 October residents of the capital's Teplyy Stan residential district heard shots. They were coming from an automatic weapon, and obviously more than one person was shooting. The scene of the battle (!) was illuminated by signal rockets and was moving from the Kiev Highway toward the Khovanskoye Cemetery. All this was happening not far from the Koltsevaya Beltway, and lasted about half an hour....

In the attempt to clarify the situation, we called Mosoblispolkom [Moscow Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] Main Administration of Internal Affairs. The duty officer said that he has no information, and that the newspaper is pointlessly exploiting rumors. Anyway, the correspondent should find a witness, and then they would "work" with him. On hearing that there are more than enough witnesses, the duty officer hung up.

We were forced to continue the quest for the truth. Major S. Tikhonov, duty officer for Vidnovskiy Rayon [Militia] Department, showed more interest in the e[illegible]t than his colleague. But there was no record of t[illegible]e shooting in the rayon militia department's duty log. The major took a calmer view of the actual fact of the suburban "battle" than the Teplyy Stan residents, and surmised: These were ordinary military exercises which are held practically constantly in that locality. Well, the shooting was with blanks.

Nor did our call to the Moscow Military District headquarters clarify matters. Duty officer Colonel G. Lysenkov replied that he has no information about exercises in that locality, and that none of the district's units are in that region.

In the end we were advised to call the "Moskovskiy" Sovkhoz. Local militiamen confirmed that a troop unit in armored carriers had indeed been on its way to the region of the Khovanskoye Cemetery. They surmised: There was no combat firing, they were firing blanks. No operations group went to the scene of the event in connection with this incident.

Was it perhaps unnecessary to describe in so much detail how the reporter sought out the story? But it is strange that the organizations responsible for law and order in the country have no reliable information about half an hour's shooting, with fireworks.

Debate Over Funding of Moscow Subway Continues

PM2410194090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 90 Union Edition p 1

[Report by I. Demchenko: "Who Will Pay for the Moscow Subway"]

[Text] As already reported in the press, Moscow and Leningrad subway construction workers nearly went on strike in mid-October. Workers of the State Administration of Construction of the Moscow Subway [Mosmetrostroy], who considered the way the organization's financial and economic situation is shaping up for next year to be absolutely unacceptable, were in a particularly determined mood.

According to a USSR Council of Ministers resolution, as of next year all questions connected with subway construction are to be resolved in the republics, whereas the planning and construction will be financed from the resources of the region where this most convenient and at the same time most expensive system of public transport is to be located. It is clear that a city as enormous as Moscow cannot do without a subway. This is not a question of prestige but of necessity. But it is also clear that the multimillion construction costs cannot be financed from the capital's budget. It was this uncertainty which was the pretext for the strike threat.

Literally a few days before the deadline which the Mosmetrostroy collective set the Union and republic government to satisfy the strike committee's demands, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision to make an exception and fund capital investments for the construction of the Moscow subway in 1991 from the Union budget but only for projects already underway. It is planned to allocate 250 million rubles [R] for this purpose.

Commenting on this decision, Yu. Matkin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee [Gosplan], said that the concession had been made because of

the exceptional status of Moscow which is essentially a capital city twice over. The city economy has to serve two Supreme Soviets, two governments, a large number of embassies and missions, and so forth. In addition, the tendency toward undue centralization has also meant that the majority of the country's main transport routes, particularly rail and air, pass through the capital. Each day the city receives around 3 million people who use the subway.

However, the city budget does not provide for spending on services for them. That is why the USSR Gosplan considered it necessary to support the construction workers' demands.

In Yu. Matkin's personal opinion, for fairness' sake the resources for the construction of new facilities on the Moscow subway for next year should be allocated by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Government. In the future it would be expedient to split the cost of financing, with part coming from the Union budget, part from the republic budget, the rest from the city.

M. Belenkiy, chief of the Mosmetrostroy's technical department, in turn expressed great doubt that the financing could be split in this way. In his opinion, neither the city nor the republic has enough money to build the subway, especially if you bear in mind that from the new year many costs will rise sharply compared with previous estimates after the switch to contract wholesale prices. The cost of sand, ballast, and tiles has already risen two to three times which makes the organization's financial situation even more unstable.

In addition, after the adoption of the government decision it became clear that it is almost impossible to determine which projects have been started and which are going to begin in the new year. Traditionally the Mosmetrostroy is in a privileged position: It is allowed to begin work without waiting for a technical or economic feasibility study [obosnovaniye] to be approved, or even before projects are completely ready. That is why the construction of almost all the projects included in the next five-year plan at the time when we still had five-year plans have now been started one way or another.

The third factor aggravating the situation is the opposition of local residents and the local authorities to the construction of the subway. For example, the residents of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon, who recently endured the construction of one station, are categorically opposed to the construction of two more, even to the point of pulling down the fences set up by the Metrostroy and picketing workers' consumer service premises. The Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee, which passed the decision on the construction of these two stations, cannot reach agreement with the rayon soviet executive committee which is banning them.

On the whole, then, this entire story surely illustrates better than anything else the situation now developing in the national economy. During our discussion, the deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan expressed his disagreement with those who view the USSR Council of Ministers' compromise solution as yet another capitulation by the authorities to strikers. It is nothing of the kind, of course. The problem here is different, I think. Many enterprises will very soon find themselves in the subway construction workers' position.

Chuvash Autonomous Republic Declares Sovereignty

LD2510074790 Moscow TASS in English 0709 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Text] Cheboksary October 25 TASS—After two days of heated debates, the parliament of the Chuvash Autonomous Republic on Wednesday proclaimed its state sovereignty.

The sovereign multinational state on the Middle Volga is now called the Chuvash Soviet Socialist Republic—Chuvashyen Republic within the framework of the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union.

The republic declared Chuvash and Russian its state languages. The republic also guarantees free development of other languages used on its territory.

According to the declaration, the land, waters, forests, flora and fauna and other natural resources are the property of the Chuvash Republic. The republic ensures the rational use of national resources on its territory and the ecological protection of the population.

Omsk To Be Open City Subordinated to Republic

LD2510024490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] The Omsk City Soviet decided to Omsk the status of an open city subordinated to the republic. The city soviet session asked the country's and republic's Council of Ministers to ratify this decision.

Tver Official Found Guilty of Vote Rigging

PM2410144990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by TASS correspondent A. Amayev: "Convicted of Forgery"]

[Text] Tver—The people's court of Tver's Tsentralnyy Rayon has found T. Golovina, secretary of the electoral commission of one district for elections to the local soviets, guilty of forging election documents.

Through graphological analysis and the evidence of witnesses it was established that people who had not in fact appeared at the polling stations had been recorded in documents as having voted. T. Golovina herself posted their ballot slips, having made her own selection beforehand. There were 48 rigged ballot slips in the urns.

The court sentenced her to two years' forced labor. But, taking into account the fact that the forgery had not affected the election results, the sentence was suspended for one year.

Tyumen Oblast Moves To Clarify Mineral Ownership

PM2410192490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 90 Union Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Yuriy Perepletkin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Whose Mineral Deposits Are They?"]

[Text] Tyumen—A session of the oblast soviet has examined the draft concept of Tyumen Oblast's transition to the principles of self-management in conditions of the formation of the market economy.

The deputies approved the draft's main provisions, including the question of mineral deposits. It was noted that Union and republic laws and normative acts cannot adequately reflect the specific characteristics of each region. Tyumen Oblast, with only a little over one percent of the country's population on its territory, produces around 4.5 percent of the nation's income and almost five percent of gross social product, and extracts two-thirds of the all-Union oil and gas output. To whom do these very rich deposits belong?

In the deputies' opinion, existing mining legislation does not correspond with the present sociopolitical and economic conditions. Tyumen intends to initiate new legislation on mineral deposits and to prepare a Code on Mineral Deposits in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

The draft envisages the creation of a specialized organization, the "Mineral Deposits Fund," which is needed to help local soviets when planning the exploitation of underground seams.

Western Republics

Coverage of Crisis Situation in Gagauz Republic

Snegur Appeals to Gagauz

PM2410155390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Oct 90 Union Edition p 1

[Dispatch by correspondent E. Kondratov: "Uneasy Days for Moldova"]

[Text] Kishinev—Mircha Snegur, president of the SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of Moldova [Moldavia], appealed to the Gagauz saying that the situation may get out of control unless they abandon the elections scheduled for 28 October which could place the republic on the brink of civil war.

This short appeal, imbued with alarm, was broadcast repeatedly on republican radio and television and was printed in the newspapers. The president has more than enough grounds for alarm and serious misgivings: The fact of the declaration of an independent Gagauz Republic in the south of Moldova—which for two months was the permanent subject of appeals, statements, newspaper articles, meetings, and rallies—is today being unequivocally assessed by the Moldavians as an attempt to alienate their age-old lands. With the approaching elections in the regions of the Budzhak steppes, the political atmosphere is becoming increasingly heated and positions are becoming increasingly irreconcilable and extreme. The latest example of this is the recent publication of an address to the citizens of Moldova and its president and prime minister, entitled "Moldova in Danger!"

This address is not an exhortation or a request. It contains an open call to organize voluntary detachments in places of residence and places of work to protect the integrity and sovereignty of Moldova. "...Blood has never been spilt between us in these lands," the appeal says." "Separatist policy has now pushed us to this limit beyond which we can no longer hear or understand one another...." The address is signed by republican organizations: the democratic youth organization; the women's orthodox league; the People's Front; the Writers' Union; the Journalists' Union; the doctors' league; and various collectives of teachers, kolkhoz [collective farm] workers, scientists, workers, students, and schoolchildren. The very fact that even women, doctors, and writers are calling the people if not directly to arms then to a mission that is by no means humane, is testimony to the pitch of national passions. Registration for the voluntary detachments was announced at a many thousand-strong rally in Kishinev on Sunday, and even the date of their first march was named. What is more, this is not the first day of registration in some places.

How is the republic government reacting to this situation, given that the head of the government was one of the people to whom the appeal was addressed?

"My compatriots' anger and indignation caused by the threat of yet another division of Moldova is quite explicable," Prime Minister Mircha Druk told me. "An uncontrolled movement has started and it is difficult to stop it. Today, even if I were to appeal to the people to stop, they would not hear or understand me. The ice has started to break, and not just young people but also adults have started registering with the detachments. Of course we will try and prevent clashes with all the forces at the government's disposal. We will stand in the middle, as they say. But there is no certainty that this will defuse the situation. Only if the Gagauz leaders give up their idea of holding elections will it be possible to save the situation today."

The Moldavian president also spoke about the need for a swift end to the election campaign in the south. He called on the Gagauz to continue constructive dialogue.

"God knows we are doing everything we can to prevent events from leading to conflict," Mircha Snegur says.

"All our problems of an economic, social, cultural, and political nature can and will be resolved. But for this we need peace, calm in our common home, and mutual understanding."

What are the moods in the south? They were waiting for Gorbachev's address there, but when it came they did not find any support for the separatist ideas. I was informed from Komrat that the Gagauz population is not united today—many inhabitants of the Budzhak steppe believe that Moldavian integrity should be preserved. However, few people ever mention this aloud: Propagandist pressure from the supporters of separation is very tangible. But the overwhelming majority is deeply convinced of the lawfulness of its main and fundamental demands. These are the demands: to review some of the articles in the laws on language, to recognize the Gagauz right to self-determination, and to give urgent economic support to the areas of the Steppe south.

"This appeal for dialogue has come too late," was the comment in Komrat about the Moldavian president's address. Well, naturally it would have been better if it had been made earlier. But who has the right to let slip this chance—perhaps the last one—for two peoples not to become enemies and not to repeat the bitter lesson of Karabakh?

Communists Appeal for 'Reason'

LD2410164290 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Fedor Angeliy]

[Text] Kishinev October 24 TASS—The republican press today published the draft document "National Concord in Moldavia," compiled by the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party.

It was circulated for public discussion and submitted to the republican parliament for consideration.

The document notes that perestroika is now running into great difficulties, especially deteriorating ethnic relations.

No parliament, government or political party will be successful in pulling the republic out of the crisis without national concord, the document says.

The Central Committee calls on all Moldavian citizens to heed the voice of reason and common sense and to abandon any actions leading to confrontation.

The main thing now is to display wisdom and patience, to begin a dialogue and to conduct it patiently and persistently, the document stresses.

Gagauz Elections Begin

LD2510101790 Moscow TASS in English 0953 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Fedor Angeliy]

[Text] Kishinev October 25 TASS— Elections to the Supreme Soviet of a Gagauz Republic began in a number of populated areas in Moldavia's south at six a.m. today, earlier than planned.

A decision on an early election, originally scheduled for October 28, was taken on the night of Wednesday to Thursday by the provisional committee that proclaimed an independent republic in the region inhabited predominantly by Gagauzes.

The Moldavian parliament is known to have declared as unconstitutional the decision on the formation of a Gagauz republic, viewing it as a threat to the territorial integrity of Moldavia.

The situation is threatening to run out of control in view of the Moldavian population's strongly negative attitude to the actions of the Gagauzes and attempts by the Moldavian Popular Front to organise teams of volunteers to prevent elections.

The situation in the republic will be considered today at the Moldavian parliament's special session which is to open at midday.

Gagauz Leader Calls for Calm

LD2510123890 Moscow TASS in English 1155 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Report by MOLDOVA-PRESS-TASS correspondents Anatoliy Golya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev October 25 TASS—Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Gagauz republic, which proclaimed its independence from Moldavia, began in some areas ahead of schedule today.

The chairman of the presidium of the provisional committee of the Gagauz Republic, Stepan Topal, told MOLDOVA-PRESS that the presidium was beseiged last night by alarmed people from the city of Komrat, who had learned that the Moldavian People's Front was forming volunteer groups to block the Gagauz elections.

"These people demanded that the elections be moved up. Unfortunately, we failed to convince everyone, and the elections began spontaneously at 6:00 a.m. today in a number of villages," Topal said.

"The further development of events cannot be predicted. We have placed posts on roads leading to Komrat. They are not armed, but we are not sure whether or not civilians possess fire-arms.

"The provisional committee has urged people to display constraint and calm and, at the same time, is taking students out of the region."

The beginning of the emergency session of the Moldavian parliament has been postponed until this afternoon.

'Antiseparatist' Movement Set

LD2510124990 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Excerpts] The social and political crisis in the Republic of Moldova is growing explosive. [passage omitted] Moldova's authorities, meanwhile, have announced that a voluntary antiseparatist movement has been set up. A volunteers' manifestation has been reported from Kishinev. In an interview for our reporter, parliament's official spokesman has denied that it called ethnic Moldavians to take up arms. He said the manifestation called on Moldavians to protect the sovereignty of their republic.

Snegur Interviewed on Tensions in Moldavia

91UN0099B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 26 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic President M. Snegur by special SOYUZ correspondent S. Gamova; reprinted from SOYUZ No 38; place and date not given: "Mircha Snegur: The Republic Must Be Undivided"]

[Text] **A president has been elected—the first in the history of the Moldavian state. He is Mircha Ion Snegur who earlier headed the republic's Supreme Soviet.**

Mircha Snegur was born in 1940. He is a candidate of agricultural sciences. After 1981 he was involved in party work. He worked as secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova [Moldavia] Central Committee and then chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. On 3 September 1990 the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet elected him president.

[Gamova] Mircha Ivanovich, the idea of creating a presidency in the republic is not new. It has been discussed at various levels. But in any case the recent elections were not expected, at least not so soon. What is the reason for this?

[Snegur] The very fact that the republic has become a sovereign state speaks to the need for strengthening its leadership. In the first place, we needed efficient coordinating measures at a higher level in the organization of activities between the legislative organs and the executive power; in the second place, the declaration of sovereignty presupposes a strengthening of ties with the Union republics and other states. Special presidential powers are also necessary for this. I need not talk about responsibility—there is tremendous responsibility. If you look at it objectively, sooner or later we would have had to arrive at the institution of a presidency. Recent events have only hastened this process and impelled the parliament to make the decision now.

The situation is well-known: The sociopolitical situation has worsened drastically in connection with the decision of the Gagauz to form their own republic on the territory of the unified state of Moldova, as well as with the declaration on the left bank of the Dnestr of the Republic of the Moldavian Dnestr Region.

All of this has hastened the introduction of the post of president so that more efficient measures can be taken, and the president is allotted special powers. He has the right to dissolve soviets that conduct an anticonstitutional policy and the right to adopt edicts on citizenship. The question of military service is also under the jurisdiction of the president. I believe that we will have certain decrees on the service of youth in their own regions. Sometimes I am asked why we are using the term "national army." I believe that this is just quibbling over words. National does not at all mean that it will only be made up of people of Moldavian nationality. Citizens of Moldova will serve in it. We could just as well call it a republic army. But what would that change? For the time being it is all just an idea. But the government has been charged with conducting negotiations with the USSR Ministry of Defense.

For some reason there are some people who are also alienated by other new concepts entering our life. For instance, police and carabinieri. But if a municipal police force is being created in Moscow, why is this unacceptable for us? What are carabinieri? They are internal forces that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their function is to uphold order. Why was such a name chosen? In the first place it is closer to our language, and in the second place, so that we do not name this subunit the gendarmes or internal forces. Would either of these sound better?

But let us return to the subject of the post of president. For me personally, this is also an opportunity to free myself somewhat from the constant work in the parliament and to untie my hands.

Today the entire country is occupied with the discussion of the concept of a market economy. We have taken an active part in its development. We are pleased that the ideas of Moldavian economists and of our government have been taken into account by the group working on it. I have no doubt that the future favors the Shatalin concept. The basis of it is the economic cooperation of sovereign states.

[Gamova] That is to say reliance on horizontal ties and not on a central authority?

[Snegur] Absolutely. Ties with the republics. We already have an agreement ready to be signed with Russia (it has already been signed—editor's note). Thus we must consider such questions. At times I am blamed for devoting attention to some things and for neglecting others. Yes, I am abrupt with leaders and organizers of separatist movements, but that does not in any way carry over to the people who have fallen under their influence. A normal conversation with the leaders is only possible if they repudiate their ideas and if they conduct themselves reasonably. Not as they did at a recent rally in Tiraspol, where it was declared that negotiations are only possible if the entire leadership of the republic resigns. Of course we will not satisfy such whims of individual people.

[Gamova] Together with all the powers that the parliament has guaranteed it, the presidency is a mighty instrument of power. Is there not danger here? At least many people are asking whether this will be a step toward dictatorship.

[Snegur] I hope that all the readers of SOYUZ will understand that the introduction of a presidency in Moldova is not the beginning of a dictatorship. It is the creation of conditions to coordinate legislative activities with the activities of the executive organs. Concerning myself, I wish to say that if you consider the situation in which I must function as president, you will not envy me.

[Gamova] Mircha Ivanovich, in your opinion how must we build relations with the South and with the Left Bank?

[Snegur] It seems to me that some of the leaders of the Gagauz population and of the Dnestr region are beginning to understand that they have chosen the wrong path. Everything should be decided by finding reasonable compromises, not dictating. For instance, if Moldavians from the Dnestr region wish to read newspapers in Cyrillic type, we will give them that opportunity, primarily because the transition period established by law will last until 1996. By that time it will be possible to study both Latin script and the Moldavian language. Today we are moving toward compromise. Of course there are expenses as the result of our haste in implementing the law on the functioning of languages....

Concerning the political demands of the Gagauz, there is one alternative—cultural autonomy. Opening a national university and a school for managers, reviving the language—all this needs to be done and is being done. Recently the Moldavian minister of foreign affairs returned from a trip to Turkey having reached an agreement on teaching Gagauz boys and girls there.

There are also questions concerning the Left Bank. Unfortunately there have been incidents noted where doctors, for instance, write up documents only in the state language using Latin script; in other places there is something that is called everyday chauvinism. But all this can be corrected. It is not necessary to create a separate republic for this. We cannot set out to abolish the law on languages or abolish the state language on the territory of the Left Bank, especially when it is not the workers who are interested in this but the leaders who are obligated by law to know two languages.

On the whole, the situation continues to be complicated. The legislature has given the leaders of the Gagauz and the Left Bank region a week to repudiate their intentions. If they do not do this, we will take measures.

[Gamova] In that event will you use your right to dissolve the soviets?

[Snegur] Dissolution is an extreme measure. At the beginning we will halt the financing of the individual soviets that are breaking the laws of Moldova. Then we need to look at who belongs to these soviets and decide whether a conversation can be conducted with the deputies. If not, then we will use our right to dissolve the soviets in order to stabilize the situation. For the time being we will wait for reasonable actions on the part of the leaders who are in the majority and head the soviets at the local level.

Moldavian Premier Discusses Policies, Relations

AU2310213990 Berlin HORIZONT in German No 32/90 (signed to press on 9 Oct 90) pp 15-16

[Interview with Mircea Druc, premier of the Republic of Moldavia, by Dieter Hollmann, in Kishinev; date not given—"I Believe in Europe"]

[Text] [Hollmann] Mr. Premier, after the special session of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet in early September, the parliament again held a special session on 1 October. What was the reason for it?

[Druc] President Gorbachev asked us to discuss the various programs on the transition to the market and to comment on them. However, we already adopted a concept of our own three months ago. We support Shatalin's program. It is acceptable for Russia and most of it is also acceptble for us, while our special features must not be disregarded. Moreover, our political agreement with Russia on the principles of interstate relations was submitted to the parliament for ratification.

[Hollmann] What do you mean by specific features of the republic? Differences betweeen the concept of Moldavia and that of Shatalin are mentioned.

[Druc] This is not so much a matter of differences, for example in the privatization of agriculture. We are taking a somewhat different road because the problems of the Russian villages are completely different. There are no strategic differences. I stick to the opinion that privatization is the key question in the transition to the market. The matter has been politically settled, now we want to create the mechanism.

[Hollmann] When you talk of the market, do you mean a joint Soviet or a republican market?

[Druc] A common European market from the Atlantic to the Urals.

[Hollmann] One of the controversial points is whether a Union market exists.

[Druc] There cannot be a joint Soviet market without the common European or the international market. The world is indivisible, above all from the economic point of view. It is not necessary to invent anything.

[Hollmann] The problem has practical consequences. A joint Union market, joint laws, central orders, prices.... What about the sovereignty of your republic?

[Druc] There is the primacy of the sovereignty of all republics. Spain, Belgium, Germany, et cetera do not cease to exist because they are EC members. The same applies to us. We will join the Union market but the Ukraine, Moldavia, Russia... continue to exist. This is unavoidable. Compare it with Western Europe. This is the model.

[Hollmann] Moldavia already concluded cooperation contracts with several Union republics. How important is the 10-year contract which has now been concluded with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic?

[Druc] It is of great theoretical and practical importance because it shows how one proceeds from words to deeds. It shows that we have to move in a horizontal direction and not toward a hierarchy and a command system. We must now decide on concrete questions of an exchange with the republics, regions, and enterprises. The contract gives legal certainty so that the Russian and Moldavian enterpreneurs can conclude mutually advantageous and long-term contracts.

[Hollmann] What functions will remain in the Union if the relations are horizontally developed?

[Druc] The Union may think about this. It must solve specific tasks—there is for example Kirgizia. Its 1990 trade with us is at a specific level. Can this level be maintained in the future? Well, we could even raise it. Or: Russia has a certain demand. Can Moldavia satisfy it? What do we need from there? Thus a contract is concluded. We have found a common language and help each other.

[Hollmann] Does the USSR have a future?

[Druc] I see, and this is my private opinion, a future like that of Western Europe—the integration of the USSR, Russia, and East Europe into the continent. In this way the Soviet Union will completely change.

I believe in the idea of a common Europe, and by the way I want to cordially congratulate you on Germany's unification. I have seen it coming for 25 years. I think that there is no longer a barrier between East and Western Europe and I also do not understand why there should be one with the Soviet Union.

[Hollmann] What would you call the society that is to develop in Moldavia?

[Druc] I already abandoned terms like "socialist," "capitalist," or "class struggle" in my youth. Today this is nonsense. We cannot go into the 21st century with such a burden. We need a reasonable society, a society in which the living creature is in the foreground and is followed by the environment, and the "homo economicus" only ranks third. I do not want to use the term "postindustrial." But there will be a "later" society, a completely different one and in any case a democratic one.

[Hollmann] Germany's unification is completed. What do you expect from it?

[Druc] I hope for close cooperation and that a German culture center, for example, will soon be established in Kishinev. Germany is an economic power. We want to be a partner who cooperates with it. Above all the agricultural sector comes into consideration. With the right stimulation, our agriculture could perform miracles. We could provide supplies for Moldavia, Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Siberia, and so on. We also have to move with our products in the direction of the Pacific. However, technical re-equipment is required for this. Existing facilities are morally worn-out and there is no adequate processing industry and infrastructure.

[Hollmann] Another question. For five decades the official language of the region was Moldavian. But now Romanian is professed. It is difficult for outsiders to unravel the Romanian-Moldavian tangle.

[Druc] There is a Soviet Moldavia with 4 million inhabitants and a Romanian Moldavia on the other side of the Prut with 8 million inhabitants. Romania consists of several historical regions, as Germany consists of several laender. One of them is Moldavia. Its inhabitants are Moldavians and Romanians at the same time, as a Bavarian is also a German. In 1812 Moldavia was separated from czarist Russia. Today there is one nation and two states: Romania with its capital in Bucharest and Moldavia with Kishinev. But we are ethnically one nation.

[Hollmann] Is unification near?

[Druc] This task does not exist. There is now a special European integration. We established an air connection with Frankfurt/Main via Romania. And if we want to go "on foot" to Europe, we will have to cross Romania anyway.

Moldavian Deputies Address Gagauz Population

91UN0099A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 26 Sep 90 p 3

["Appeal to the Gagauz Population by Deputies of all Levels from Basarabyaskiy, Vulkeneshtskiy, Komratskiy, Tarakliyskiy, and Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayons"]

[Text] We—participants of the assembly of deputies of all levels from Basarabyaskiy, Vulkeneshtskiy, Komratskiy, Tarakliyskiy, and Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayons—are deeply alarmed by the sociopolitical situation existing in the Republic of Moldova [Moldavia] that is leading to confrontation between the people of various nationalities residing on this plot of land. We are firmly convinced that the steps that have been taken and the ruling of the "provisional committee" from Komrat do not express the will and aspirations of the entire Gagauz population, but only of individual provocateurs who are scheming anticonstitutional plans.

People of good will belonging to the Gagauz population! Think soberly and take off the blinders put on you by the leaders of the former movement "Gagauz Khalky." Let us unite all our efforts in the interests of consolidation and mutual understanding in our country of Moldova, which will prosper and flourish only as a sovereign state. The reason for the social opposition of peoples residing in the republic is not the laws on languages, which you view as discriminatory. In order to achieve their basic goals, the provocateurs lead you astray with empty promises, disparaging the Moldavian people to you. Do not believe in the statements of individual separatists who insist everywhere that the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] wishes to secede from the USSR and unite with Romania. M.I. Snegur, president of the Moldova SSR, has repeatedly declared that we are not trying to unite with Romania but rather to create a truly sovereign republic.

You are first-hand witnesses to the fact that the separatist leaders from Tiraspol and Komrat are prepared for anything—economic sabotage, dismemberment of the territory of the republic, and even bloodletting. Moldavians have forgiven and do forgive much, but they will not forgive anyone the division of their ancient land. The time has come when we all, independent of our social and ethnic background, should prove that we are genuine patriots of that land which we inhabit.

We are counting on your wisdom, tolerance, and good will in this time that is so difficult for all of us.

Respected Gagauz! Make your voice—the voice of reason—heard by those who are leading you astray so that they will understand your thoughts and aspirations. Do not permit them to cloud your future and push you to actions that may prove fateful for all of us.

The text of the appeal was adopted at an assembly of deputies of all levels from Basarabyaskiy, Vulkeneshtskiy, Komratskiy, Tarakliyskiy, and Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayons on 23 September 1990.
The village of Sadakliya, Basarabyaskiy Rayon.

Ukraine Supreme Soviet Amends Constitution

LD2410183290 Moscow TASS in English 1805 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Report by UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Stanislav Volnyanskiy]

[Text] Kiev October 24 TASS—The Ukrainian parliament today approved over 20 amendments to the republican constitution, which included dropping the clause on the leading role of the Communist Party and allowing a multi-party system.

The Supreme Soviet legislature also proclaimed the precedence of republican laws over federal ones, which will now only enter into force in the Ukraine after being ratified by its parliament.

One adopted amendment calls for creating a constitutional court.

The parliament formed a commission to draw up a new constitution, which will be offered for grass-roots discussion next year. The commission is led by President Leonid Kravchuk.

The amendments were made following several days of stormy debates both in Supreme Soviet committees and at full-scale parliamentary sittings.

Lvov 7 Nov Parade Moved From City Center

LD2310154190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 23 Oct 90

[Text] Seven and eight November have been declared ordinary working days in Lvov. This is the decision of the presidium of the executive committee of the city soviet. Leaders of enterprises and councils of labor collectives have been given the right to examine that question independently.

However, the traditional military parade and honor of the anniversary of the October Revolution will not take place in the center of the city as before, but near the monument to the Glory of the Soviet Army.

Rukh Party Holds Convention, Leader Resigns

LD2510091290 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 25 Oct 90

[Text] The current convention of the Ukraine's largest public movement, Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], has opened in the Ukrainian capital Kiev with the participation of over 2,000 deputies.

Talking at the convention, the movement's leader Ivan Drach revealed that he is resigning to pursue an exclusively parliamentary career. (?Mikhail Gorin) is expected to replace him as Rukh's chairman.

Analysts see the replacement as a sign of Rukh's further radicalization. The movement calls for the Ukraine's secession from the Soviet Union and the political removal of the Communist Party.

Ukrainian Nationalists' Agenda Hampering Democracy

PM2510095790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent V. Drozd under the general heading "Noose"]

[Text] Lvov—Three days of events have been held in Ternopol Oblast, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, and Lvov Oblast to mark the anniversary of S. Bandera's death: Church services, a well organized pilgrimage to the place where he was born and where a monument to him has been erected, marches, and rallies. Before all this, former members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UIA) assembled for rallies of their own. Leaders of the city soviet and Ukrainian and USSR people's deputies met them in Lvov.

Several local newspapers responded to the events. It is disappointing, of course, that they had to drag out 30-year-old quotations from a transatlantic newspaper to assess S. Bandera's character. It is also regrettable that experts and writers in the region still have not told the whole truth about the Bandera movement. After all, Bandera and many of those under his banners were not the same kind of people at all. How unjust it is that the same name is still given to the militants and to those whom they turned into their assistants by force and on pain of death, and often at the cost of their relatives' lives. Experts and writers should help people to understand who is who in the OUN-UIA. The older generation is guarded in its response to the blue and yellow and black and red banners fluttering all over the place. You may remember that Bandera's principle—"Enough, our power must be formidable"—was put into practice under these banners. That is how that power—which left behind it thousands of graves, orphans, and people made destitute—is remembered. The fear still haunts many today, decades later. That is why the OUN-UIA directed its address at young people. They only know of its crimes by hearsay. And the external attributes are attractive to many. The OUN-UIA counted on this, coupled with youthful enthusiasm to stand up for a sovereign Ukraine, in its address to young people.

The Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] area council was quick to pass its own resolution. Blatantly ignoring an earlier agreement among political forces to support the city soviet in the solution of vital problems, Rukh quite categorically began to recommend who should do what: All party committees should be picketed in working hours, a Ukrainian general strike should be organized, the oblast soviet should call an emergency session to discuss the question of decommunizing and nationalizing CPSU and Komsomol property, and the city soviet should likewise call an emergency session to discuss the question of banning the 7 November celebrations. Rukh branches abroad were told to organize picketing of our country's diplomatic missions.

It is obvious why the OUN-UIA has turned its gaze on young people: to ensure that there is someone to pick up the banner of its struggle. But why has Rukh gone to such great lengths? Apparently, it too has young people's best interests at heart. Particularly the interests of the students on hunger strike in Kiev. Really, is there any limit to some politicians' hypocrisy? Back in the summer, Rukh and the People's Council put forward demands which are amazingly in keeping with the students' claims. The insistence being shown by Rukh and the People's Council is understandable. As expected, there has been no response to their call for a Ukrainian general strike. They have also failed to wreck the work of the Supreme Soviet. So now they have resorted to extreme methods of attaining their objectives.

The politicians are in a hurry. After all, the republic's parliament is making slow—thanks to endless obstruction from the People's Council—but sure progress toward establishing stability, calm, and harmonious work in the republic. But this does not enter into the calculations of Rukh and the People's Council. They want undivided power, and now. As parliament heard recently, they want to destroy the last Communist regime in Europe. And for this, apparently, all methods are acceptable.

...One terrible instrument of death used by Bandera and his followers was the noose. I do not think there is any need to explain its purpose. The present actions of some of the leaders of Rukh and the People's Council strongly resemble a noose which they have prepared to slip round the neck of democracy....

'Ukrainian Insurrection Army' Commemorated

91UN0108B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy: "In Honor of...S. Bandera"]

[Text] This past Sunday was rich in political events in the Western Ukraine. The noisiest show of the day was probably in Ivano-Frankovsk where the so-called Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth [SNUM] were celebrating an "anniversary" of the "Ukrainian Insurrection Army" ["UPA"], as well as the day of Stepan Bandera's death.

It was not only Ivano-Frankovsk that prepared for this day. There were also numerous visitors from the Lvov, Ternopol, Volyn, and other oblasts.

It must be mentioned that attempts have been made for a long time to restore the prestige of Bandera and his minions in the western part of the republic. At one of the rallies this summer, O. Vitovich, the SNUM activist, declared that "the ideas Stepan Bandera fought for are just as crucial now. These are the ideas of turning the Ukrainian revolutionary movement nationalistic. We, the young generation of nationalists, are going to make use of these ideas."

Similar revelations could be heard also at the "events" in Ivano-Frankovsk. There was the same justification of terrorism that had been a frequent weapon of the Bandera gangs. The participants insisted that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] leaders simply did not have any other way out.

The former UPA warriors wrote down in their resolution that they stood for the creation of an independent Ukrainian, popular rule, state; they demanded realization of the declaration on the state sovereignty of the Ukraine immediately; they demanded its complete economic and political independence; they expressed their wish that the citizens of the republic serve their terms in the military on the territory of the republic exclusively; and they spoke of a gradual establishment of the "Ukrainian armed forces."

At the same time they spoke decisively against the Ukraine signing the new Union agreement. O. Dychkivskiy said at the meeting of former UPA members that these former OUN soldiers were still ready, in spite of their age, "to continue the national liberation fight."

These "soldiers" donned the uniforms they wore in the 1940's and 1950's and marched in columns along the city streets. On the same day, they visited the village of Stary Ugryniv in the Kalushskiy rayon—Bandera's home. A bust, decorated with a trident, was unveiled near the house where the OUN leader was born.

Lenin Monuments Vandalized Throughout Crimea

91UN0108A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel A. Yurkin: "Attacked by Vandals"]

[Text] An explosion destroyed a monument to V.I. Lenin in Feodosiya. The investigation is continuing. But the criminals will hardly be found, said Valentina Grigoryevna Levina, CPSU city party committee secretary.

Recently acts of vandalism occur in the Crimean cities more and more often. Somebody poured black paint over a monument to the leader of the revolution in Dzhankoi. People's deputies of the Kerch city soviet appealed to the residents of the hero-city to protect V.I. Lenin from vandalism. A meeting was held in the theater imeni A.S. Pushkin where the working people of Kerch demanded a stop to the desecration of monuments and prevention of anti-democratic actions.

Meetings are being held in other Crimean cities also. Their participants say that the acts of vandalism are being organized by the leaders of the Ukrainian Republican party and of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka, and by the nationalistic elements from the Crimean Tatars' ethnic movement who joined forces with them.

Belorussia Citizenship Bill To Be Revised

LD2410182990 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondents Vladimir Bogdanov and Aleksandr Kryzhanovskiy]

[Text] Minsk October 24 TASS—The Belorussian parliament has started debating a bill on Belorussian citizenship, which figures on its agenda as a key legal act necessitated by the republic's transition to a market economy. Two alternative texts were submitted—one by the government and the other by the opposition Belorussian People's Front.

They have only two different articles, but the contradictions they contain rule out any compromise. The government proceeds from the existing realities—Belorussia is a part of the Soviet Union and two constitutions are in force in the republic. Therefore, the bill must be based on them.

The main controversy was triggered by the principle of dual citizenship for Belorussians and equal rights and obligations for citizens of all Soviet republics on its territory. Not only individual deputies, but some standing commissions objected to it. They believe this principle contradicts the declaration on Belorussia's state sovereignty and fails to guarantee the economic interests of its citizens during the republic's switchover to a market economy.

The opposition backed the following principle: Everybody who permanently resides in the republic at the time the bill is approved, irrespective of nationality, race, property, social status or other circumstances, is entitled to Belorussian citizenship. There are restrictions for people who apply for citizenship after the law is approved. They will be required to know the Belorussian language and the republic's laws, to have a lawful source of subsistence, to live in the republic for at least seven years. These requirements met opposition among advocates of the government project.

The opposition's draft won more votes than the government's for the first time in the history of the Belorussian parliament, but their number was not enough to approve the bill's first reading. It will have to undergo further revision.

Caucasus

Troops Kill Man in Nagorno-Karabakh Shoot-Out

LD2410174990 Moscow TASS in English 1718 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] Stepanakert October 24 TASS—One man was killed and another gravely injured by Interior-Ministry troops in a shoot-out during a security sweep in a village in the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh today, officers at the area's military headquarters told TASS.

The troops were checking identity cards and looking for arms caches in the village of Kadzhavan, Mardakert district, when they came under attack and had to return fire. The servicemen suffered no casualties.

The sweep resulted in the discovery of some hidden arms, including automatic weapons, and several arrests.

The troops also liberated four Azeris held hostage in the village.

The fate of seven Armenians taken hostage over the past few days remains unknown.

Captured Nagorno-Karabakh Weapons Displayed

LD2410205690 Moscow TASS in English 1943 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By AZERINFORM-TASS correspondent Viktor Shulmanov]

[Text] Baku October 24 TASS—Combat and home-made weapons and a lot of ammunition seized in Armenian communities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region during the past three days were exhibited at an unusual exposition which opened in Stepanakert today.

Housed at the commandant's office, the display shows ill intentions of people coming out, arms in hand, for the accession of this Azerbaijanian Autonomous Region to Armenia, a neighbouring Transcaucasian republic. Exhibits include even a guided missile.

Impressive is a cache of weapons captured at the flat of a cooperative restaurant manager in Gadrut, a district centre in the region, two days ago: home-made submachine-guns, an army carbine, various ammunition, a fixed radio station with a radio telephone for a car.

The headquarters of an Interior Ministry task force which is investigating this case, reported that the task force also instituted criminal proceedings against a Stepanakert resident who made blanks for pistols at a Stepanakert enterprise.

Thanks to Interior Ministry troops, weapons displayed at the exposition will not be used against the Azerbaijani population.

Draft Problems Foreseen in Nakhichevan ASSR

PM2410192090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin: "Draft May Be Disrupted"]

[Excerpts] Nakhichevan—Following an agreement with the USSR Defense Ministry, the USSR KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on the one hand and the Railroad Troops Directorate on the other, a resolution has been adopted stating that 50 percent of the total planned number of draftees for fall 1990 will serve on the republic's territory. [passage omitted]

I met with Lieutenant Colonel Kh. Balayev, deputy military commissar of the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], and asked him to comment on this resolution in the context of the draft campaign in the autonomous republic.

"Unfortunately," Khosrov Alidzhabarovich said, "even this undoubtedly correct decision by the government has not substantially affected the mood of our draftees and their parents. The continuing tension in regions bordering Armenia—and in terms of its geographic position the entire autonomous republic is essentially such a region—remains very high and explosive. Under these conditions young people do not want to leave their villages or their relatives to the whim of fate. The people have less and less confidence in state organs and their ability to stop the attacks from the Armenian side."

There is another factor too. There are increasing cases of Nakhichevan people returning home from military units without authorization. There are currently around 50 such fugitives in our republic. They all said that the reason for their return was the taunting they had received from their fellow servicemen, as well as the problems that have arisen on ethnic grounds. This fact is also leaving its mark on the draft.

The military commissariat staffers showed me four bulging files compiled this year alone and containing several hundred telegrams sent by the military commissariat to military unit commanders asking them to at least briefly report on how people from Nakhichevan are serving. Only around 15 commanders replied to these telegrams.

According to forecasts from the military commissariat staffers, more than half the draftees may not turn up at draft centers. And this despite the fact that military commissariat staffers are conducting explanatory work in literally every draftee's family. A typical detail is that in all 22 cases of draft-dodging during the fall draft the republic prosecutor's office has refused to institute criminal proceedings.

Aliyev's Azerbaijan Election Success Examined

PM2410172090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 42, 16-22 Oct 90 p 8

[Article by Marina Shakina: "Geydar Aliyev Comes Back. In Nakichevan, Electors Bring the Former Boss of Azerbaijan Back to the Political Scene"]

[Text] With the elections in Azerbaijan over, passions are still running high there. Hundreds of complaints have accumulated in the Central Electoral Commission. Independent observers from other republics, who have found, by hook or by crook, their way to Baku (closed on the eve of the elections by Colonel Buniyatov, the military commandant who failed in the parliamentary elections) testify to numerous violations of the election law. The majlis of Azerbaijan's National Front insists that the new Supreme Soviet should not be recognized until all the complaints are looked into. In a number of constituencies no candidate emerged victorious, so a second round of elections, or even runoffs, will have to be held in some places. In the atmosphere of utter uncertainty, one thing was definite: Geydar Aliyev, a former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee now retired, has won 95 percent of the vote in his native Nakhichevan. Although few people in Azerbaijan doubted the prospect of the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Republic's Communist Party winning a landslide, the phenomenon of Aliyev's comeback calls for an explanation.

A bearer of two Hero of Socialist Labour stars, Geydar Aliyev was regarded as a close associate of Brezhnev's, reponsible, along with his chief, for the mess the country has found itself in. Until quite recently, the derogatory term "Aliyevism" was current in the national press. A long list of charges proferred against him ranged from securing, by fraudulent means, an exemption from the draft during the Great Patriotic War, to corruption, nepotism and abuse of power....

In Azerbaijan proper, popular attitude to Aliyev varies. The National Front and the Social Democratic Party hold Aliyev guilty for the crisis which hit the Republic; others regard him as a strong and competent leader under whom life was quite tolerable. In 1969, after Aliyev had been promoted from the KGB chief to the party boss of the Republic, delegations came over from many parts of the country—from Moscow even—to see how the young Baku leader was putting things in order. There is another aspect to this, too. Known for his proneness to give preference to men from his native part of Azerbaijan when selecting executive personnel, Aliyev retains influence among the people of Nakhichevan who owe him their dizzy careers. This is not surprising at all. They say that at the time when Aliyev was first Secretary of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan's Communist Party, people who knew on which side their bread was buttered sought to live in Nakhichevan for a couple of years at least so as to secure a chance of getting a promotion and making a political or government career for themselves. Besides, Aliyev, whatever his human qualities, used to be the right hand of the Man at the Helm which, in itself, made him a local celebrity like Stalin in Georgia or even Napoleon in France (to quote the representatives of the national Front and the Social Democratic party of Azerbaijan I spoke with), a living symbol of the greatness of the republic and of Nakhichevan. No matter what accusations might be heaped on him in Moscow or even in Baku, in his native Nakhichevan he has, without a doubt, been entered on the list of "outstanding local personalities."

How has Aliyev's success been taken in Azerbaijan? The National Front and the Social Democratic Party stress that his triumph was an exclusively Nakhichevan phenomenon and that he cannot expect to enjoy Republic-wide popularity. Many suspect that Aliyev has Moscow's backing. Azerbaijanis cannot forget the fact that Aliyev was pensioned off only when perestroika was in its third year. The two years during which Aliyev remained a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers did not add to the Azerbaijanian democratic forces' trust in the centre. Recently, a Central Television news commentator likened Aliyev to Yeltsin, which is interpreted in Azerbaijan as a sign of Moscow's approval.

And what about Aliyev himself? While campaigning for votes he took the sentiments of the masses into account. These sentiments were determined by the Karabakh problem, by people feeling sick and tired of years of ethnic tensions often exploding into armed clashes, by Nakhichevan being cut off from the rest of Azerbaijan. Emphasizing the need for Azerbaijan's independence, Aliyev says he would not allow all this to happen if he were in power, that he would suggest many useful ideas and the way to deal with the Popular Front.... Azerbaijanian democratic forces do not think Aliyev stands much of a chance at the republican level and say the most he can hope for is to get elected President of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. These forecasts are substantiated by statements ranging from "the centre will not let Aliyev gain too much power" to "he is not popular in Azerbaijan." Still, nostalgia for "order", for a "strong personality", which has by now spread nationwide, may become tangible in this republic exhausted by internal strife and external conflicts.

Geydar Aliyev claims he has nothing to reproach himself with. Says he: "I've been an honest man all my life. I have always been upholding a party member's good name. Had I been given a chance to make a fresh start, I would have chosen the same road."

Foreign Specialists To Observe Georgian Elections

PM2410161590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Besik Urigashvili under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Monitored Elections"]

[Text] Tbilisi—Eminent specialists in the spheres of law, political scientists, and lawyers specializing in human rights from the United States, Belgium, France, and Austria will give consultative assistance during the elections in Georgia, and will partly fulfill the role of international observers.

"All their findings and conclusions will be recorded and will become known to the international community. It is important for us that the world knows about the conditions in which the first multiparty elections in 70 years are taking place," G. Dzhavakhishvili, the republic foreign minister, said. "I hope that this will be the genuinely free expression of the people's will without any pressure from any side."

Official UN observers will not take part in the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet. This was announced to the Georgian minister at the United Nations Vienna branch, where he had talks on this question on the instructions of the republic's central electoral commission. The basis for the refusal is a UN resolution under which official observers are only sent to states that belong to this organization.

Issues of 'Round Table-Free Georgia' Detailed

LD2410193190 Moscow TASS in English 1549 GMT 24 Oct 90

[By TASS special correspondent Igor Gvritishviliy]

[Text] Tbilisi October 24 TASS—The "Round-Table-Free Georgia" bloc seeks "to restore Georgia's independent statehood by peaceful political struggle, by founding a national parliament and by drafting national constitution and legislation", according to the political and economic platforms the bloc released today.

The bloc was set up in April 1990. It groups radical-democratic opposition—a total of several political parties and organisations. Recent public opinion polls show that alongside the Georgian Communist Party, the "Round-Table" is one of the real contenders in elections to the Supreme Soviet of this Transcaucasian Soviet republic, which are scheduled for October 28.

The programme of the "Round-Table", which is headed by possibly the most popular leader of the Georgain opposition Zviad Gamsakhurdia, points out that civil disobedience and parliamentary struggle "are the two sides of a single strategy, which should bring about the restoration of Georgia's state independence".

The programme provides for the new Georgaian parliament's recognition of the "illegitimacy" of Soviet power in Georgia, the suspension of the constitutions of the USSR and the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] on the entire territory of the republic and the international recognition of Georgia's present status as "an annexed state".

In the economy, the "Round Table" gives preference to free enterprise and private ownership.

Georgian Congress Not 'Parallel Authority'

PM2410190190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Besik Urigashvili under the "Direct Line" rubric: "National Congress Elected"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The results of the Georgian National Congress elections have been announced.

The Central Electoral Commission for the Elections to Congress announced that a little over one-half of the republic's electorate participated in them. Thus, the Central Electoral Commission statement says, according to the law on elections, the congress is deemed elected.

The leaders of the parties that participated in the elections have repeatedly stated that the congress does not aspire to the role of a parallel authority and merely assumes the functions of the coordinating body of the Georgian national liberation movement. According to them, the congress intends to cooperate with the future republican Supreme Soviet if the Supreme Soviet's decisions accord with the interests of the Georgian people and the national liberation movement.

In the opinion of one eminent representative of the "Democratic Georgia" bloc, the philosopher Merab Mamradashvili, the congress is also necessary as a counterweight to a potential usurpation of power in the future Supreme Soviet and the establishment of an authoritarian dictatorship.

The "Democratic Georgia" bloc and also the People's Party are participants in the republican Supreme Soviet elections as well as the national congress elections.

No Support for Georgia Anti-Army Incident Seen

PM2410202290 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel V. Kaushanskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "People Did Not Give Their Support"]

[Text] Georgia—The telephone at the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA office in Tbilisi was red-hot on Monday. The reason being Sunday's commentary entitled "'Guests' at the Officers' Institute." Readers inquired whether the threat to the cultural establishment's personnel has passed following the lifting of the blockade on the building and—this was the main thing—when provocative outbursts against the military in the republic would stop. I have difficulty in answering the second question, it should be put to the leaders of the National Independence Party, the organizer and inspiration behind such

actions. It proved impossible to make a telephone call from Tbilisi to the Officers' Institute at the "N" garrison in Western Georgia: The "guests" had severed the telephone lines before the capture. I had to avail myself of the latest information provided by the operational group led by Lieutenant Colonel V. Barabanov:

"As is well known, we raised the blockade on the Officers' Institute by our own efforts, but passions are still hotting up around it. The facade of the building is covered with graffiti insulting servicemen and the tarmac by the main entrance is strewn with torn pieces of military service cards. A tent has been pitched to house the pickets' headquarters. A loudspeaker unit has been brought up to the building, so another performance from the traditional anti-Army repertoire can obviously be expected. Roughly 200 people are crowded there. But the townspeople did not back this action and have taken a sharply condemnatory attitude toward it."

All the people are familiar, and so are the methods. I recalled the summer attempt to capture the Tbilisi District Officers' Institute. And the continuing threats from National Independence Party leaders to carry out this action in the Georgian capital at any cost. Is this the dress rehearsal then? Particularly since law-enforcement organs are not preventing it from occurring.

Central Asia

Issues Facing Kirghiz Supreme Soviet Outlined

PM2410190990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent G. Shipitko: "Kirghizia: Extraordinary Session"]

[Text] Frunze—An extraordinary session of the republic's Supreme Soviet opened 22 October. The deputies will discuss very important matters determining the state system and ways of effecting economic development in Kirghizia.

Since the first session many events have influenced the course of development of political processes in the republic. The Osh tragedy, during which hundreds of lives were lost in interethnic conflict, occupies a special place among them. Even today, four months on, many questions remain unanswered. The deputies have first of all to give a political assessment and identify the causes and the culprits, as demanded by the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities decision.

The second reality that has to be faced is the appearance on the political scene of various movements which base their activities on the solution of ethnic questions. Finally, there is the confrontation that has occurred in the republican parliament itself. Some 114 deputies—one-third of the Supreme Soviet—have united "in order to radicalize the processes of democratic renewal in the republic," as they stated in their program document. The subsequent statement by the group of Osh deputies agreeing with the republican leadership's stance only aggravated the confrontation in the Supreme Soviet. The republican Communist Party is prepared to defend its position, of course.

It was in these conditions that the deputies started their work. I would not predict to what extent they can achieve a compromise in the interests of the cause. The program documents of the forces represented in parliament are in some cases very different.

On the draft law on state sovereignty alone there are seven documents to choose from. The working commission at the republic's Council of Ministers and the representatives of the "Kyrgyzstan" democratic movement regard the creation of the republic's own financial credit, banking, currency, customs, and tax system and the creation of its own monetary units as essential. More moderate solutions are proposed in the republican Supreme Soviet Presidium's draft. Although the draft retains the right of the legislative organ of Kirghizia to suspend union acts that "infringe its sovereign rights."

The session will also examine the question of instituting the post of president and the question of citizenship and will discuss the government program for the stabilization of the economy and transition to market relations. It is difficult to say what kind of program the republic's parliament will outline. But it is perfectly clear that the republican leadership's statement on the choice of the Union government's program was hasty and will not meet with support among the deputies, given the current political diversity and instability in Kirghizia.

Economic Transition Discussed

LD2410122690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 24 Oct 90

[Text] The discussion of the program for the stabilization of the republic's national economy and the transition to a market economy has concluded at the session of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. The deputies adopted a decision approving the economic machinery for the transition to the market, taking account of comments and amendments. The question of an office of president was considered at today's sitting. Despite heated debates a majority of the deputies spoke in favour of instituting a presidency. Proper decisions will also have to be made on this issue.

Baluchi Tribes Seek Refuge in Turkmen SSR

91P50013A Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by M. Pereplesnin; "They Crossed the Border"]

[Text] At the junction of the borders of the USSR, Afghanistan, and Iran, two thousand people crossed over to Soviet territory from the Afghan side. These people are principally representatives of the Baluchi tribes.

The border crossing took place under fire. The Afghan refugees had to repel an attack by the mujahidin who pursued them. The result was that representatives of five tribes with their families, household goods, and livestock numbering 16 thousand head ended up on Soviet territory in the Serakhs region of the Turkmen SSR.

"We were forced to abandon our lands under threat of complete annihilation," declared Abdul-Haq, the leader of the tribal formations. "The mujahidin began to persecute our tribes because we have been supporting the Kabul goverment. Our crops were burned, our homes destroyed, and our relatives killed."

After crossing the border, the Baluchi tribes handed their weapons over to the Soviet border guards. The refugees, among whom were many women and children, were given medical assistance and food. In accordance with the wishes of the refugees, their transport through USSR territory to the regions of northern Afghanistan where their tribesmen reside has begun. The refugees have appealed to the Afghan government to facilitate a return to their native lands as soon as possible.